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We have many different ways of offering advice or suggesting a course of action:
issuing a direct order, asking a question, stating a fact in the world or even point-
edly looking at something can all serve as clues that something should be done.
This dissertation explores a use of the subjunctive in German which also serves
to give advice or make a tentative offer. This use has not received attention in the
formal semantics literature, and it goes against much of what we believe we know











‘There is pizza in the fridge.’
The meaning of (1) is glossed here with an indicative: there is pizza in the
fridge. This is not a typo. A speaker can only felicitously utter (1) if he or she
is committed to the truth of the proposition there is pizza in the fridge in the
actual world, much the same as if he or she had used an indicative instead. In this
respect, free factive subjunctives differ substantially from more familiar uses of
the subjunctive: usually subjunctives are used to express the speaker’s uncertainty
about the truth of the embedded proposition. German seems to be fairly unique in
allowing the subjunctive to appear in contexts where the speaker is committed to
the truth of the embedded proposition.
The effect that using a free factive subjunctive has can best be described as giv-
ing tentative, hidden advice: a speaker who uses (1) does not advise or recommend
eating the pizza, but by using the free factive subjunctive, she is suggesting that
eating the pizza may be a good way to move forward.
In this dissertation I set out to first provide a collection of data: how productive
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is this construction? Can it occur in embedded contexts? Can it occur anywhere
that we expect an indicative to occur? Then I investigate some broader questions:
how does the free factive subjunctive interact with other parts of meaning? And
most importantly: what does it mean itself?
I will show that using free factive subjunctives has to do with giving advice.
They convey that the speaker has a good idea of what to do next, but does not
want to appear pushy. Intuitively, free factive subjunctives are used whenever the
speaker conveys, ‘there is an opportunity here, but it is up to you to use it!’
This makes free factive subjunctives very different at once from both indicatives
and other uses of the subjunctive: both the reportative and the irrealis use of the
subjunctive, rather than conveying that the speaker is committed to the truth of
the expressed proposition, typically convey that the speaker is not convinced of its
truth. The indicative, on the other hand, is lacking the additional layer of meaning
conveying that there is an ‘opportunity’. Where indicatives describe, free factive
subjunctives give (tentative) advice and egg the addressee on to take advantage of
an opportunity.
The dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter 1, I give an overview of
the data. I discuss different uses of the subjunctive in German and how they have
been described in the descriptive literature. I also give the first – to my knowledge
– comprehensive description of the free factive subjunctive and which contexts it
can and cannot occur in.
Chapter 2 discusses the relevant literature on mood within formal semantics. We
will quickly see that none of the existing accounts can be extended to explain the
phenomenon of the free factive subjunctive because they either hardwire a ‘weak
commitment’ component into the semantics or postulate a competition with the
indicative. Neither is the case for the free factive subjunctive. The chapter also
gives a brief overview over the frameworks of intensional semantics and decision
theory.
In chapter 3 I argue that the contribution of the free factive subjunctive is in
fact threefold: I show that it has a non-at-issue component, and that it has two
presuppositions.
Chapter 4 formalizes the proposal. I show how the free factive subjunctive fits
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into a multi-dimensional semantics and how it interacts with operators such as
negation and tense.
Chapter 5 branches out and, after briefly discussing an alternative analysis of
free factive subjunctives as relevance conditionals with a hidden antecedent and
dismissing this analysis, I take a closer look at relevance conditionals. I propose
that there are two types of relevance conditionals: those that can co-occur with
past reference and those that cannot. I show that this poses a problem for tradi-
tional theories of relevance conditionals, but then show a way out.




The present chapter introduces the phenomenon of the free factive subjunctive
in German. However, because this construction has not received attention in the
literature before, section 1.1 first looks more broadly at the German subjunctive
paradigm (the forms Konjunktiv I and Konjunktiv II) and the different uses of both
forms that have been identified in the descriptive literature. Section 1.2 zooms in
on descriptions of the free factive use of the subjunctive to the extent that they
exist.
Using these insights as a starting point, section 1.3 introduces a working def-
inition of the notion of free factive subjunctives which helps determine whether
a particular use of the subjunctive is a free factive one or not. Finally, sections
1.4 and 1.5 provide a systematic discussion of the free factive subjunctive data, an
intuitive first stab at a generalization regarding its meaning, and a (pre-theoretic)
overview over the kinds of contexts that the free factive subjunctive can be used
in. Readers who are only interested in the free factive subjunctive, but not the
other uses, should skip ahead to section 1.2.
1.1 The Subjunctive in German
German has two paradigms of subjunctive marking, the Konjunktiv I and Konjunk-
tiv II. The classification of Palmer (2006) distinguishes between subjunctives and
irrealis moods, with subjunctives being found more frequently in Indo-European
5
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languages, while irrealis moods are found more frequently in Amerindian and
Papuan languages. Palmer suggests both subjunctives and irrealis moods have
basically the same function, namely signalling ‘non-assertion’. However, they
differ in their distribution and syntactic properties. Subjunctives typically have
their own paradigm, whereas irrealis mood is simply marked with a single ele-
ment. Subjunctives are also more often selected by embedding verbs, whereas ir-
realis mood often occurs in certain sentence types (such as questions or utterances
about the future). Because the German Konjunktiv has its own paradigm and is
not tied to any particular sentence type, it is more similar to the category of sub-
junctive. But it differs from e.g. Romance subjunctives in certain important ways
to be discussed below. For now, it is important to note that while the subjunctive
in Romance is always selected by an embedding construction (resulting in an un-
grammatical construction if no subjunctive is used with those constructions), the
Konjunktiv in German is never obligatory – it is always chosen for semantic effect
(cf. Giannakidou t.a. for a typology of selected subjunctives vs. subjunctives of
choice; also cf. Schlenker 2005 who suggests that only the Romance subjunctive
is a ‘true’ subjunctive).
Like most other subjunctives, the Konjunktiv is typically used to signal weak-









































‘Maybe Janis will come.’ Greek3
(1.4) I wish I were rich. English
1Example (5) from Villalta 2006.
2Example (1b) from Giannakidou t.a..
3Example (11) from Giannakidou 2011.











‘I would have passed the test.’ German
As these examples show, subjunctives can occur in a wide number of environ-
ments – for example, with verbs of preference (vouloir ‘want’), possibility adverbs
(isos ‘maybe’), emotive factives, and in unembedded contexts (German).
In each of these examples, the speaker is using the subjunctive to signal that
she has a weakened epistemic commitment to the truth of the proposition that the
subjunctive co-occurs with (following von Fintel 1997 I call this proposition the
prejacent). The speaker of (4) is not committed to the truth of the prejacent propo-
sition I am rich in the actual world. Neither is the speaker of (2) committed to the
truth of spring is long in the actual world.
This use of the subjunctive, which I will call the ‘irrealis’ use, has received a
lot of attention in the semantics literature. This rich body of literature will be dis-
cussed in chapter 2. It will be put to the test to see how well it can account for the
free factive use of the German Konjunktiv II. Since this use is quite different from
the irrealis use (and crucially does not signal weakened epistemic commitment to
the truth of the expressed proposition), we will see that it is extremely difficult if
not impossible to find a unified analysis of both of these uses, and that none of the
existing analyses of the irrealis use can be extended to account for the free factive
use as well.
1.1.1 The Konjunktiv I
The aim of this section is to introduce the Konjunktiv I. Note that it is only men-
tioned here for completeness’ sake. While it gives rise to many interesting puzzles,
it cannot be used in the free factive construction I am interested in and is therefore
beyond the scope of the present work. For a recent discussion of its meaning and
use, see Sode (2014).
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Morphological makeup
According to Zifonun et al. (1997) the Konjunktiv I is morphologically derived
from the simple present tense. The table in (1.1) illustrates the Konjunktiv I forms
of sein ‘be’, leben ‘live’, and kommen ‘come’. Note that the indicative and sub-
junctive paradigms for leben ‘live’ show a great deal of overlap – in fact, the only
audible difference can be found in the third person singular. (The difference in the
second person singular and plural is typically not pronounced.)



















Table 1.1: The Konjunktiv I
Chapter 1. The puzzle 9
Uses of the Konjunktiv I
Konjunktiv I is only very rarely used in today’s speech (Buscha and Zoch 1984
already suggest that it is a prestige form used only in written language). There are
three contexts of use which allow it.4
Reported speech The Konjunktiv I can be used to signal that the speaker is
not presenting her own assessment of a situation, but presenting what someone
else said. In these contexts, the subjunctive is often embedded under a matrix
clause which contains a verb of saying. When there is no embedding clause, the
subjunctive alone signals that the (belief in the) proposition expressed is attributed






















‘The troops have reportedly been removed.’
To signal reported speech, it is not obligatory to use Konjunktiv I, though: it is
also acceptable to use Konjunktiv II or a plain indicative instead (a corpus study
conducted by Jäger 1971 found about two thirds of tokens of reported speech used
Konjunktiv I. One might expect an even higher percentage if it was a true ‘default’
mood). More details on the use of Konjunktiv II in reported speech follow below.
Note that despite the Konjunktiv I’s morphological similarity to the present in-



























4Kjederqvist 1896 proposes that Konjunktiv I may additionally have had a ‘potentialis’ use
which was no longer attested at the time of his writing. It is unclear if this results from corpus data
available to Kjederqvist, or if he extrapolated from ‘potentialis’ forms in Latin.
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‘I just spoke with Alex. He says he is sick right now.’
But the speaker can also use the Konjunktiv I to report something that happened























‘Ten years ago, Alex said he was happy with his Italian class.’
In this context, Alex did not take the Italian class recently, and does not have to
still be taking one at the time of the utterance for the speaker to be able to use the
Konjunktiv I. Instead, Eckardt (2014) has argued for Konjunktiv I (in free indirect
discourse) that it encodes temporal co-reference with a context of utterance which
is different from the ‘current’ context in which the speaker utters the Konjunktiv
I.5
Note further that Konjunktiv I, Konjunktiv II and indicative are often used inter-
changeably when used in reported speech. Many speakers take them to have no















‘Alex says he is sick.’
In (10) the speaker’s choice of mood in the reported utterance does not change
the meaning of the sentence. In all three cases the speaker simply conveys that
Alex made the utterance ‘I am sick.’
5Note that this proposal correctly predicts that German does not have true double access read-
ings for Konjunktiv I and therefore does not exclude examples like the following. (I do not discuss
Eckardt’s proposal for reportative uses of the indicative and Konjunktiv II and its predictions for



















‘Three years ago, Alex said that Maria is pregnant.’
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Hypothetical comparatives Similarly to reported speech, indicative, Konjunk-
tiv I and Konjunktiv II can all be used interchangeably in hypothetical comparative























‘The child is screaming as if he is in a lot of pain.’
There is a sense in which a hypothetical comparative such as (11) is similar
to an instance of reported speech: in both cases, the speaker has only indirect
evidence of the truth of the prejacent proposition. Indeed it has been argued in
the literature that the reportative use of the Konjunktiv I is similar to evidentials
in other languages (cf. AnderBois 2014; see below). It would be interesting to
see if languages that show evidential marking in reportative contexts also show
evidential markings in hypothetical comparatives. This is beyond the scope of the
present work but would be interesting to investigate. It is important to note that
German does not have obligatory Konditional I marking on either reported speech
or hypothetical comparatives.
Special imperatives; ‘Heischesätze’ There is only one context in which Kon-
junktiv I cannot be used interchangeably with indicative and Konjunktiv II: third










‘Long live the king!’
This kind of construction is discussed in Schlenker (2005) for French and Port-
ner (1997) for English imperative may. It is not relevant for the present discussion.
Analyses of the Konjunktiv I
There are a number of recent analyses of the Konjunktiv I on the market. Since
the Konjunktiv I is not relevant for the present work, I refer the reader to them
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directly rather than discuss them in detail.
Schlenker (2003) proposes that Konjunktiv I is a ‘logophoric mood’: its world
index is presupposed to be excluded from the context set. Similar analyses are
proposed by von Stechow (2003), Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø (2004), and Sode
(2014). Both von Stechow and Fabricius-Hansen and Saeboe propose that the
subjunctive presupposes that there must be an attitude verb to bind the subjunc-
tive (note that Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø 2004 develop their proposal within the
framework of DRT). All of these analyses argue against adopting the view that the
Konjunktiv I has a core function of signalling non-factivity.
Potts (2005) proposes to apply his multi-dimensional semantics of conversa-
tional implicature to the Konjunktiv I, which according to Potts signals that the
speaker ‘disavows himself of any commitment, even via implicatures, to the propo-
sition’ expressed by the prejacent (p. 186). The two-dimensional meaning he as-
signs to an utterance like Fritz glaubt, dass Maria krank sei ‘Fritz believes that
Maria is sick’ is a pair of sets of worlds: the set of worlds in which Fritz believes
that Maria is sick, and the set of worlds in which the speaker is open to the falsity
of the proposition that Maria is sick.
Finally, it has been noted in the evidentials literature (e.g. in AnderBois 2014)
that the Konjunktiv I behaves similarly to reportive evidentials in other languages.
I will leave it to the reader to decide which of these analyses is best suited to
account for the Konjunktiv I.
1.1.2 The Konjunktiv II
Table (1.2) gives an overview over the morphological make-up of the Konjunktiv
II. Note that while the past tense indicative and subjunctive forms of sein ‘be’ and
kommen ‘come’ differ from each other, there is complete overlap in the forms of
leben ‘live’.6 The Konjunktiv II can also be formed analytically with würde +
infinitive, as illustrated in table (1.3). The würde-Konjunktiv is used especially in
6Iatridou (2000) has noted that crosslinguistically counterfactual meaning is often expressed
by using a past morpheme and a future morpheme. German does not fall into this category; both
Konjunktiv paradigms differ from the past indicative and future paradigms.
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cases where the other form is conflated with the past tense indicative, but can also
be used in cases where a distinctive synthetic form is available.



















Table 1.2: The Konjunktiv II
For simplicity, the examples in the body of the text will often use a form of sein
‘be’, but note that all claims made for the synthetic Konjunktiv II are also valid for
the würde-Form.
Uses of the Konjunktiv II
The Konjunktiv II can be used in a variety of contexts: in reported speech, in hy-
pothetical or counterfactual contexts, and in ‘free factive’ contexts (the topic of
the present text). This of course raises the question whether it also has a multitude
of (different) meanings. Do we need to assume homophony between two or more
types of Konjunktiv, or can we assume there is one unified meaning which covers
all the different uses?




















Table 1.3: The würde Konjunktiv
Different authors have different answers to this question: Heidolph et al. (1981:522)
argue for a unified meaning. They propose that all uses of the Konjunktiv in
German share a core meaning, namely that it signals that the utterance is ‘not
completely valid’, whereas the indicative signals that the utterance is ‘completely
valid’. Jäger (1971:170) proposes a common core meaning of ‘distancing’.
Saltveit (1969:172) and Buscha and Zoch (1984:19), on the other hand, argue
against a unified meaning, claiming that there is no unified meaning of the Kon-
junktiv. Buscha and Zoch argue that in language there is no isomorphism between
form and meaning so we should not even look for a unified meaning, whereas
Saltveit simply argues that the uses of the Konjunktiv are too diverse to assume
a common meaning. Finally, Jung (1980) has suggested a two-way split: Kon-
junktiv I is used to signal reported speech, and Konjunktiv II is used to signal
non-factivity.7
7Claiming that Konjunktiv I (and only Konjunktiv I) can signal reported speech is already
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In the remainder of this section, I will discuss those uses of the Konjunktiv II
that are not free factive uses.
Reported speech As mentioned before, indicative, Konjunktiv I and Konjunktiv
II can all occur in reported speech, but intuitions differ as to whether there is a
difference in meaning between the three. A psycholinguistic study in Sommerfeldt
(1971), reported in Buscha and Zoch (1984), finds that speakers do not use rules
to guide their choice between Konjunktiv I and II in reported speech: they use
them at random, without distinction. This is also my intuition.
However, Flämig (1959) claims that there are indeed subtle differences, as fol-
lows: whenever the Konjunktiv I form is identical to the indicative form, the Kon-
junktiv II can be used with no difference in meaning. The Konjunktiv II then
has an Ersatz function to replace the Konjunktiv I, which in turn signals that the
speaker is reporting the prejacent.
Whenever there is a difference in form between indicative and Konjunktiv I, the
choice between Konjunktiv I and II is a semantic one: Konjunktiv I is a neutral
signal that the speaker is reporting the prejacent, but Konjunktiv II additionally
signals that the speaker herself distances herself from the proposition; she believes



























‘Alex said he is sick.’ speaker attitude: disbelief
challenged by Jäger (1971) who did a corpus study of the Mannheim Corpus (containing mostly
novels and newspaper articles). Jäger shows that 57.7% of all occurrences of the Konjunktiv occur
in reported speech, but that reported speech can be expressed by Konjunktiv I, II, or indicative.
The second-largest group Jäger identifies are conditionals, and other uses of the subjunctive are
much less frequent, at least in the genres represented in the Mannheim corpus. It would be helpful
to conduct a corpus study with one of the more recent corpora that are larger and more balanced
with respect to text types, in order to get a clearer picture of how the subjunctive is used (especially
in spoken language).
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The speaker of (13) is (reportedly) not conveying her own attitude towards
Alex’s reported illness. (14), on the other hand, supposedly conveys that the
speaker herself doubts whether Alex is in fact sick. As mentioned above, speaker
judgments vary, and we cannot assume that every speaker is distancing herself
from the prejacent proposition whenever Konjunktiv II is used instead of Kon-
junktiv I.













‘If only Alex was here already!’
For a recent analysis of optatives, see Grosz (2012).
Conditionals Konjunktiv II is the form that German uses in non-indicative con-
ditionals: both in counterfactuals and in future less vivid conditionals.
Counterfactual conditionals typically describe a state of affairs which is not only
improbable, but strongly believed to be impossible to hold in the actual world.
Usually the antecedent proposition is believed to be false in the actual world.
Then, because the truth of the antecedent is typically a pre-condition for the truth
























‘If I had had time yesterday, I would have gone to practice.’
In a typical situation, (16) can be understood to mean that because the speaker
did not have time yesterday, she did not come to practice in the actual world.
But, as pointed out by Anderson (1951), it is also possible to use counterfactuals
when the speaker does in fact believe that the consequent holds in the actual world.

































‘If the dead man had taken arsenic, he would show exactly those symp-
toms which he does in fact show.’
Note that counterfactuals can also refer to the present time (present counterfac-
tuals), if at the present time certain facts hold which make it impossible for the





















‘If I had time now, I would go to practice.’
As with (16) the typical interpretation of (18) is that because the speaker does
not have time now, she is not going to practice in the actual world.
There is a large body of literature devoted to describing and analyzing the dif-
ferences between indicative and subjunctive conditionals which I will not discuss
here.8 Very roughly, a speaker who utters an indicative conditional signals that
while she may not be committed to the truth of the antecedent (or the consequent)
in the actual world, she does hold it possible that it is true. When the speaker uses
a counterfactual conditional, her interlocutors will by default assume that she does
not believe the antecedent (or consequent) to hold in the actual world.
Future less vivid conditionals I follow the terminology of classical Greek gram-
mars and Iatridou (2000) in using the term future less vivid conditionals for condi-
tionals whose antecedents show subjunctive marking while referring to the future.
With an indicative conditional, the speaker simply asserts that she believes all
worlds in which the antecedent holds are also worlds in which the consequent
holds. But with a future less vivid conditional, the speaker gives an additional
signal: she signals that she believes it is unlikely that the antecedent holds in the
actual world.
8Cf. e.g. Stalnaker 1968, Kratzer 1977, von Stechow and Grønn 2011, von Fintel 2011, 2012b
among many others.










































‘If you went to practice regularly, you would get better.’
In both cases, the speaker is asserting that all worlds in which the addressee
goes to practice regularly are worlds in which he will improve. However, Iatridou
reports that the future less vivid conditional (20) conveys a biased speaker attitude:
the speaker believes it unlikely that the addressee will go to practice regularly.
Unembedded subjunctives All the uses of the Konjunktiv II discussed so far
have had one thing in common: they were all embedded under an operator, such
as a verb of saying, an exclamative operator, or a conditional. But subjunctives
in German can also occur in matrix clauses. These are the cases that are relevant
for the present work. I now show that we can distinguish two types of unembed-
ded sentences with Konjunktiv II: one is interpreted counterfactually; the other
factively.
Counterfactual unembedded subjunctives This use is frequently described in
the German literature, and it is also available in English.











‘I would have passed that exam.’
This use of the subjunctive has been analyzed as having a hidden counterfactual
antecedent in Kasper (1992) and more recently in Schueler (2008).
(1.22) If I had taken it, I would have passed that exam.
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The core of this analysis is already mentioned in the descriptive literature:
Flämig (1959) and Buscha and Zoch (1984) agree that the (hidden) antecedent,
which should denote a pre-condition to making the consequent true, is elided but
contextually accessible. This type of unembedded counterfactual subjunctive and
Kasper’s analysis of it will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5.
The free factive subjunctive The Konjunktiv II also has free factive uses. Since
these are the topic of interest here, their treatment in the literature will be reviewed
in the following section in more detail.
1.2 Free factive subjunctives in the literature
The existence of a factual use of the Konjunktiv II in German is less well-known
than its other uses.9 The present dissertation is dedicated to discussing this con-
struction and providing a semantics and pragmatics for it. This free factive use is
formed using exactly the same string as the more familiar counterfactual use, but
context typically allows speakers to disambiguate the two uses easily. Consider
the following two contexts: in (23), the speaker’s utterance is clearly interpreted
factively, whereas in (24) the same string in a different context is interpreted coun-
terfactually.
(1.23) Context: The speaker has attended a lecture and has already asked a
question. She doesn’t want to hog the discussion, but notices that there













‘Then I have a(nother) question.’
Note that (23) is glossed with an indicative – crucially, the speaker is committed
to having a question in the actual world, and there is no feeling that her commit-
ment is somehow weakened. In fact, in a typical context of use, she will follow
up (23) with her actual question.
9The term free ‘factive’ subjunctive is somewhat misleading: the speaker actually has to be
committed to the truth of the prejacent proposition.
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This exact same string can also be used as a counterfactual or ‘irrealis’ subjunc-
tive.
(1.24) Context: The speaker is lamenting that she fell asleep during a lecture
and therefore has not come up with any interesting questions. She is de-













‘Then I would have a(nother) question.’
Here the speaker does show weakened commitment to the prejacent proposition
in the actual world: the context makes it clear that she does not have a question in
the actual world.
Let us consider another typical example of a free factive subjunctive: in a
restaurant environment, waiters will often present the specials using a free fac-
tive subjunctive construction.












‘Today we have a nice gilthead.’
Again, it is clear from the context that the speaker is committed to the truth of
the prejacent and does not want to signal weakened commitment – in fact, he has
to be committed to the fact that the restaurant has gilthead to use (25) felicitously.
However, as before, it is also possible to use the string in (25) in a different
context with the irrealis interpretation.
(1.26) Context: The speaker is complaining about the fishermen’s union going
on strike. He knows that it is gilthead season, and if there was no strike,












‘Today we would have a nice gilthead.’
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The context disambiguates again: here the speaker unmistakeably is not com-
mitted to having gilthead in stock in the actual world.
Finally, let us again consider the paradigm example (1) mentioned in the intro-













‘There is pizza in the fridge.’
In a typical, out-of-the-blue context the interlocutor will interpret an utterance
of (27) factually: the speaker conveys that she is committed that there is pizza in
the fridge in the actual world.10
As these examples show, the subjunctive in German can be used both with a
factual and a counterfactual interpretation. What determines which interpretation
is chosen? How do interlocutors disambiguate? And what exactly is the meaning
of the free factive subjunctive? Moreover, if the subjunctive can be used with a
factual interpretation, then how is it different from an indicative?
After this first sketch of the phenomenon itself, let us now review the existing
literature. Note first that no formal semantic analysis of the free factive subjunc-
tive exists. The way it is presented in the descriptive grammars of German is
usually as an ‘exceptional’ use: it always comes with the warning that this use is
not the main function of the subjunctive, and the claim that it is not as productive
as the other ‘main’ uses of the subjunctive. Moreover, because the category of
‘free factive subjunctive’ is not used in the literature, the ‘exceptional’ uses pre-
sented typically conflate free factive uses with other uses, such as using an irrealis
subjunctive to express a polite wish.
Proof for its marginal status is claimed to be its (supposed) lower productivity
(suggested by Buscha and Zoch 1984, Duden 2006:527) and that it mainly appears
in spoken language (Götze and Hess-Lüttich 1999:131) or is limited to questions
(Weinrich 1993:257). In section 1.4 I will show that these generalizations do not
10A less salient irrealis interpretation can be coerced for the string in (27), for example in a
context where the speaker’s sibling came for a visit and cleaned out the fridge, and the speaker is
thinking about how much better the world would be if this hadn’t happened.
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hold, and that there is in fact little evidence that the free factive subjunctive has
‘limited productivity’.
The descriptors used for the contribution of the free factive subjunctive are very
similar for all authors: it is thought to be used in order to achieve a ‘politeness’
effect. Using a free factive subjunctive instead of an indicative makes the utterance
appear ‘tentative’ or ‘cautious’. The authors of Duden (2006) suggest that free
factive subjunctives are ‘low key assertion[s] which [are] trying not to insult the
























‘Here is the florist.’
(28) and (29) are supposed to be more low key than their indicative counter-
parts: rather than using a ‘demanding’ indicative, the speaker uses a subjunctive
to signal that the speaker is not trying to be pushy.














‘I would like a Silvaner wine, please.’
They suggest that a speaker who utters (30) rather than its indicative counterpart
is ‘more low key’: since ordering wine is placing an inconvenience on the waiter
already, by using a subjunctive the guest is taking the sting out of ordering the
waiter around. I argue in section 1.3 below that this is actually not a free factive
use of the subjunctive, but rather the ordinary irrealis use.
Götze and Hess-Lüttich (1999) claim the free factive subjunctive is used to
signal (emotional) distance and trying not to appear dominant. They provide the
example below.











‘I did not expect that!’
They argue that in a context where the speaker had a different expectation and
uses the free factive subjunctive in (31), she is expressing less emotional attach-
ment to her original expectation than if she had used (31)’s indicative counterpart.
(Weinrich 1993:257) proposes that questions using a free factive subjunctive
are supposed to inconvenience the interlocutor as little as possible and to give the
































‘Would you do me a favour?’
According to Weinreich, a speaker who uses (32) instead of its indicative coun-
terpart is using the subjunctive to signal that he is more willing to accept a negative
answer than if he had used the indicative instead.
Three accounts deserve special attention: (Engel 2004:221) claims that the free
factive use of the subjunctive signals that the utterance is ‘incidental’ or ‘negligi-










Engel suggests that both interlocutors in this context know that they did make it,
and that making it was neither negligible nor incidental. The fact that a free factive
subjunctive is used nonetheless gives rise to a modest, polite interpretation.
Buscha and Zoch (1984) propose that any free factive subjunctive can be re-
placed with its indicative counterpart without changing the meaning – I will show
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below that this is partially true, but misleading. While the truth conditions of
free factive subjunctives and their indicative counterparts are (almost) the same,
free factive subjunctives can only be used in a subset of contexts which allow in-
dicative utterances. They also give rise to an ‘opportunity’ reading which I will
describe in more detail below.
Flämig (1959) offers a generalization and sketches an analysis. The free fac-
tive subjunctive (which he calls the non-committal use) is a special case of the
unembedded counterfactual subjunctive: there is a hidden antecedent which is
something along the lines of if this is agreeable to you. In particular, Flämig ar-
gues that the speaker does not ‘take responsibility’ for the prejacent proposition
because she knows that the preconditions for the utterance (namely that it is agree-
able to the interlocutor) may not be satisfied. It is not clear how Flämig’s proposal
works: it seems odd to preface a proposition such as I have cooked pizza with if
this is agreeable to you.
In the following sections, I will investigate in how far the intuitions presented
in these earlier accounts capture the actual distribution and meaning of free fac-
tive subjunctives. In particular, I will show that free factive subjunctives are not
unproductive, and that their meaning is not interchangeable with that of their in-
dicative counterparts. I will show that they occur in written texts as well as in a
variety of sentence types, and I will provide contexts in which only an indicative,
but not a free factive subjunctive is acceptable.
I will, however, follow the earlier accounts in their intuition that free factive
subjunctives signal tentativeness and can sometimes serve to achieve a politeness
effect. The challenge will be to develop a formal analysis which derives these
facts.
1.3 A working definition of free factive subjunctives
In the previous section we have seen some examples of free factive subjunctives.
The aim of this section is to provide a criterion that helps us identify cases of free
factive subjunctives and to distinguish them from other uses of the Konjunktiv II.
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The following working definition is supposed to help us determine whether a
given instance of a subjunctive is a free factive use or not.
(1.35) Definition. The use of a subjunctive Subj(p) is a free factive use if it does
not change the truth conditions of p (ignoring conditions on the felicitous
use).
a. Ignoring presuppositions, on the truth conditional level,
~Ffs(p)w,g=~pw,g.
b. Notation. When a subjunctive Subj(p) is interpreted as a free factive
subjunctive, this will be glossed as Ffs(p).
c. Indicative replacement test. An occurrence of Subj(p) is a free fac-
tive occurrence iff the speaker is equally committed to Ind(p).
According to the definition in (35), a use of the subjunctive counts as a free
factive use if (in the case of a declarative) at the utterance time the speaker is
committed to the truth of the prejacent proposition at the world of evaluation w0.
This is reminiscent of Buscha and Zoch (1984) who suggest that the free factive
subjunctive can be replaced by the indicative. Crucially, they suggest that there is
no difference at all between an utterance containing a free factive subjunctive and
its indicative equivalent. The following sections will show that this is not the case,
but that on the at-issue, truth-conditional level the contributions are the same.
As I will show in chapter 3, an utterance containing a free factive subjunctive
requires the right context (this will be spelled out as two presuppositions), and it
contributes not-at-issue, non-truth-conditional material. Therefore it is wrong to
say that the two forms have exactly the same meaning. However, by replacing
the subjunctive with the indicative, the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the
prejacent remains the same. This is not the case for the more familiar ‘irrealis’ or
counterfactual use of the subjunctive.
Consider the following contexts that illustrate using this working definition.
(1.36) Context: The speaker just opened the fridge, so she is confident that she
knows its contents. Among the contents of the fridge is some leftover
pizza.











‘There is pizza in the fridge.’
In this context, the speaker is very sure that she knows the contents of the fridge.
Thus, she is committed to the truth of the prejacent proposition there is pizza in
the fridge in w0, and she can felicitously utter (36). The indicative replacement
test also works: the speaker could also utter Es ist Pizza im Kühlschrank ‘there
is.Ind pizza in the fridge.’
(1.37) Context: The speaker opened the fridge in the morning, and while there












‘There would be pizza in the fridge.’
not available: ‘There is pizza in the fridge.’
In the context of (37) the speaker is not sure what the contents of the fridge are.
She only knows that it is possible that there is pizza in the fridge, but she is not
committed that there is. That is why the free factive subjunctive interpretation in
(37) is out. Note that it would also be odd for the speaker to use an indicative in
this context. That is, the indicative replacement test fails: to the extent that the
Konjunktiv is acceptable, it can only receive an irrealis interpretation.
The same contrast is illustrated in the following minimal pair.
(1.38) Context: The speaker is a tour guide and knows exactly where each path











‘This is the way to the summit.’12
(1.39) Context: The speaker is hiking with a map, but has never been to the area
before so she is not quite sure where the paths at the intersection lead.
11Throughout the text I will use ?? to indicate that an utterance is odd.
12This example is due to Irene Heim (p.c.).











‘This would be the way to the summit.’
not available: ‘This is the way to the summit.’
Again, the speaker in (38) is committed to the truth of the prejacent proposition,
while the speaker in (39) has some doubts. The indicative replacement test works
for (38) but fails for (39). We see that the free factive subjunctive does not allow
any epistemic uncertainty about the truth of the prejacent proposition.









‘I have a question.’










intended: ‘I have a question.
Again we see that the free factive subjunctive is only acceptable when the
speaker is actually convinced of the truth of the prejacent: only in (40), the context
where the speaker is quite sure that she does have a question, is the Ffs acceptable.
These clear-cut cases give us a good idea of how the definition works. Now we
will apply it to two slightly more tricky cases: questions and ‘polite’ utterances.
Weinrich (1993) argues that free factive subjunctives exclusively occur in ques-
tions. While this is false (cf. all examples of free factive subjunctives in declarative










‘Is there any pizza left?’
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The working definition as formulated in (35) crucially makes use of speaker
commitment: a use of the subjunctive only counts as a free factive use if the
speaker is committed to the truth of the prejacent. What about questions? We do
not want to assume that a speaker who asks ?p is committed to the truth of either
p or ¬p.13
But note that the indicative replacement test still works: ~?pw,g=~?(Ffs(p))w,g.14
A speaker who is asking whether Ffs p is –truth-conditionally – doing the same
as asking whether p.























‘(If Alex hadn’t eaten it,) would there still be pizza in the fridge?’
By answering yes, the speaker is not committed to the existence of pizza in the
fridge in the actual world (unlike in the free factive example (42)). Instead, she
is committed to the following more complex belief: In those worlds which are
closest to the actual world and in which Alex did not eat the pizza, it is in the
fridge. Similarly by answering no, the speaker is committed to the belief that in
those worlds which are closest to the actual world and in which Alex did not eat
the pizza, there is no pizza in the fridge.15
Finally, we come to an interesting use of the subjunctive which at first glance
seems like a prototypical use of the free factive subjunctive. The speaker is using
the subjunctive in order to sound polite. But is it really a free factive use?16
(1.44) Context: Alex is in line at a food cart. Finally he comes up to the front
and orders.
13I will follow Krifka 2011 and others who assume that a question consists of a question operator
? and a sentence radical p.
14Polar questions containing free factive subjunctives will be discussed briefly in chapter 4.
Constituent questions can be treated analogously so I will ignore them here.
15The same goes for constituent questions. Since the subjunctive in questions is not the focus
of the present work, I do not discuss the semantics of questions in further detail.
16This example is due to Manfred Krifka, p.c.











‘I would like a currywurst, please.’
We apply the definition in (35): the speaker needs to be committed to the truth
of the prejacent in the actual world. And she is committed to her wish: she does
want a currywurst in w0. But note that the indicative replacement test fails. The
speaker cannot replace the subjunctive with an indicative and speak truthfully. Ich
habe eine Currywurst ‘I have a currywurst’ is not true of the speaker – she is in
line precisely because she does not yet have a currywurst and would like to buy
one. Thus the subjunctive used in (44) is not a free factive one.17
In summary, we have seen that the working definition of what free factive sub-
junctives are, in particular the indicative replacement test, are suitable tools for
identifying when a use of the subjunctive is a free factive use. But note that our
working definition does not exclude the possibility that an interlocutor cannot tell
whether a speaker is using a subjunctive in its free factive use or in its coun-
terfactual use. The notion of the free factive subjunctive crucially depends on
knowing the epistemic state of the speaker: as soon as it is not clear from context
whether the speaker is committed to the prejacent proposition or not, the inter-
locutor cannot tell whether the speaker is using the subjunctive factively or not.
This corresponds to our intuitions about how the free factive subjunctive is used.
17I am ignoring the contribution of gerne ‘gladly’ here. It seems to trigger a generic reading in
















‘I enjoy having visitors.’
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1.4 Usage and distribution of the free factive sub-
junctive
After identifying what free factive subjunctives are, we are interested in finding
out more about their distribution. Remember that much of the literature discussed
in 1.2 claims that free factive subjunctives are not productive; that is, that they
have a very limited usage and distribution.
In this section, I will do three things: I will provide a variety of contexts in
which free factive subjunctives are acceptable and from which we can distill a
‘canonical’ paraphrase. At the same time, I will show that free factive subjunctives
are very productive: They can occur in a variety of contexts, and in a variety of
forms. Secondly, I show that free factive subjunctives are in fact more limited in
their distribution than their indicative counterparts. This is expected if we assume
that they contribute something slightly different than their indicative counterparts.
Finally, I formulate some conditions in which free factive subjunctives are ac-
ceptable. This will be the basis for the analysis developed in chapters 3 and 4.
Free factive subjunctives are very productive. They can appear both with the
synthetic form of the Konjunktiv II as in (45) – (47) and with the analytic würde-
Form as in (48) and (49).












‘This is city hall.’
{‘There might be an opportunity connected to the fact that this is city
hall.’










‘I have a question.’
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{‘There might be an opportunity connected to the fact that I have a
question.’











‘This is the way to the summit.’
{‘There might be an opportunity connected to the fact that this is the
way to the summit.’
(1.48) Context: The speaker is on the phone with the addressee and is trying to











‘The sun is shining here.’
{‘There might be an opportunity connected to the fact that the sun is
shining here.’











{‘There might be an opportunity connected to the fact that I know
someone.’
As noted in the descriptive literature, the free factive subjunctive is particularly














Waiter: ‘Today we have a nice steak.’
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Customer: ‘I have a question.’












Waiter: ‘Your total is 30 Euro.’
{‘There might be an opportunity connected to the fact that your total is
30 Euro.’
However, it can also be used to discuss a third party who is not an interlocutor
(in such contexts it is not clear that the interlocutors would need to be particularly
polite).
(1.53) Context: Mary is searching for bearded men for a casting call. Alex and









Alex: ‘Claudio has a beard.’
{‘There might be an opportunity connected to the fact that Claudio
has a beard.’
Finally, we note that the construction can also be embedded under a variety of









‘Is there any pizza left?’ Question














‘There was pizza in the fridge.’ Past reference
{‘There was an opportunity connected to the fact that there was pizza in
the fridge.’



















‘If you are hungry, there is pizza in the fridge.’ Consequent of a
relevance conditional
{‘If you are hungry, there is an opportunity connected to the fact that
there is pizza in the fridge.’
It is more difficult to embed the Ffs in the antecedent of a conditional as it is
interpreted factually. However as soon as the context allows us to construct a fac-
tual conditional (a conditional whose antecedent is interpreted as true in the actual
world, cf. Iatridou 1991), it is perfectly acceptable for a free factive subjunctive to
appear in its antecedent.





















‘If you have swordfish today, then I will have that.’ Antecedent of a
factual conditional
{‘If there is an opportunity connected to the fact that you have sword-
fish, I will have the swordfish.’
Compare this variety of forms and contexts to the that would be X construction
in English which is extremely limited in use (cf. Birner et al. 1997). Allowing that
would + V is an English subjunctive, we might want to argue that this construction
is similar to the free factive subjunctive in German.
(1.58) A: Who is that guy outside our window?
B: That would be John, my not-so-secret admirer.18
As with the free factive subjunctive, speaker B is committed to the fact that the
person outside is John in w0. However, the two constructions are actually very
different in their distribution. The that would be X construction can only occur
with the verb be, only in the present tense, and not in a conditional.
18Example adapted from Birner et al. (1997).
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(1.59) ??I would have pizza. Bad: (other) verbs
(1.60) ??That would have been John. Bad: past reference
(1.61) ??If you really want to know, that would be John. Bad: consequent of a
conditional
(1.62) ??If that would be your stalker John, we should call the police. Bad:
antecedent of a factual conditional
Thus the free factive subjunctive in German behaves very differently – and
much more productively – than the that would be X construction in English.
The examples above effectively prove that free factive subjunctives can occur in
a wide variety of sentence types and are not limited to questions. We now set out
to prove that they can also occur in written texts and are not a recent phenomenon.
Consider the following literary examples, from literature written between 1854
and 1908.
(1.63) Hinter unserm Haus liegt ein alter, verwahrloster Garten. Wenn ich ihn
morgens früh vom Bureaufenster aus sehe (ich muss mit Kraus zusammen
jeden zweiten Morgen aufräumen), tut er mir leid, dass er so unbesorgt
daliegen muss, und ich hätte jedes Mal Lust, hinunterzugehen und ihn
zu pflegen. Robert Walser: Jakob von Gunten (1908).
‘Behind our house lies an old, neglected garden. When I see it from my
office window in the mornings (I have to clean up every other morning
together with Kraus), I feel sorry for it because it is sitting there un-cared-
for, and every time, I feel.Ffs like going downstairs and caring for it.’
(1.64) Um Gott, Excellenz! Dies Wort ist nicht Ihrer Gnaden Ernst. Ich hätte
noch viel zu sagen. Ludwig Bechstein: Der Dunkelgraf (1854).
‘my Goodness, your Excellency! You are not serious. I have.Ffs much
more to say.’
(1.65) Sie war merkwürdig verlegen, ja bestürzt: ‘Ach, oh – diese Liebenswürdigkeit!
diese Güte!. . . Ich hätte wirklich nicht erwartet . . . dass Sie so früh . . . ’
Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach: Rittmeister Brand (1896).
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She was so oddly embarrassed, even dismayed: ‘oh – the kindness! the
generosity!. . . I really didn’t.Ffs expect . . . that you so early . . .
The following examples are from Thomas Mann’s Die Budenbrooks (1901).
(1.66) ‘Erinnern Sie sich’, fing Morten wieder an, ’dass ich Ihnen einmal sagte,
ich hätte eine Frage an Sie zu richten?’
‘Do you remember’, Morten started again, ’that I once told you I had.Ffs
a question to ask you?’
(1.67) Tony to Tom: ‘
Hättest du etwas dagegen einzuwenden?’
‘Gar nichts.’[. . . ]
‘Du kennst mich: ich hätte schlecht zum Garcon getaugt.’
‘Do you have.Ffs any objections?’
‘None.’ [. . . ]
You know me: I was.Ffs ill suited to be a garcon.’
(1.68) ‘Ich hätte nicht gedacht, dass es mir so gänzlich misslingen würde, dir
ein wenig zur Seite zu stehen, Tom!’
‘I didn’t.Ffs think I would fail so completely to support you, Tom!’
All of these literary examples come from scenes describing dialogue. This is
expected because of the ‘opportunity’ reading that free factive subjunctives re-
ceive – they need to occur in a context where there is a salient individual who
might have an opportunity given a set of facts. Nonetheless the examples show
that the construction already existed in the 19th century (and was socially accept-
able enough to appear in literary texts).
The present section has shown the variety of contexts where the free factive
subjunctive is acceptable. The rest of this chapter will be devoted to identifying
exactly which environments are suitable to hosting a free factive subjunctive, and
which environments are not.
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1.5 Which environments can free factive subjunc-
tives occur in?
So far the only restriction we have placed on the free factive subjunctive is that the
speaker be committed to the truth of the prejacent in the actual world. But there
seem to be additional restrictions on the distribution of the free factive subjunc-
tive. As I will argue in chapter 3, free factive subjunctives carry two presupposi-
tions: there must be a salient decision problem in the context, and the proposition
co-occurring with the free factive subjunctive must uniquely identify an action
alternative.
Decision problems will be formally introduced in section 2.3. Assume for now
that an agent who has a decision problem is considering a set of action alterna-
tives and is trying to choose the one which will provide the optimal solution while
taking different desires and facts into account.
I will discuss the restrictions in more formal terms in chapters 3 and 4. Here I
just give some contexts of minimal pairs that illustrate the issue.











‘There is pizza in the fridge.’












‘There is pizza in the fridge.’
The addressee in (69) has just come home from work. It is reasonable for the
speaker to assume that she is hungry and wonders where to get some food. There-
fore the free factive subjunctive is acceptable (so long as the speaker is committed
that there is pizza in the fridge). On the other hand the addressee in (70) has just
come home from a dinner – it is not likely that she is wondering where to get
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food. Thus there is no salient decision problem, and the free factive subjunctive is
unacceptable.
Now consider the following minimal pairs to get an idea of what it means to
uniquely identify an action alternative (this notion will be spelled out in much
more detail in chapter 3).










‘This dress is pretty.’












‘This dress is not pretty.’
In both contexts, the addressee is looking for a beautiful dress. By pointing out
a beautiful dress as in (71), the speaker is uniquely identifying an action alterna-
tive which will get the addressee to her goal: she can buy the dress pointed out
by the speaker. But the speaker in (72) fails to provide a unique action alterna-
tive: instead she only excludes one option (buying the ugly dress). But all other
options (buying dress 2, dress 3, dress 4, etc.) are still live. Note that this restric-
tion to uniquely identify one action alternative often causes negated sentences to
be bad with free factive subjunctives even when the speaker is committed to the
truth of the prejacent. I show below that Ffs and negation can in fact co-occur
when the context allows it – it is not a property of free factive subjunctives to be
incompatible with negation.
1.5.1 Free factive subjunctives and negation
Utterances containing a free factive subjunctive resist co-occurring with negation
(while their indicative counterparts have no such restriction).
38 1.5. Which environments can free factive subjunctives occur in?





























‘There is no more pizza in the fridge.’





















‘Peter has not bought pizza.’
Note that this resistance to negation is not at all related to contexts which license
negative polarity items (NPIs). Free factive subjunctives are typically bad under
negation (cf. (74a)), but as we have seen, they are acceptable in NPI licensing
contexts like questions (cf. (42)) and the antecedent of a conditional (cf. (57)),
and also under negation given special circumstances (cf. section 4.2.2 below).
They are also fine in the presence of nur ‘only’ (cf. (75)), and they are equally bad
in the scope of the NPI licensor ‘zweifeln’ doubt as under the non-NPI-licensor













































‘I am certain that Alex bought pizza. ‘be certain’
Given the variability of these data we have to conclude that NPI-licensors do
not also ‘license’ free factive subjunctives.
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In addition to examples such as (72) above which contain an overt negation, the
incompatibility of free factive subjunctives and negation extends to cases where
some kind of negative attitude or evaluation is expressed, as in the slightly modi-
fied (78).
(1.78) Context: The addressee is looking for a pretty dress. The speaker is









‘This dress is ugly.’
Unlike (72), there is no syntactic negation in (78), but rather the speaker ex-
presses her negative view of the dress through the choice of lexical elements. As
all of these examples show, it is not the presence of overt negation or downward-
entailingness which causes the free factive subjunctive to be odd.
Note further that as soon as a negated prejacent uniquely identifies an action
alternative, the free factive subjunctive is of course acceptable.
(1.79) Context: The addressee is looking for a clean place to work and is com-











‘There is no chaos in the study.’
Here the prejacent – containing a negation – uniquely identifies an action alter-
native for the addressee. Therefore the free factive subjunctive is acceptable.
1.6 Chapter summary
After briefly surveying the different uses of the German Konjunktiv I and Kon-
junktiv II I have zoomed in on the construction I am interested in: the free factive
subjunctive. I have shown that it is distinct from other uses of the subjunctive
in German, and I have introduced a test for whether a given subjunctive is a free
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factive one or not: a use of the subjunctive is a free factive one if the speaker is
committed to the truth of the corresponding indicative proposition.
I have also attempted to give a first description of the meaning of the free factive
subjunctive, going slightly beyond what is found so far in the descriptive litera-
ture. I will now set out to present an analysis which captures the meaning and
distribution of the free factive subjunctive.
Chapter 2
The subjunctive in the literature:
state of the art
In this chapter I introduce some of the background that is needed to develop the
theory of the free factive subjunctive as it is presented in chapters 3 and 4. In sec-
tion 2.1 I briefly introduce the possible worlds analysis of modality in the tradition
of Kratzer (1981, 1991, 2012). I take this analysis to be fairly standard and will
not spend time discussing alternative proposals.
Section 2.2 then surveys the existing formal semantic analyses of the subjunc-
tive. We will see that they rely heavily on Kratzer’s theory of modality introduced
in section 2.1. All of the existing accounts are intended to capture the irrealis use
of the subjunctive. I show that none of them can adequately capture the distribu-
tion and meaning of the free factive subjunctive in German, and I conclude that a
new approach is needed.
Finally, in section 2.3 I give a brief introduction to decision theory. After in-
troducing some basic concepts, I argue that the meaning of the free factive sub-
junctive can be thought about in terms of decision problems in a fruitful way. In
section 2.4 I sketch what a decision-theoretic account could look like.
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2.1 Modality and possible worlds
Modals like must, should and can are used to discuss possibilities and necessities:
what the laws are, what an agent’s desires are, or what we think the world is
like. The literature identifies modal force (possibility or necessity) and modal
flavour (epistemic, deontic, bouletic, circumstantial, or teleological). Modal force
determines whether the prejacent is required for all accessible worlds (necessity)
or only some of them (possibility). The modal flavour determines what kind of
accessibility relation exists between the world of evaluation and the worlds where
the prejacent is evaluated at (an epistemic accessibility relation is concerned with
what the speaker knows; a deontic accessibility is concerned with what the rules
are; a bouletic accessibility relation is concerned with the speaker’s desires; a
circumstantial accessibility relation is concerned with facts in the world; and a
teleological accessibility relation is concerned with goals).
(2.1) (In view of what we know,) Alex must be at home. epistemic necessity
(2.2) (In view of what the laws are,) Alex may purchase a home. deontic
possibility
(2.3) (In view of her desires,) Alex should eat a cookie. bouletic (weak)
necessity
(2.4) (In view of what her plans are,) Alex can take the A-train. teleological
possibility
For an in-depth overview on research into modality in the languages of the
world as well as into the history of modal logic, see Hacquard (2011). The ana-
lysis of modals that I use here is developed in the works of Kratzer (1977, 1981,
1991, 2012) and much subsequent research. Kratzer follows Lewis (1973) and
others in assuming that modals are quantifiers over possible worlds: necessity
modals universally quantify over all the worlds in the domain of quantification,
and possibility modals existentially quantify over the worlds in the domain of
quantification.
Which worlds are quantified over is sometimes mentioned explicitly (in (1)
must quantifies over the worlds which are compatible with what we know), but
more often this information is provided by context.
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Kratzer introduces the notion of conversational backgrounds which make cer-
tain worlds accessible for quantification by the modal, and exclude other worlds.
Conversational backgrounds are functions from worlds to sets of propositions.
Kratzer proposes to make a broad distinction between two types of conversa-
tional backgrounds: modal bases and ordering sources. Modal bases contain facts
(for example: what we know), and they are always consistent. While the modal
base is defined as a function from a world to a set of propositions, we often iden-
tify this function with the intersection of those propositions, i.e. the set of worlds
where those propositions are true. Therefore we write ∩f (w) to mean the modal
base.
The second conversational background is the ordering source. Its set of propo-
sitions contains ‘ideals’: propositions describing what holds ideally. An ordering
source g is associated with an ordering ≤g(w) which ranks worlds according to how
close they come to the ‘ideal’ provided by g.
(2.5) For all u, u’ ∈W and any ordering source g(w):
u ≤g(w) u’ iff [p: p ∈ g(w) and u’ ∈ p] ⊆ [p: p ∈ g(w) and u ∈ p]
In prose, the ordering ranks a world u as high or higher than a world u’ if for
any proposition p in the ideal g(w) that is true in u’, p is also true in u.
Many authors additionally make the so-called ‘limit assumption’, which is that
there are always accessible worlds that come closest to the ideal. These worlds
are called the best accessible worlds: Bestg(w)(∩f(w)), or optimal accessible worlds
Optg(w)(∩f(w)). I will make the limit assumption in what follows, but note that
there is some debate in the philosophical literature about it (cf. von Fintel 2012a
and references therein).
I assume the following lexical entries for must and can following the notation
in von Fintel and Heim (2011).
(2.6) ~mustw= λp.λf. λg. ∀w’∈Optg(w)(∩f (w)): p(w’)=1.
~canw= λp.λf.λg. ∃w’∈Optg(w)(∩f (w)): p(w’)=1.
For a universal modal like must, its meaning (relative to a world w) is the fol-
lowing: in all the best worlds relative to a modal base f and an ordering source g,
the prejacent p holds.
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An existential modal like can has the following meaning: relative to a world w,
there is a best world relative to a modal base f and an ordering source g such that
the prejacent p holds at that world.
I will follow von Fintel and Iatridou (2008) in assuming that modals can in
principle have multiple ordering sources and that these are simply stacked on top
of each other, selecting the ‘best of the best’ possible worlds. I take a universal
modal with a modal base f and finitely many ordering sources g1, . . . , gi to have
the following form:
(2.7) ~modalw= λp.λf.λg1.. . .λgi. ∀w’∈Optgi(w)(. . . (Optg1(w)(∩f (w)): p(w’)=1.
My analysis of the free factive subjunctive will make use of a modal with three
ordering sources.
2.2 Recent analyses of the subjunctive
The literature on mood is quite varied, with modern analyses dating back to
Bolinger (1968). In this section I will discuss the different lines of research into
the semantics of mood. It will become apparent that while this research is valid
for the languages it investigates (and the irrealis use of the subjunctive that exists
in these languages), none of the analyses that have been put forward can be ex-
tended straightforwardly to account for the German free factive subjunctive.
There are two main strands of reasoning in the analyses of mood: some au-
thors attempt to derive a unified semantics of the subjunctive mood. They often
conclude that the subjunctive signals non-assertion or at least weakened epistemic
commitment towards the prejacent. Bolinger (1968), Farkas (1992), Giannakidou
(2009, t.a., 2013b), Quer (1997, 1998, 2009) and Villalta (2008) among others fall
into this camp.
The other main approach is to argue that it is in fact impossible to derive a
unified semantics of the subjunctive, and that instead the subjunctive simply is
the elsewhere case, as has been argued by e.g. Portner (1997), Schlenker (2003),
and Siegel (2009). More recently, Schlenker’s proposal of the subjunctive as a
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logophoric mood has been adapted up by Sode (2014) for the German Konjunktiv
I.
In a typology of the subjunctive developed by Palmer (2006) he argues that the
languages of the world have one of two types of subjunctive: either the subjunctive
is selected for grammatically by an embedding verb. In this case the subjunctive
is obligatory under those selecting verbs and ungrammatical elsewhere. The sec-
ond type of languages requires the subjunctive to co-occur with certain operators
(such as questions or conditionals). Again it is required under those operators
and ungrammatical elsewhere. Farkas (1992), Quer (2009) and Giannakidou (t.a.)
among others show for subjunctives in Romance languages that this is not quite
true – there are verbs which can embed both indicatives and subjunctives, and the
choice creates a difference in meaning. Consider the following Spanish example
(Quer 2009’s (10)).
(2.8) a. Aunque se equivocan, no retirarán la propuesta.
‘Although they are wrong (IND), they won’t withdraw the proposal.’
b. Aunque se equivoquen, no retirarán la propuesta.
‘Even if they are wrong (SUBJ), they won’t withdraw the proposal.’
By using an indicative, the speaker conveys that she is convinced that ‘they’
are wrong. Using a subjunctive, on the other hand, signals that the speaker is not
committed: they could be wrong or not.
Crucially though the subjunctive is still embedded. Only very few authors dis-
cuss languages which allow unembedded subjunctives: Matthewson (2010) de-
scribes St’át’imcets which allows its subjunctive to occur in matrix clauses which
then have a different meaning than their indicative counterparts. Kasper (1992)
discusses unembedded ‘subjunctives’ in English.
2.2.1 The subjunctive as a marker of weakened commitment
Many authors assume that the different contexts in which the subjunctive can oc-
cur (especially in languages like Romance and Greek) share properties that make
it possible to identify a unified semantics of the subjunctive itself. Typically this
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core function of the subjunctive is assumed to be to signal either non-assertion, or
its weaker variant, weakened epistemic commitment to the truth of the prejacent.
Villalta (2006, 2008) assumes that it is not the subjunctive itself which has a dis-
tinct semantics, but the predicates which embed it. These predicates, she argues,
require a set of focus alternatives at the level of the embedded proposition, and the
predicates themselves encode a certain relation between the asserted proposition
and its alternatives. For example, wish encodes a preference for the expressed
proposition over its alternatives, while doubt encodes that the speaker believes
other alternatives to be more likely, etc.
Villalta gives the subjunctive the semantics of Rooth’s ∼-operator (a focus op-
erator; cf. Rooth 1985) and locates it in MoodP, right below the embedded CP.
This derives focus alternatives of the right kind: alternative propositions. She sug-
gests that the indicative does not allow the ∼-operator in this position, while still













Sofia traiga [una torta de chocolate]F
∼C
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Note that Villalta’s approach is explicitly tailored to account for the Spanish
subjunctive, which only appears in embedded contexts. It is not clear how to
straightforwardly extend it to account for languages which do not require the sub-
junctive to be embedded. We can imagine two ways: either we assume that there
is no superordinate operator evaluating the alternatives. In that case it is unclear
why the subjunctive appears at all and how its semantics are different from the se-
mantics of the indicative (since there is no operator to deal with the alternatives).
The second adaptation would be to assume that there is a covert operator which
embeds subjunctives which are only seemingly unembedded. We would then have











We would have to propose the existence of a covert operator OpC, and we would
have to assign it a semantics and explain why it is not freely available (cf. the re-
strictions on the use of free factive subjunctives discussed in the previous chapter).
But again this would destroy the core idea of Villalta’s proposal: the subjunctive
is no longer triggered by the common semantics of the verbs embedding it, but
rather by a covert operator whose presence is not externally motivated.
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The analysis I ultimately propose to adopt for the free factive subjunctive will
also deal with alternatives. They will not be focus alternatives as in Villalta’s
proposal, but action alternatives in the tradition of decision theory.
Another account which assumes that the subjunctive makes a semantic con-
tribution to the propositions it occurs with is developed in a series of papers by
Giannakidou (Giannakidou 2009, 2013a,b). She proposes that subjunctives are
only acceptable in nonveridical contexts, i.e. when the speaker (or the subject of
the clause) wishes to express weakened epistemic commitment to the prejacent
proposition.
(2.11) A propositional operator F is veridical iff from the truth of F(p) we can
infer that p is true relative to some individual x (i.e., in some individual x’s
epistemic model) . . . If inference to the truth of p under F is not possible,
F is nonveridical. (Giannakidou 2009: 1889)
For the examples I am interested in, this approach is doomed to fail: the speaker
is precisely not communicating a weakened epistemic commitment to the preja-
cent proposition, and the subjunctive does not have to occur in a non-veridical
context (in fact, I have shown in section 1.5.1 that it often resists being embedded
under negation or in the antecedent of a conditional). While the account I end
up proposing for the free factive subjunctive crucially does not express weakened
epistemic commitment to the truth of the prejacent proposition, it does also ex-
press ‘weakened commitment’ in a sense: the speaker makes an existential claim
about the agent’s action alternatives instead of a necessity claim.
Iatridou (2000) and Ippolito (2013) investigate the relationship between sub-
junctive and past tense in languages like Greek and English. English relies on
past tense forms to express remoteness not only temporally, but also across worlds
(i.e. modally). I ignore these accounts here because German has distinct paradigms
for past tense and Konjunktiv (as illustrated in tables (1.2) and (1.3) in the previous
chapter); therefore this kind of approach does not make sense for German. There
is no ambiguity in German between the two forms; past tense forms cannot be
used to express modal remoteness, and the Konjunktiv cannot be used to express
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temporal remoteness (but cf. section 5.6).
Taken very broadly, the analysis I propose for the free factive subjunctive in
German is closest in spirit to the analyses proposed by Portner (1997) for Ital-
ian and English and Matthewson (2010) for St’át’imcets (Lillooet Salish): moods
place presuppositions on the modal environment in which they appear (Matthew-
son 2010: 24).
In particular, Portner proposes that English mood-indicating may presupposes a
deontic or bouletic accessibility relation (as in May you be happy!). He proposes
the semantics given in (12).
(2.12) For any reference situation r, modal force F, and modal context R,
~maydep(φ)r, F, R is only defined if φ is possible with respect to Doxα(r),
where α is the denotation of the matrix subject.
When defined, ~maydep(φ)r, F, R= ~φr, F, R
Matthewson adapts this analysis and argues that the subjunctive in St’át’imcets
also places a restriction on the accessibility relation: it weakens the modal force of
the governing modal. According to the proposal for St’át’imcets modals presented
in Rullmann et al. (2008), modals carry presuppositions on what their conversa-
tional backgrounds are (they have a fixed modal flavour). A choice function picks
out a subset (potentially a proper subset) of the best worlds, and universal quan-
tification is applied over all the worlds picked out by the choice function. The
more worlds are picked out by the choice function, the ‘stronger’ the modal: if the
choice function does not pick a proper subset but the entire set of best worlds, we
have universal quantification.
Matthewson proposes that the subjunctive in St’át’imcets enforces a ‘weaker-
than-necessity’ reading by presupposing that there is at least one world in the set
of best worlds in which the prejacent is false (p. 34). Like Portner, she also argues
that the subjunctive must always occur in a modal environment. It is dependent
on the governing modal providing a modal base and an ordering source. Then the
subjunctive has the semantics as in (13).
(2.13) ~Sbjn(φ)c, w is only defined if ∃w’ ∈ Optg(w)(∩h(w))[φ(w’) = 0].
When defined, ~Sbjn(φ)c, w = λw’. ~φc,w’
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The subjunctive is only defined if there is at least one world in which the preja-
cent proposition is false. This blocks the choice function from picking the entire
set, resulting in a ‘weaker-than-necessity’ reading.
In my analysis developed over the next chapters, I also assume that the free
factive subjunctive places presuppositions on its environment, and I model this
environment using tools familiar from the semantics of modals.
2.2.2 The subjunctive as the elsewhere case
Because the contexts in which subjunctives occur are quite diverse (typically de-
sire predicates, but also emotive factives; certain modals; predicates expressing
doubt; directives; causatives; and certain relative clauses), some authors have
argued that there is no way to formulate a condition on the semantics of these
contexts which ‘licenses’ the subjunctive. Instead they argue that the subjunctive
marks the ‘elsewhere’ case which contrasts with the indicative.
Thus it is not the subjunctive which is the marked form, but the indicative. In-
stead of formulating a condition when the subjunctive is required, these authors
focus on identifying when the indicative is acceptable. Both indicative and sub-
junctive are partial identity functions, but the indicative has an additional presup-
position: that the prejacent is compatible with being true in the actual world.
I will discuss the particular account developed in Schlenker (2003), but note
that Portner (1997), Siegel (2009) and Sode (2014) have developed similar ideas
(differing in the details).
Schlenker proposes that the (French) subjunctive is the default mood, i.e., it is
used whenever the indicative, infinitive or imperative cannot be used. He suggests
that it makes no contribution to the semantics at all, whereas the indicative, in-
finite and imperative each make certain presuppositions of the context. Because
the subjunctive and the other moods differ in this point, they are in competition
with each other. The principle of Maximize presupposition! (cf. Heim 1991) de-
termines that whenever the presupposition of the indicative/infinitive/imperative
is met, it must be used. Only when it is violated may the subjunctive be used.
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While Schlenker does not give a semantics of the indicative in French, he does
make a proposal for indicative conditionals (his example (10)).
(2.14) For any world term w,
~w{CS}e*,s= # iff ~we*,s=# or ~we*,s is not in the Context Set of e*.
In prose: the indicative mood introduces a presupposition {CS}. In a context e*,
the world term w that this presupposition applies to must be in the Context Set of
e*, otherwise the presupposition fails.
What is important for us is that the distribution of the free factive subjunctive
cannot be explained in terms of competition: when the indicative and the subjunc-
tive are in competition with each other, one always wins. But ‘winning’ in this
case means that a given context allows only the indicative or the subjunctive to
occur. Considering the free factive subjunctive, this is a false prediction. We have
seen that the free factive subjunctive occurs in contexts which are also acceptable
with an indicative. Moreover, when using a free factive subjunctive the speaker
must be committed for the truth of the prejacent to hold in the actual world. But
this precisely means that the prejacent must be compatible with the context set (if
the speaker is committed to the truth of the prejacent, she must (at least) hold the
prejacent to be epistemically possible), which Schlenker argues is the hallmark of
the indicative.
In order to make this account work, we would therefore have to assume both
that there is a presupposition that the prejacent is compatible with the Context
Set, but also that it is possible to override Maximize Presupposition!, allowing
the subjunctive to be used. This would completely destroy the core idea of the
proposal.
2.3 Decision theory
Decision problems have been the subject of study in decision theory (and game
theory more generally) since at least Bernoulli (1738) who realized that the ‘ex-
pectation of profit’ is not always the only consideration that goes into (rationally)
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choosing a course of action, especially when gambling. The goal of decision the-
ory is to model how individuals (‘decision makers’ or ‘agents’) use reasoning to
make a decision (how they choose between different ‘action alternatives’).
This section gives a brief introduction to decision theory. I first discuss more
generally how to model decision problems within decision theory: what decision
problems are and how to calculate expected utilities. This general introduction
is based on Hansson (2005) and Weatherson (2011). I then zoom in on previous
work done in formal pragmatics on the effects of utterances on decision problems:
how does an agent’s utility function change when learning something through an
utterance? When is an utterance relevant to a decision problem? I base this discus-
sion on a series of papers on mention-some answers by van Rooij (2003a, 2004),
Benz (2004), and Benz and van Rooij (2007).
Decision theory aims to model the different kinds of decision problems that
individuals are facing every day. Any time we have to make a decision, we decide
between different action alternatives. Sometimes this is conscious (as when we
make a mental list of pros and cons), and sometimes we subconsciously calculate
each action alternative’s pros – it’s payoff – and its cons – the cost.
On a theoretical level, decision theory predicts for any given decision prob-
lem which action the agent should take to optimize her payoff. It even takes into
account how much the individual knows and whether others are involved in the
decision making process.
Decisions are modeled as tuples of the form <P, A, U> where P is a probability
function, A is a set of action alternatives, and U is a utility function. P maps states
of the world to [0, 1]; it describes the probabilities the agent assigns to different
states of the world (for example how likely the agent believes it is that there is
pizza in the agent’s fridge). The set of action alternatives A contains those actions
between which the agent must choose.1 Finally, the utility function U maps the
1This set remains very underspecified in the literature. It is not spelled out whether a decision
problem contains only those actions that the agent knows about, or also ones that he is not aware of.
In particular, it is unclear whether a decision problem remains the same when action alternatives
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action alternatives onto R. It describes the utility that choosing an action (given
a particular state of the world) has for the agent (the utility basically compounds
the payoff and the costs of each action alternative). Consider the following toy
example.
Example. The agent Bert is hungry. He is wondering what to do to get some-
thing to eat. For simplicity, we will only consider two actions: open the fridge
and go to the pantry. Past experience has led Bert to believe that the fridge may
or may not contain pizza, and the pantry may or may not contain beans.
We can first determine Bert’s utility function in the following way. (Note that




Table 2.1: Agent payoffs and costs
The table should be read as follows: Bert is considering two action alternatives
(represented by fridge and pantry), and for each alternative he is considering both
the payoff and the cost. Note that the payoff is the maximum payoff that is pos-
sible; his payoff for opening the fridge is only 10 if there is actually pizza inside.
The cost for opening the fridge is -4. The payoff for going to the pantry is 6, and
the cost is -1. Bert’s preferences might include information such as he doesn’t like
to waste food; he loves pizza; opening the fridge uses more electricity than not
opening the fridge; Bert doesn’t want to get up from his chair. Because the utility
function is tied to a particular decision problem and a particular agent, it can take
all these preferences into account and combine the payoff and cost for each action
alternative into a utility value.
For now we will assume that Bert has no beliefs about how likely it is that there
is pizza or beans. We will build this into the model later. The following is a table
are added, for example when someone else mentions a new solution. Because the set of action
alternatives is a defining part of the decision problem, altering the set should result in facing an
altered decision problem, a technical solution which does not correspond to the intuition that the
problem itself remains the same.
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of Bert’s utility function: when there is pizza in the fridge, the utility of opening
the fridge is 6 (payoff of 10 plus a cost of -4). When there is no pizza in the fridge,
the utility is -4 (no payoff, but a cost of -4). We assume that a higher payoff is
better. Regarding Bert’s utility concerning opening the pantry, we can say that if
there are beans in the pantry, the utility is 5 (a payoff of 6 and a cost of -1). If
there are no beans, the utility of opening the pantry is -1 (a payoff of 0 and a cost
of -1).
action pizza no pizza
beans no beans beans no beans
fridge 6 6 -4 -4
pantry 5 -1 5 -1
Table 2.2: Agent utilities
From this utility function we can determine which action alternative is optimal
for Bert in different situations. For example, if there is pizza in the fridge, it is best
for him to open the fridge because in the pizza-worlds (column 1 and 2) the action
alternative open fridge has the highest utility. If there is no pizza, it is better for
Bert to open the pantry (a utility of 5 or -1, depending on whether there are beans
in the pantry or not).
Now let us model what happens when the probabilities of ‘pizza in the fridge’
and ‘beans in the pantry’ are not up to chance. Let us assume that Bert believes
it is unlikely that there is pizza in the fridge: he believes there is only a .3 chance
that there is pizza in the fridge. But the probability that Bert assigns to ‘there are
beans in the pantry’ is much higher: it is .8. Now we can calculate Bert’s expected





To calculate the expected utility of an action alternative, we sum up the utilities
of each utility given a particular state of the world and that state of the world’s
probability to hold. In Bert’s case, we get the following expected utilities.
Given Bert’s ‘bare’ utilities that do not reflect probabilities (in table 2.3), he
prefers eating pizza over beans (this is reflected in the higher payoff assigned to
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action expected utility
open fridge .3×.8×6+.3×.2×6+.7×.8×-4+.7×.2×-4= -1
go to pantry .3×.8×5+.3×.2×-1+.7×.8×5+.7×.2×-1= 3,8
Table 2.3: Expected utilities
opening the fridge compared to opening the pantry). However, the expected utili-
ties show that when Bert is facing this particular decision problem considering the
probabilities he assigns to different states of the world, it is actually optimal for
him to choose the action alternative go to the pantry. So if Bert is a rational agent,
he will give up his dream of eating pizza and pursue the goal of eating beans in-
stead.
Let us now turn to van Rooij (2003)’s theory of what it means for a speaker
to say something that is relevant for a decision problem. Consider a context in
which Bert is facing the above decision problem, but where a speaker comes and
tells him that there is in fact pizza in the fridge. According to Bert’s model, the
probability of pizza being in the fridge is only .3 – but if a trustworthy speaker
tells him that there is pizza, this probability will rise, and with it the expected
utility of the action alternative open fridge. Consider a speaker, Anne, who utters
(16).
(2.16) There is pizza in the fridge.
Intuitively we know that after hearing Anne’s utterance, Bert will not go to the
pantry but open the fridge instead. We are even prepared to argue that Bert’s open-
ing the fridge in this case is rational. How is this reflected in the model?
The probability that Bert assigns to ‘there is pizza in the fridge’ will change
from .3 to a much higher value. Let’s say it is now .9. We can then calculate the
new expected utilities.
This shows two important facts: the expected utility of open fridge has in-
creased following Anne’s utterance of (16). Van Rooij defines this as relevance:
whenever an utterance causes a change in expected utility for one or more action
alternatives, it is relevant to the decision problem.
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action expected utility
open fridge .9×.8×6+.9×.2×6+.1×.8×-4+.1×.2×-4= 5
go to pantry .9×.8×5+.9×.2×-1+.1×.8×5+.1×.2×-1= 3,8
Table 2.4: Updated expected utilities
But – equally importantly – uttering that there is pizza in the fridge does not
change the agent’s expected utility of go to pantry – the utterance is not relevant
for this action alternative.
After Anne’s utterance the action alternative with the highest expected utility is
open the fridge with an expected utility of 5. This reflects our intuition of what
happens when we learn new, relevant information.2
Note that if Anne had said something else – something which is intuitively not
relevant for the hearer’s decision problem – the model reflects this as well.
(2.17) I rescued a kitten yesterday.
If Bert’s expected utilities prior to Anne’s utterance of (17) are those given in
table 2.3, what happens after Anne utters (17)? Obviously the utterance does not
change the probabilities for either there is pizza in the fridge or there are beans in
the pantry. Her utterance of (17) is not relevant to the decision problem.
The literature does not discuss cases where the utility function itself is changed
following an utterance. But in principle this is possible, and in fact it is easy to
imagine that an utterance of ‘pizza is unhealthy’ might cause an agent’s utility for
open the fridge to drop.
For simplicity’s sake I will follow van Rooij and Benz and only discuss cases
where an utterance influences the probability function. But the model should be
able to account for changes in the utility function as well.
2Note that Benz (2004) argues that we need a more complex model: the speaker needs to reason
about what the agent already knows in order to make the most relevant utterance. The subjunctive
does not make the most relevant utterance; therefore I omit this level of complexity.
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2.4 An analysis in terms of decision theory
With this decision-theoretic background, I will now reexamine an issue introduced
in section 1.5: not all indicative sentences have free factive subjunctive equiv-
alents. I will show that it is precisely those indicative sentences where there is
a salient decision problem in the context which do have an FFS equivalent, but
that even this is not enough. The Ffs utterance also needs to uniquely identify a
particular action alternative in a certain way.
I will further argue that these two restrictions on the context are presuppositions
of the free factive subjunctive.
2.4.1 Presupposition I
The first presupposition introduced by a free factive subjunctive is that there is a
salient decision problem in the context. When there is no decision problem, free
factive subjunctives cannot be used. Consider the following contrast.
(2.18) Context: The hearer just got home. It is plausible that he is hungry (i.e.,
the speaker is licensed to assume that there is a salient decision problem,











‘There is pizza in the fridge.’
(2.19) Context: Speaker and hearer are talking on Skype. They are on different
continents. The conversation turns to the contents of the interlocutors’
fridges, and the speaker wants to inform the hearer about the contents of
her fridge (nothing in the context indicates that the speaker is licensed to






















‘There is pizza in the fridge.’
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The subjunctive is acceptable in (18) but not in (19).3 It is important to note
that in both conversations the speaker’s utterance is relevant in the sense of Grice
(1975): in both conversations, the speaker is contributing to the overall commu-
nicative goal of the conversation by naming the contents of her fridge. If the hearer
is hungry as in (18), it is relevant because the hearer might use the information to
solve his decision problem (the communicative goal is to help the hearer solve his
decision problem, and based on the speaker’s contribution he might decide to get
something to eat from the fridge). If the topic of conversation is ‘the content of
our fridges’ (as in (19)), it is still relevant to the conversation to name the con-
tents of the speaker’s fridge. However, the hearer will not use this information to
solve a decision problem (the communicative goal of the conversation is simply
to exchange information).
The unacceptability of (19) shows that Gricean relevance is not the determin-
ing factor in what ‘licenses’ free factive subjunctive, while the acceptability of its
indicative equivalent shows that there is nothing wrong with the exchange itself.
The previous examples have shown that the free factive subjunctive is only
acceptable in contexts where there is a salient decision problem. So what are the
requirements on the decision problem? It does not need to be mentioned explicitly,
but note that when the hearer asserts that he is not hungry (i.e., when it is common
ground that he does not have a decision problem), the free factive subjunctive is
not acceptable. Again note that the indicative is acceptable in such a context, for
example because the speaker wishes to inform the hearer about the contents of the
fridge.4
(2.20) Context: The addressee just said that he is not hungry.
3There is a marginal ‘list’ reading available which I ignore here; it only arises if the speaker
goes on to list more things.
4Note that the following subjunctive is acceptable in the same context. It will be discussed as















‘Too bad, there would have been pizza in the fridge.’






























‘There is pizza in the fridge.’
Next, consider a third example in which the addressee also does not have a de-
cision problem. In the previous examples, there was no decision problem because
the addressee was not hungry and was not going to eat the pizza. This example
is the opposite: the addressee has to eat the pizza. There is no decision problem
because if he does not eat the pizza, he will die.
(2.21) Context: The addressee is diabetic and must eat something immediately.
The only available food is pizza that is in the fridge. It is not an option for






















‘There is pizza in the fridge.’
Here, too, the free factive subjunctive is not acceptable, while its indicative
counterpart is fine.
We can adapt the context in (21) minimally to make the FFS acceptable: assume
that the addressee is not diabetic; he is just hungry. Then even if pizza is the only
available food, the addressee still has a choice between eating the pizza and not
eating anything at all. Thus, he is facing a decision problem and the free factive
subjunctive is acceptable.
(2.22) Context: The hearer has expressed that he is hungry. The only food that

















‘The only option is the pizza in the fridge.’
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The examples in (19) and (21) have shown that free factive subjunctives are not
acceptable if there is no salient decision problem in the context. If the context
is changed in minimal ways so as to provide a salient decision problem, the free
factive subjunctive becomes acceptable.
2.4.2 Presupposition II
Turning to the second presupposition, consider a context where it is common
ground that the hearer is hungry. Clearly he is facing the decision problem ‘what
should I do to get something to eat?’. We expect the free factive subjunctive to be
acceptable. However, we observe that when the speaker is far away, the contents
of her fridge are not available as a ‘solution’ to the hearer’s decision problem, and
the free factive subjunctive is odd.
(2.23) Context: Speaker and hearer are talking on Skype. They are on differ-
ent continents. The hearer has just said that he is hungry (the speaker is
licensed to assume that the hearer is facing the decision problem ‘what


























‘Here there is pizza in the fridge.’
The free factive subjunctive is not acceptable here because even though the ad-
dressee has a salient decision problem, the speaker’s contribution does not identify
a solution for it (the action alternative that the addressee would have to identify is
something like ‘travel to the speaker’s location and eat the pizza in their fridge’,
which is both expensive and time-consuming – therefore it is not a reasonable
suggestion to make). The utterance would of course be completely acceptable if
the interlocutors are located close enough to each other to make it feasible for the
addressee to travel to the speaker’s house and eat the pizza.
When the interlocutors are in the same location and the agent has a salient deci-
sion problem, the speaker’s utterance can still fail to identify an action alternative.
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‘There are worms in the fridge.’
My account will explain why the speaker’s utterance in these contexts does not
allow the free factive subjunctive (cf. section 3.3).5
In the following chapter, I will develop an account that translates this decision
theoretic account of how we can think about decision problems into a composi-
tional modal framework. Note that this is not a new idea; the intuition that modals
are closely connected to probability and rational behaviour has also been dis-
cussed in Kaufmann (2005), Levinson (2003), Büring (2003), von Fintel (2012a),
and Cariani et al. (2013) among others.

























‘There is champagne in the basement, but I want to save it for New Year’s Eve.’
The free factive subjunctive is acceptable in cases like this because there is a salient decision
problem and the prejacent proposition does uniquely identify an action alternative – the speaker





In this chapter I develop a first (not fully formalized) analysis of free factive sub-
junctives that aims to account for their distribution and meaning in simple con-
texts. This first, simplified analysis will be formalized in chapter 4.
Let me briefly recapitulate the insights from chapter 1 regarding the distribution
and use of the free factive subjunctive. It occurs in contexts where the speaker is
committed to the truth of the prejacent proposition, but it conveys more than just
the content of the proposition. Compare the contrast between the free factive






















‘There is pizza in the fridge.’
additional message: ‘There might be an opportunity involving the fact
that there is pizza.’
The free factive subjunctive, unlike its indicative counterpart, conveys not only
that the speaker is committed to the truth-conditional content of the proposition,
but also additional material. What exactly this additional material is and how it
can be modeled is discussed in the present chapter.
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First, remember that the ‘additional message’ is a crucial part of the meaning of
the free factive subjunctive, and where such a message does not make sense the
free factive subjunctive cannot be used. Compare the contrast in acceptability in
(3a) and (3b).
(3.3) Context: Speaker and hearer are talking on the phone; they are on differ-


















intended: ‘The sun is shining here.’
While in this context it is acceptable to use an indicative to convey information
about the weather, the free factive subjunctive is out. In the previous chapters,
we have seen more examples like this, and the generalization we drew was that
free factive subjunctives seem to give information which helps solve a decision
problem. When there is no salient problem as in the context of (3), the free factive
subjunctive is odd.
We have also seen that not all kinds of potentially helpful information can be
provided by using a free factive subjunctive – only ‘productive’ information is
acceptable. Consider the following set of contexts: in (4), the addressee is looking
for a beautiful dress. In this case, pointing out an ugly dress is not ‘productive’,
and the free factive subjunctive is out. But in (5), the addressee is going to a fancy
dress party and actually needs an ugly dress. In this case, pointing one out counts
as productive, and the free factive subjunctive is fine.











intended: ‘This is an ugly dress.’
(3.5) Context: The addressee is going to a fancy dress party and is looking for
an ugly dress.











‘This is an ugly dress.’
A third important observation will be spelled out in section 3.1 below: the
contribution of the free factive subjunctive is not truth-conditional. The truth-
conditional content of a free factive subjunctive utterance is the same as that of its
indicate counterpart. I will show that the contribution of the free factive subjunc-
tive is not at issue.
I propose that a successful analysis of the free factive subjunctive should contain
the following pieces.
• On the truth-conditional level, the free factive subjunctive is a (partial) iden-
tity function
• The distinctive contribution of the free factive subjunctive is non-truth-
conditional
• There are two (mostly) independent use conditions that must be met for the
free factive subjunctive to be acceptable; in my proposal below they will
appear as presuppositions
The proposal that I develop in this chapter aims to do justice to these ingredients
by appealing to both decision theory and possible worlds semantics. In fact, I will
attempt to translate the tools of decision theory outlined in 2.3 into the (perhaps
more familiar) possible worlds framework sketched in 2.1. This allows the use of
decision theoretic tools within the framework of compositional semantics without
having to introduce new basic types.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 shows that the contribution of
the free factive subjunctive is not truth-conditional. In section 3.2 I describe how
we can model decision problems in a modal framework. Section 3.3 discusses
the second presupposition: what it means for a proposition to uniquely identify
an action alternative. Finally, section 3.4 develops the (non-at-issue) meaning
contribution of the free factive subjunctive morpheme.
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The pieces of the analysis developed in sections 3.1-3.4 are brought together in
chapter 4.
3.1 Non-truth-conditionality of free factive subjunc-
tives
The observation that not all expressions of natural language contribute to the truth
conditions of the utterance they occur in is an old one; it has recently received
renewed interest in the formal semantic and pragmatic literature (cf. Potts 2005,
2007, McCready 2010, Gutzmann 2012, and Lauer 2013).
The previous section already hinted that the meaning contribution of the free
factive subjunctive is not limited to a truth-conditional component, but that it also
adds non-truth-conditional material. I will adopt the following terminology here,
borrowing heavily from Potts (2005): a proposition p has truth-conditional con-
tent which is at-issue; this content can be questioned, negated, etc. The proposi-
tion p can also have presuppositions, which contribute to the truth conditions of p
without being at-issue. Additionally, p can convey non-truth-conditional meaning
which does not contribute to the truth conditions. Potts investigates conventional
implicatures or CIs which are non-truth-conditional as well as non-at-issue. He
develops a battery of tests to identify CIs. I will show that some of his tests work
for free factive subjunctives, while others fail. In view of this, I will remain agnos-
tic about whether the contribution of free factive subjunctives should be counted
as a conventional implicature or some other type of non-truth-conditional, non-at-
issue meaning.
The rest of this section will be devoted to showing that free factive subjunctives
do not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance they occur in (apart from
the conditions of use that they impose on the context in order to be felicitous
which I will model as presuppositions). I will employ the tests of non-at-issue-
ness as proposed in Potts (2007). While the rest of the chapter will be devoted to
finetuning what exactly the Ffs contributes, we will paraphrase it as there might
be an opportunity involving p for now.











‘There is pizza in the fridge.’
Ffs contribution: ’There might be an opportunity involving the fact that
there is pizza in the fridge.’
The following data show that this ‘sense of opportunity’ which I take to be the
contribution of the free factive subjunctive stands (most of) the tests for not-at-
issue-ness as proposed in Potts (2007).
Independence
Potts formulates the notion of independence in the following way.
(3.7) [Non-at-issue] content contributes a dimension of meaning that is separate
from the regular truth-conditional content.
There are different ways to show that non-at-issue content is independent from
at-issue content. I show that the free factive subjunctive cannot be the target of
ordinary negation ((8) – (10)), it cannot be denied directly ((11) – (13)), and it
cannot be questioned ((14) – (16)).
As we already observed in chapter 1, free factive subjunctives often resist co-
occurring with negation; therefore it is difficult to test whether they can be the
target of ordinary negation. Only when the context is such that learning that not p
makes salient a particular action alternative, Ffs(not p) is acceptable. It is unsur-
prising therefore that the negation in (8) – (10) cannot target the contribution of
the Ffs in a context where the sentences are acceptable.
Cannot be the target of negation
(3.8) Context: The addressee has just complained that every surface in the
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‘There is no pizza in the fridge.’
not available: ‘There is pizza, but there is no opportunity involving
this fact.’
















‘This is not the way to the summit.’
not available: ‘This is the way to the summit, but there is no opportu-
nity involving this fact.’
(3.10) Context: The addressee has just expressed a desire to meet someone who









‘Alex doesn’t have a beard.’
not available: ‘Alex does have a beard, but there is no opportunity
involving this fact.’
To the extent that these examples are grammatical, in each case they can only
mean one thing: that the proposition co-occurring with the Ffs does not hold –
there is no pizza in the fridge; this is not the way to the summit, and Alex does not
have a beard. What they cannot mean is that while it is true that there is pizza/this
is the way to the summit/Alex has a beard, the speaker is not invoking the sense
of opportunity which is the contribution of the Ffs. The interaction between Ffs
and negation will be investigated in more detail in section 4.2.2.
Another test for the independence of a meaning contribution is whether or not
it is possible to easily deny the contribution. Truth-conditional content can be
the target of denial; i.e., the addressee can reject it by replying ‘no’. Again the
contribution of the free factive subjunctive cannot be the target of this kind of
denial.
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A: ‘There is pizza in the fridge.’
B: No.












A: ‘This is the way to the summit.’
B: No.










A: ‘Alex has a beard.’
B: No.
B’s reply can only mean: ‘I do not believe that Alex has a beard.’
Again, we see that while B’s denial is perfectly acceptable if used to deny that
there is pizza in the fridge/that this is the way to the summit/that Alex has a beard,
it cannot be used in a context where B does believe those things but wishes to
negate the contribution of the subjunctive (roughly: that B can use the informa-
tion to solve a problem; for example eating the pizza/walk that way/cast Alex as
a bearded character). Again I take this as evidence that the contribution of the
subjunctive is not part of the truth conditional meaning of A’s utterance.
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‘Is there pizza in the fridge?’












‘Is this the way to the summit?’










‘Does Alex have a beard?’
cannot mean: ‘Is there an opportunity involving the fact that Alex has a
beard?’
Note that these questions are grammatical: if the speaker is ignorant about the
existence of pizza/the way to the summit/whether Alex has a beard, she can ask
(14) – (16), respectively, and will be understood to ask about the prejacent. What
is excluded are contexts in which the speaker already knows that the prejacent is
true, and is only asking about the Ffs contribution.1
Nondisplaceability
Another test that Potts (2007) suggests for non-at-issue content is that it cannot be
displaced.
(3.17) [Non-at-issue content] predicates something of the utterance situation.
1In rhetorical questions this use is (marginally) available, but since their semantics and prag-
matics are different from that of information-seeking questions (cf. Sadock 1971, Han 2002) it is
not clear whether the test can diagnose at-issue-ness.











‘Is there pizza in the fridge?’
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That is, non-at-issue content is expected to remain tied to the utterance situation
and not shift under operators such as past tense, modals, and the antecedent of a
conditional. Potts himself already points out that this test is less reliable than the
previous one, and that it is in fact possible to displace expressive elements like
bastard given the right context. The free factive subjunctive can be systematically







































‘Alex had a beard.’
The contribution of the Ffs in (18) – (20) does not pertain to the utterance
situation – rather, the speaker is talking about a past situation in which know-
ing that there was pizza in the fridge/this was the way to the summit/Alex had
a beard would have been useful. This interaction of the Ffs and past tense will
be discussed in more detail in chapter 4. For now it is important to note that the
contribution of the Ffs can be displaced temporally.
The contribution of the Ffs can also be displaced modally across worlds. This
is possible when the context is such that there is an opportunity involving the fact













‘Maybe/probably there is pizza in the fridge.’
{ ‘There is an opportunity that involves the fact that maybe/probably
there is pizza in the fridge.’
Again this will be discussed in more detail below. Let us also consider the
behaviour of Ffss in conditionals: given the right context, they are acceptable in
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intended: ‘If Peter went shopping, there is pizza in the fridge.’
We predict that it means ‘in all the best worlds where Peter went shopping,
there is pizza in the fridge’, but (22) is simply odd. But note that free factive
subjunctives can occur in the consequent of a conditional if additional markers
such as immerhin ‘at least’ or schon mal ‘for now’ are present. (Schon mal seems
to interact with the free factive subjunctive in an interesting way, but for reasons
of space (and the fact that the semantics and pragmatics of discourse particles
are notoriously difficult to capture) I will leave this aside for now. The important
message to take away is that it is possible to embed free factive subjunctives in



















‘If Peter went shopping, there is (at least) pizza in the fridge (for now).
As the previous section has shown, it is difficult but not impossible for free fac-
tive subjunctives to co-occur with negation. It is also difficult but not impossible
for them to occur in the consequent of a conditional.
Ffss can also occur in the antecedent of a conditional, but then the conditional
must be interpreted factually, i.e., the antecedent must be interpreted as being
true in the actual world. Typically its truth is established as part of the common
ground.2
2If the antecedent cannot be interpreted factually, the conditional is interpreted hypothetically
and the subjunctive does not receive a Ffs interpretation, but rather an irrealis one. For more details
on mood in German conditionals, cf. chapter 5.




































































‘If Alex has a beard, you can cast him.’
In sum, we see that it is somewhat difficult to displace free factive subjunctives
across both worlds and times, although not impossible given the right context.
Let me add a brief side note on the presupposition projection properties of con-
ditionals. We will compare the projection of the complement of a factive verb
like know, an expressive element like bastard, and the free factive subjunctive.
It is well-known that conditionals interact with presuppositions in an interesting
way: if the consequent of a conditional contains a presupposition trigger, then
the presupposition does not project if the presupposition itself is entailed by the
antecedent of the conditional (cf. e.g. Karttunen and Peters 1979, Heim 1988).
Consider (27) which presupposes that Alex is cheating.
(3.27) Lee knows that Alex is cheating.
(3.28) If Alex had cheated on Lee, Lee would have known that Alex did.
(3.29) If Alex had started buying flowers, Lee would have known that Alex was
cheating.
If (27) appears in the consequent of a conditional, and if the antecedent of the
conditional does entail that Alex cheats on Lee, then the presupposition does not
project: (28) does not commit the speaker to believing that Alex did in fact cheat
on Lee. The antecedent of (29), on the other hand, does not entail that Alex cheats
on Lee. The presupposition in (29) projects: the speaker is committed to Alex
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cheating in the actual world.
Expressive elements such as bastard are harder to displace. Consider the fol-
lowing set of sentences.
(3.30) Alex is a bastard.
(3.31) If Alex cheats on Lee, I will punch the bastard.
(3.32) If Alex gets a promotion, that bastard will be happy.
(30) conveys that the speaker has a negative attitude towards Alex. If embedded
in the consequent of a conditional, this negative attitude is projected both when
the antecedent of the conditional provides a reason why the speaker might have
a negative attitude (such as in (31)), and when the antecedent does not provide
any such reason (as in (32)). However it is also possible to use bastard in the
consequent of a conditional where it is consistent that the speaker actually likes
Alex, and the negative attitude only exists in worlds where the antecedent is true.
One such example is (33).
(3.33) If Alex cheats on Lee, what a bastard.
Here it is easy to imagine a context where the speaker of (33) actually likes Alex
and is talking about a hypothetical cheating scenario in which she would dislike
Alex then.
Perspective dependence
(3.34) [Non-at-issue] content is evaluated from a particular perspective. In gen-
eral, the perspective is the speaker’s, but there can be deviations if condi-
tions are right.
Note that a free factive subjunctive typically conveys a suggestion that the
speaker is making for a problem that the addressee is having. But it is also pos-
sible for the speaker to make a suggestion for a third party, or for the speaker to
report on somebody else making a suggestion.
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(3.35) Context: The speaker and the addressee are discussing Peter, who is
looking to cast bearded men for a part in a movie. The speaker is making









A: ‘Alex has a beard.’
Because the speaker and the addressee are discussing Peter and his decision
problem, A’s utterance is evaluated with respect to Peter’s perspective.
In contexts where the speaker is reporting on a suggestion that a third party
made, the facts are more difficult to discern: the speaker can use a free factive
subjunctive both to add her own suggestion to a statement made by the third party
(who herself used an indicative), and to report that the third party was using a free
factive subjunctive. But in addition, the Konjunktiv II can also be used to simply
signal reported speech (cf. chapter 1). The reported speech reading is always
available, and it is often not possible to tell whether an additional free factive
meaning was intended or not.
(3.36) Context: A and B are using Peter’s vacation home. They arrive late at


















‘Peter said there is pizza in the fridge.’
There are three possible readings available: Peter merely informed A that there
is pizza in the fridge, but A herself is using a free factive subjunctive suggesting
they eat the pizza. Or Peter himself used a free factive subjunctive when talking
to A, suggesting that A and B eat the pizza. Finally, A could also simply use a
reportative subjunctive with no free factive interpretation.
Now consider the following clear-cut case where none of the interlocutors has a
decision problem.
(3.37) Context: The speaker and Peter went on a weekend trip to Peter’s va-
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cation home and were hungry when they arrived. The speaker is now

















‘Peter said there is pizza in the fridge.’
Here the subjunctive can only signal reported speech; it cannot be a free factive
subjunctive.
Free factive subjunctives convey that someone has a decision problem, and that
someone knows something that might help choose a particular action alternative.
Typically the person who knows something is the speaker, and the person who
has the decision problem is the addressee. But as this section has shown, other
configurations are possible.
Summary While the nondisplaceability test fails, both the independence test
and the perspective dependency test can be applied successfully to free factive
subjunctives. I take this as evidence that free factive subjunctives contribute non-
at-issue meaning to the utterance they occur in. In particular, I take the results of
the independence test to mean that free factive subjunctives do not contribute to
the truth conditions of the proposition they occur with beyond what their presup-
positions contribute in terms of limiting the context of use.
3.2 Presupposition I: the existence of a salient deci-
sion problem
In this section I show that the existence of a salient decision problem is presup-
posed by the free factive subjunctive. Section 3.2.1 gives an overview over the
relevant data and performs the family of sentences test. Section 3.2.2 proposes
how to model decision problems within a possible world semantics.
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3.2.1 The data
In this section I show that the existence of a salient decision problem is presup-
posed whenever a free factive subjunctive is used. We can apply the well-known
family of sentences test (cf. Langendoen and Savin 1971, Karttunen 1974, Chier-
chia and McConnell-Ginet 1990):
(3.38) Presupposed material stays presupposed in the following environ-
ments:
1. embedding under questions
2. embedding under a modal expression
3. embedding under the antecedent of a conditional
4. embedding under negation
If the existence of a decision problem is indeed presupposed whenever a speaker
uses a free factive subjunctive, this should also be the case under negation, under
modals, in questions, and in the antecedent of a conditional. We find that this is
the case.
(3.39) Da wäre schon mal keine Pizza im Kühschrank.
‘There is.Ffs no pizza in the fridge.’ Negation
(3.40) Da wäre wahrscheinlich noch Pizza im Kühlschrank.
‘There is.Ffs probably pizza in the fridge.’ Modal
(3.41) Wäre da noch Pizza?
‘Is.Ffs there any pizza in the fridge?’ Question
(3.42) Wenn da doch Pizza wäre, kannst du die doch essen.
‘If there is.Ffs pizza in the fridge, you can eat that. Conditional
In each of these cases we understand the speaker to assume that there is a person
who has a salient decision problem, and that learning that there is pizza in the
fridge will uniquely identify an action alternative.3
3Note the presence of modal particles in all of these examples! While they are not strictly
required, they improve the examples especially when presented out of the blue.
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In order to see that (39) – (42) each presuppose a decision problem, consider
again the context of the diabetic interlocutor – the one who does not have a de-
cision problem, but who does have to eat something (as before, we assume that
when there is only one edible thing and the diabetic person has to eat immediately,
there is no decision problem because there is only one action alternative that will
not lead to death). In this context, they are extremely odd. By using a free factive
subjunctive, the speaker either seems to be tip-toeing around the interlocutor’s
possibly life-threatening disease, or is not being cooperative.
I will discuss the interaction between the Ffs and negation in more detail in
section 4.2.2.
Overall we see that when a Ffs is present, we can assume that a salient decision
problem is presupposed because most of the tests for presupposition-hood are
fulfilled. The feeling that ‘someone has a decision problem’ remains when co-
occurring with negation, in questions, and in the antecedent of a conditional. It is
further interesting to note that using a free factive subjunctive allows an objection
which is a variant of the ‘Hey, wait a minute!’ test (von Fintel 2004).
Note that von Fintel’s version of the ‘Hey, wait a minute!’ test is designed to
contest the presupposition that the existence of an individual is established prior
to a given utterance. He shows that only presupposed material can be contested in
this way, whereas asserted material cannot.4 Consider (43) (von Fintel’s example
(3)).
(3.43) A: The mathematician who proved Goldbach’s Conjecture is a woman.
B: Hey, wait a minute. I had no idea that someone proved Goldbach’s
Conjecture.
A’s utterance presupposes that there is a person who proved Goldbach’s con-
jecture, and B contests this. The example in (44) shows that speaker B can also
contest the presupposition that B has a decision problem which is presupposed by
A’s utterance.
(3.44) A: Da wäre Pizza im Kühlschrank.
‘There is.Subj pizza in the fridge.’
4This idea is explored further in a corpus study, cf. Potts 2008.
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B: Hey, wait a minute! You seem to assume I want to eat something, but I
don’t!
Speaker B contests that it has been established in the previous discourse that he
himself is facing a particular decision problem.
3.2.2 The analysis
After establishing that the existence of a salient decision problem is indeed pre-
supposed, I will now propose how to spell out this presupposition using tools
from decision theory and translating them into the possible worlds framework of
modality.5 Remember from chapter 2 that there are three elements to a decision
problem: a set of action alternatives, a probability function, and a utility function.
I will associate the set of action alternatives with a modal base, and the probabil-
ity and utility functions with ordering sources. Overall my analysis of decision
problems will look similar to how modals are analyzed in the literature.
A modal base is a function from a world to a (consistent) set of propositions.
I propose that the modal base modelling a decision problem should be doxastic,
that is, containing only worlds which are consistent with the beliefs of the agent.
Since agents often have conflicting beliefs but modal bases must be consistent we
choose the largest conflict-free subset of beliefs.
The set of action alternatives forms a partition on this modal base: for an action
to be an action alternative, the agent has to believe that it is possible to perform
that action, and in each world the agent can only perform exactly one action. Thus
the action alternatives partition the modal base.
Note that the trivial action alternative – the agent ‘does nothing’; she does not
choose any particular action – is also defined as an action alternative.
Whether we allow ‘compound’ actions or not is a matter of definition. In prin-
ciple, all that is needed is a set of action alternatives which partitions the modal
base. But for simplicity’s sake we will only discuss partitions with ‘atomic’ action
alternatives. For example, when an agent is hungry, we could consider a partition
5The idea that decision theory enters into the semantics of certain expressions is not new; it
has been explored in Cariani et al. 2013 and Levinson 2003 among others.
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consisting of three ‘atomic’ action alternatives: action a, opening the fridge; op-
tion b, ordering Chinese food; and option c, buying groceries. a, b and c partition
the modal base. But other partitions are of course also possible, for example a,
b, and a and c. The third action alternative a and c is not ‘atomic’, but the three
alternatives together still make up a partition. While it is possible to extend my
analysis to these cases, I will ignore them for simplicity.
To recapitulate: The set of action alternatives A from decision theory will be
associated with a modal base: the (consistent) belief state of the agent.
The probability function p of decision theory has a similar function as an or-
dering source: intuitively the agent uses p to rank the action alternatives based
on how likely they will yield a positive outcome – that is, if the agent chooses
alternative a, what is the probability that she will reach her goal?
Ordering sources rank the worlds in the modal base – they identify the ‘best’
worlds according to the ideal spelled out in the ordering source. In order to reflect
the work of the probability function, I propose to use a double ordering source:
first, a stereotypical ordering source ranks the worlds in the modal base according
to what is normal, i.e., it ranks worlds according to how similar they are to the
actual world, and what the future holds given a ‘normal’ course of events. For
example, among those worlds which the agent holds doxastically possible, there
might be some in which the fridge contains leftover lasagna, but there might also
worlds in which the fridge contains a three-course gourmet meal (because the
agent’s parents are friends with a chef who made them a meal, and the agent’s
siblings snuck into her apartment and placed the leftovers from that meal in the
agent’s fridge). For most people, worlds with leftover lasagna will be more normal
than gourmet meal-worlds, and the stereotypical ordering source will thus rank
them higher than the gourmet-meal worlds.
A second ordering source then ranks the worlds according to whether the agent
reaches her goal. Note that this ordering source only contains one proposition, the
agent successfully reaches her goal, because at this point we are only interested
in identifying those worlds among the doxastically accessible worlds which are
both likely and such that the agent solves her decision problem successfully. The
optimal worlds with respect to both of these ordering sources are worlds which
Chapter 3. The analysis 81
are normal (no improbable things are happening) and the agent reaches her goal.
This means that the action alternatives which the agent performs in these opti-
mal worlds are the ones which have the highest probability of success – we have
modelled a probability function.
(3.45) Primary ordering source g1:
stereotypical
Secondary ordering source g2:
{The agent successfully reaches her goal}
(teleological)
A world w’ in the modal base f =Doxα is ‘better’ than a world w” iff it is either
more ‘normal’, i.e., w’<g1w”, or (if both worlds are equally ‘normal’), iff w’<g2w”
(i.e., if the agent reaches her goal in w’ but not in w”).
The third component of a decision problem is the utility function. The utility
function in decision theory models how much an agent ‘likes’ an action alterna-
tive; it models her preferences and compounds costs and payoffs. It assigns each
action alternative a utility value which can be seen as a kind of shorthand to mea-
sure how attractive a particular action alternative is for the agent. Importantly, the
utility function ignores probabilities. For example, the utility for order Chinese
food is measured based on things like how much the agent likes Chinese food,
how long it takes for orders to arrive, and how many leftovers will spoil if she
orders it. It does not care about how likely the agent thinks it is that the Chinese
restaurant is open.
The utility function can be modelled as a third ordering source, namely a bouletic
one. Ranking the worlds according to how well they correspond to the agent’s
wishes corresponds to comparing the utility value of the action alternatives.
This view of the utility function however oversimplifies matters slightly. By
simply postulating that we need an (unrestricted) bouletic ordering source, we
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create the following problem: since the ordering source is not restricted to wishes
relating to the decision problem, we allow cases like the following.6
(3.46) Alex is hungry. Her desires regarding the decision problem are:
p1 the agent saves money
p2 the agent does not leave the apartment
p3 the agent does not waste food
Her unrelated desires are:
u1 the agent is successful
u2 the agent has a cat
u3 the agent gets a haircut
Let there be two sets of worlds which are best according to g1 and g2:
worlds where Alex is successful, has a cat, and gets a haircut (but does not
save money, does leave the apartment, and does waste food) and chooses
to solve her decision problem by travelling to Brooklyn and getting a muf-
fin, and worlds where she does not leave her apartment and does not waste
food (but where she does spend money, is not successful, does not have a
cat, and does not get a haircut) and solves her decision problem by order-
ing Chinese food.
Our intuition is that the second set of worlds is ‘better’ according to Alex’s
desires regarding the decision problem – but when ranked according to g3, the
first set of worlds is actually predicted to be better. In the first set, three desires
are fulfilled: u1, u2, and u3. In the second set, only two desires are fulfilled: p2
and p3. We need to somehow restrict the bouletic ordering source to consider only
desires that are somehow ‘relevant’ to the decision problem.
One way to do so is to postulate a restriction on the kind of desires that are
considered in g3. In the context of (46), we would eliminate the set of ‘unre-
lated’ desires from the ordering source (assuming that we can tell for each desire
whether it is related to the decision problem or not). By restricting it in this way,
6This problem is reminiscent of the Ruud van Nistelrooij problem in anankastic conditionals
discussed in Huitink 2008.
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we avoid getting the counterintuitive result that the first set of worlds in the con-
text of (46) are ranked higher.
It has been noted by Condoravdi and Lauer (2012) and others that modelling
desires by a bouletic ordering source can cause problems: agents often have con-
flicting desires, and it is easy to come up with scenarios in which a bouletic or-
dering source does not allow a ranking of which worlds are ‘better’ than their
competitors. Consider the following scenario.
(3.47) Alex is hungry. Her desires regarding the decision problem are {the agent
does not spend money; the agent buys Chinese food}.
Let there be two sets of worlds which are optimal according to g1 and g2:
one in which the agent does not spend money (but does not buy Chinese
food) and gets food from the fridge, and one in which the agent buys
Chinese food (but does spend money).
Clearly the two sets of worlds described in (47) are mutually exclusive. But it
is not clear how the bouletic ordering source should rank them: both make exactly
one proposition true while making exactly one proposition false.
There are two ways of treating a situation like this: we can either say that there
are two optimal action alternatives for the agent (in decision theoretic terms: they
have the same expected utility). Then we do not need to modify the analysis. This
type of analysis can model decision problems where the agent has narrowed down
the set of action alternatives to two or three and does not care which of these she
ends up picking.
A second option is to adopt Condoravdi and Lauer’s notion of an effective pref-
erence structure (or an equivalent way of ranking the propositions in g3). They
argue that when an agent has conflicting desires, in order to choose an action the
agent resolves any conflicts by strictly ranking the desires. In (47), Alex would
decide that either not spending money is more important than buying Chinese
food, or buying Chinese food is more important than not spending money. In ei-
ther case, the desires are strictly ranked, and the two sets of worlds can be strictly
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ranked accordingly.
I believe that these options can exist independently of each other: it is easy to
imagine cases where agents truly do not prefer one alternative over another, and
there are also cases where agents rank their desires and resolve any conflicts.
In sum, we can model decision problems in a possible world semantics as a
structure consisting of a modal base and three ordering sources.
(3.48) a. We can model a decision problem D as consisting of the following
components:
f= {w: w∈ Doxα} (the largest conflict-free subset of the agent’s dox-
astic alternatives as the modal base)
g1= stereotypical ordering source
g2={the agent reaches her goal}
g3= bouletic ordering source (possibly with effective preference struc-
ture)
b. Π(f)={{wi: α chooses action alternative ai}}
(the action alternatives form a partition on f)
One final caveat: this modal model of a decision theory does not work in exactly
the same way that decision problems work in decision theory. In decision theory,
the probability function and the utility function operate on the same set of action
alternatives at the same time. This allows for action alternatives to have the highest
expected utility even when their probability of succeeding is very low: the agent
simply has to assign them a very high utility value.
Consider an example where an agent wants to get something to eat. She believes
it is extremely improbable that her favourite restaurant is open (because it is a
holiday, or because she knows the cook is sick, or some other reason). However,
she is desperately craving their food; so much so, in fact, that she would rather
spend her lunch break going to the restaurant on the off chance that it is open after
all than choosing the ‘safe’ option of going somewhere that is guaranteed to be
open.
Chapter 3. The analysis 85
In a decision theoretic model, we can model the agent’s behaviour in the fol-
lowing way.
action probability of success utility expected utility
favourite restaurant .1 50,000 5000
24-hour diner .99 10 990
Table 3.1: Modelling the decision of an ‘opinionated’ agent
As table 3.1 shows, choosing the 24-hour diner (which has a probability of
99% of being open and a utility of 10, resulting in an expected utility of 990)
is less rewarding for the ‘opinionated’ agent who absolutely loves her favourite
restaurant: even though the favourite restaurant only has a probability of .1 of
being open, the utility of going there if it is open is 50,000, thus its expected
utility is still 5000. Thus decision theory would predict that it is rational for the
agent to go to her favourite restaurant given these expected utilities.
In the modal system as I have presented it above, we do not get this result: be-
cause the ordering sources are strictly ranked, certain worlds may not be available
any longer at certain points in the calculation. In this example, the worlds are first
ranked according to what is normal via ordering source g1. Worlds in which the
agent’s favourite restaurant are closed are thus ranked near the top, while worlds
in which it is open are ranked near the bottom. The second ordering source g2 then
applies to the best worlds according to the ranking provided by g1. The worlds
in which the favourite restaurant is open are no longer considered at this point,
but there might still be worlds among the g1-best worlds in which the agent goes
to the (closed) restaurant. Ordering g2, which ranks worlds according to whether
the agent succeeds at her goal of getting something to eat will now exclude those
worlds because going to a closed restaurant means the agent will not succeed in
getting something to eat. By the time g3 ranks the best worlds relative to g1 and
g2 according to the agent’s other preferences, there are no worlds left in which
she goes to her favourite restaurant. Thus, there are no favourite-restaurant worlds
among the best worlds according to this model: the decision theoretic model and
the modal model yield slightly different results.7
7Note that we do not even need to consider such an extreme case. Even if the favourite restau-
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However, we might want to argue that the ‘opinionated’ agent is not acting
rationally and that, in fact, the decision theoretic model is wrong predicting that
the most rational course of action for her is to go to the (likely closed) restaurant.
But I do not want to argue this. Instead, I argue that we can replicate the decision
theoretic prediction through ordering source promotion. As pointed out in Büring
(2003) speakers may fall into one of two camps: those who care about safety
(being more worried about getting food than about getting tasty food), and those
who worry more about getting what they prefer (being willing to take the risk of
not getting any food over not getting her favourite food when it is available). The
‘opinionated’ agent falls into the second category: at the risk of not getting any
lunch, she goes to her favourite restaurant so that she can have their food in the
unlikely case that they are open. The modal model can capture this behaviour
by promoting g3 as the primary ordering source along the lines proposed by von
Fintel and Iatridou (2008).
If g3 first orders the modal base according to the overall desires of the agent,
those worlds in which she goes to her favourite restaurant are sorted to the top,
and those where she goes elsewhere are sorted towards the bottom. Only then
does g1 apply. It sorts the best worlds (relative to g3) according to what is likely:
now worlds in which the agent goes to the restaurant and it is closed are near the
top, and those where it is open are near the bottom. By the time g2 comes in in
order to rank the worlds according to the goal of getting something to eat, the only
worlds that are left are worlds where the agent goes to the closed restaurant and
she does not get anything to eat; that is, g2 does not have any work left to do.
This mechanism of ordering source promotion captures the different behaviour
of agents. Note that decision theory also allows for some idiosyncratism on the
part of the agents: the agent’s utilities have to show a large enough preference for
one action alternative to make up for that alternative’s low probability if we want
to derive the ‘opinionated’ picture as in table 3.1. It is no surprise that we also
rant has a probability of .49 for being open, the primary ordering source in my model would cut
out the worlds where it is open. In this case perhaps many people might argue that it is ‘worth the
risk’ going there, which at first glance seems to be different from my predictions. But it is in fact
compatible with my system: it simply calls for ordering source promotion as discussed below.
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need a different way of ordering worlds to treat cases like that.
Summary
Using a free factive subjunctive is only acceptable if the following presuppo-
sition is met:
• There is a decision problem D.
We can model D as consisting of the following components:
– a modal base f ={w: w∈Doxα}, the largest conflict-free subset of
the agent α’s beliefs
– g1, a stereotypical ordering source
– g2= {α reaches her goal’}
– g3= a bouletic ordering source, when necessary plus an effective
preference structure
• The action alternatives form a partition on f :
Π(f)={{wi: α chooses action alternative ai}}
3.3 Presupposition II: uniquely identifying an ac-
tion alternative
The previous section has shown that free factive subjunctives can only occur in
contexts in which there is a salient decision problem, and it has provided an
analysis of decision problems in a possible worlds framework and argued that the
existence of the decision problem can be treated as a presupposition.
In this section, I show that there is a second use condition which I propose to
also treat as a presupposition: the free factive subjunctive can only be used if the
utterance it occurs in ‘helps’ the agent in a particular way.
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3.3.1 The data
Recall from the detailed discussion in chapter 1 and also from examples (4) and
(5) at the beginning of this chapter the contexts where the agent was looking for a
beautiful dress. Using a free factive subjunctive to communicate that a particular
dress is ugly, that is, that it should not be chosen by the agent, is not possible
(even though the context clearly contains a decision problem and learning that a
particular dress is ugly is intuitively relevant for the decision making process in
some way).
In the discussion of decision problems in chapter 2, I briefly introduced van
Rooij’s notion of relevance: a proposition p is relevant for a decision problem D
if learning that p changes the expected utility of one or more action alternatives.
This notion of relevance is not strong enough to explain what is going on here:
an agent who learns that a particular dress is ugly (when looking for a beautiful
dress) will adjust the expected utility of the action alternative choose that dress –
its expected utility will decrease (and thus change), so by van Rooij’s definition,
the proposition that is an ugly dress is relevant to the decision problem – but the
free factive subjunctive is not acceptable in such a context.
Therefore we have to postulate a second condition on the use of the free factive
subjunctive: not only is the expected utility of one or more action alternatives
changed, but the agent has to be able to identify one unique action alternative
which is improved the most by learning that p. The way this action alternative is
identified will be left underspecified; we will see that the identification is not a
compositional process and is even susceptible to speaker variation.
Intuitively, we understand that when a speaker utters ‘there is pizza in the
fridge’ that this is related to the action alternative ‘open the fridge’ and it im-
proves the expected utility of this alternative (the expected utility of this particular
action alternative is raised). Because there is a unique action alternative whose
expected utility is improved, the free factive subjunctive is acceptable. On the
other hand, if the speaker says ‘I ate the leftover pizza’, the expected utility of
‘open the fridge’ is lowered. There is no unique action alternative whose expected
utility is improved, so using a free factive subjunctive is not possible. (Of course
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learning that the speaker ate the pizza may change the expected utilities of some
other action alternatives and thus change the way the agent ranks them – what
is important for the use of the free factive subjunctive though is that there is no












‘What should I eat?’










intended: ‘There is no more pizza.’












‘There is pizza in the fridge.’
Speaker B attempts to demote an action alternative; using a free factive sub-
junctive is prohibited. Speaker B’ whose utterance improves an action alternative
is acceptable with a free factive subjunctive.
In principle there are two ways in which learning something new can improve
an action alternative: either the new fact influences how likely the agent believes
an action alternative will lead to a ‘positive’ outcome (learning that there is pizza
in the fridge improves the likelihood that ‘open the fridge’ will lead to success),
or it influences how much the agent ‘likes’ an action alternative (learning that kale
is healthy improves how much the agent ‘likes’ getting a kale salad).
But we observe that the free factive subjunctive can only occur with utterances
that influence the ordering source g1 (the ordering related to what is (stereotypi-
cally) the case). They cannot occur with utterances that influence g3 which ranks
the worlds according to how much the agent ‘likes’ the action alternatives. Here
are some examples of a speaker attempting to influence the third ordering source
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‘What should I eat?’








intended: ‘You are on a diet.’






intended: ‘Pizza is not healthy.’






intended: ‘Kale is healthy.’














intended: ‘You did not eat much this morning.’
It is important to note that neither improving nor demoting an action alternative
via the third ordering source is compatible with the free factive subjunctive. B
and B’ are suggesting to demote the action alternative get pizza: assuming that A
wishes to be healthy, learning that pizza is unhealthy or being reminded that one is
on a diet and should not eat pizza should influence the ranking of worlds in which
the agent chooses to eat pizza. B” and B”’, on the other hand, are suggesting to
improve an action alternative (eat kale in the case of (55) and eat something hearty
in the case of (56), respectively) by pointing out benefits of certain action alter-
natives. Importantly, none of these utterances are acceptable with a free factive
subjunctive.
Therefore we postulate that the proposition co-occurring with the free factive
subjunctive must result in a different ordering by the ordering source g1 (the
stereotypical ordering source). However, the exact process of identifying the ‘im-
proved’ action alternative seems to rely heavily on world knowledge.
We can again run the family of sentences test to see whether we can assume
this restriction on the use of free factive subjunctives can be modelled as a pre-
supposition. Consider a context in which the agent is looking for a pretty dress.
The family of sentences test predicts that the Ffs should be odd in questions, the
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‘This dress is probably ugly.’
The oddness of these examples shows that the family of sentences correctly
predicts the Ffs to be odd in these contexts, so we can assume that presupposition
2 is indeed a presupposition.
3.3.2 The analysis
How can we model this condition on the use of the free factive subjunctive within
the modal framework? The system so far provides a (doxastic) modal base and
three ordering sources: two which rank the worlds according to what the agent be-
lieves is likely, and one which ranks them according to how much the agent ‘likes’
that world. I have noted in the previous section that there is no compositional way
to determine which action alternative is uniquely identified by the prejacent – we
simply have to posit that the addressee will be able to do this.
When an agent learns the proposition there is pizza in the fridge, he adds this
proposition to his doxastic alternatives, removing all worlds in which there is no
pizza in the fridge. Thus the ordering sources only operate on worlds in which
there is pizza in the fridge – if before the agent thought that in the most stereo-
typical worlds there was no pizza in the fridge, this leads to a re-ranking of which
worlds are optimal.
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Consider the following toy example. We consider two action alternatives: open-
ing the fridge and ordering Chinese food. We also consider whether there is pizza
in the fridge and whether the Chinese restaurant is open. There are 8 types of
worlds (for simplicity’s sake I ignore worlds where the agent does not do any-
thing).
w1= pizza X, restaurant X, open fridge
w2= pizza X, restaurant  , open fridge
w3= pizza  , restaurant X, open fridge
w4= pizza  , restaurant  , open fridge
w5= pizza X, restaurant X, order Chinese
w6= pizza X, restaurant  , order Chinese
w7= pizza  , restaurant X, order Chinese
w8= pizza  , restaurant  , order Chinese
Table 3.2: A toy model of a decision problem
Assume that before learning that there is pizza in the fridge, the agent believes
the most stereotypical worlds are those where there is no pizza in the fridge. These
are worlds w3, w4, w7, and w8. Ordering g1 will rank those 4 worlds the highest.
Assume that the agent has no beliefs about how likely it is that the Chinese restau-
rant is open. Ordering g2 will rank those worlds highest in which the agent gets
food. This only happens in w7 where the restaurant is open and the agent orders
Chinese food, so w7-worlds are optimal according to g2 applied after g1. g3 ranks
the type w7 worlds (this ranking is vacuous).
Now compare this to an agent who learns that there is pizza in the fridge. The
doxastic alternatives in which there is no pizza in the fridge are eliminated, leaving
only worlds of type w1, w2, w5, and w6. Since the agent has no beliefs about how
likely it is that the Chinese restaurant is open, the stereotypical ordering source
g1 will include all four types of worlds as optimal. Ordering g2 ranks the worlds
according to whether the agent reacher his goal: this happens in worlds of type
w1, w2, and w5. Finally, ordering g3 ranks the worlds according to the agent’s
desires – e.g. if she wants to stay home, it ranks w1 and w2 worlds as optimal.
As the data in the previous section has shown, free factive subjunctives can
only co-occur with propositions which influence the ranking of the stereotypical
Chapter 3. The analysis 93
ordering source in a particular way: the likelihood with which one unique action
alternative leads to a ‘positive’ outcome must be improved.
(3.60) A free factive subjunctive can only occur felicitously if the following sec-
ond presupposition is met:
∃a*: for any two worlds w1, w2 ∈ Doxα∩p which only differ in whether
the agent performs a* or some other action alternative a (assume that
w1 ∈a* and w2 ∈a): w1 ≤g1w2
In prose, there is an action alternative a* such that worlds in which the agent
chooses this alternative are always ranked as high or higher than worlds in which
the agent chooses some other action alternative. The ranking is done by the stereo-
typical ordering source g1, applied to the agent’s doxastic alternatives intersected
with the prejacent proposition p.
In the discussion of presupposition 1 I suggested that it does not matter how
the action alternatives partition the modal base, but that we would only discuss
atomic action alternatives for simplicity’s sake. As the present section shows,
presupposition 2 requires that there is an action alternative which is as good or
better than its alternatives. Consider the following scenario which features non-
atomic action alternatives.
(3.61) Alex is hungry. He is considering the following action alternatives: a,
opening the fridge, b, opening the fridge and calling a Chinese restaurant











‘There is pizza in the fridge.’
The speaker’s utterance does not violate the second presupposition: there is an
action alternative (namely alternative a – open the fridge) which is as good or bet-
ter than its alternatives after being ranked by g1.
This system correctly predicts the presuppositions not only for declarative sen-
tences, but for questions as well. Consider (62).









‘Is there pizza in the fridge?’
Presupposition 1 correctly predicts that (62) can only be uttered in a context
where there is a salient decision problem. Presupposition 2 predicts that there is a
second condition on the felicitous use of the free factive subjunctive in (62): there
is an action alternative a* such that for two worlds which are doxastic alternatives
of the agent and which only differ in whether the agent chooses to perform action
a* or some other action alternative and in which p holds, the world in which he
performs a* is as good or better as the other world. Note that p is the sentence
radical there is pizza in the fridge without the question operator (as with negation,
the question operator scopes over the free factive subjunctive).











‘Who has a beard?’
Again, presupposition 1 predicts that (63) is only acceptable if the context is
such that there is a salient decision problem. Presupposition 2 predicts that for
any true answer p, there is an action alternative a* such that for two worlds which
are doxastic alternatives of the agent and which only differ in whether the agent
chooses to perform action a* or some other action alternative and in which p holds,
the world in which he performs a* is as good or better as the other world.
3.3.3 Additional considerations
So far we have identified the conditions of use for free factive subjunctive and
have modelled them as presuppositions. In the following section, we will turn to
the non-truth-conditional, non-at-issue contribution of the free factive subjunctive.
But before doing that, let me briefly address some additional issues concerning
the second presupposition. Since the speaker has incomplete knowledge of the
agent’s actual beliefs and desires, she can make mistakes about what ‘counts’ as
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an utterance that will improve an action alternative. Consider a speaker who loves
brussels sprouts, and an agent who hates them.8










‘There are brussels sprouts in the fridge.’
b. B: Hey wait a minute! Brussels sprouts are disgusting!
Here B rejects A’s assumption that brussels sprouts have a high enough utility
to make this proposition a helpful contribution to B’s decision problem. But note
that A’s utterance is felicitous because brussels sprouts are edible – A did improve
the ranking of certain worlds.
On a related note, consider a context in which the agent has already prepared
his favourite dish: a delicious salad. It is sitting on the counter. Meanwhile, the
speaker comes home. Without looking at the counter, she says Da wäre Pizza im
Kühlschrank ‘there is pizza in the fridge.’ Again this is felicitous even though the
agent will likely not change his actions based on the speaker’s utterance.
The action alternative whose ranking is improved the most is not necessarily the
best action alternative overall.
Finally, it is important to note that the speaker is not just using the preferences
and rankings that she herself would use if she had the same decision problem as
the agent. For example, it is perfectly acceptable for a vegetarian (who herself
would assign a very low utility to eating a steak) to utter (65).














‘There is a steak in the fridge.’
If the speaker simply used her own ordering sources, she would not be able to
make this contribution, since for her, none of the worlds in the modal base are
such that eating steak is optimal.
8This example is due to M. Zimmermann (p.c.) whose example involved the local non-
translatable type of sausage Stracke.
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Summary
The free factive subjunctive can only be used if the following two presup-
positions are met:
• There is a decision problem D, consisting of a modal base f =Doxα, a
stereotypical ordering source g1, a teleological ordering source g2={the
agent reaches her goal}, and a bouletic ordering source g3, when neces-
sary supplemented by an effective preference structure
• There is a unique action alternative a* such that for any two worlds w1,
w2 which only differ in whether the agent performs a* or some other
action alternative a (assume that w1 ∈a* and w2 ∈a): w1 ≤g1w2
3.4 The non-truth-conditional meaning component
of the free factive subjunctive
We have seen in section 3.1 that the free factive subjunctive contributes non-truth-
conditional, non-at-issue material in addition to its presuppositions. In this sec-
tion, I make a proposal for what this material is.
(3.66) Proposal for ~Ffs (to be revised)






where D is a decision problem, consisting of a modal base f D=Doxα, a
stereotypical ordering source g1D , a teleological ordering source g2D={the
agent reaches her goal}, and a bouletic ordering source g3D , when neces-
sary supplemented by an effective preference structure,
and a unique action alternative ap such that for any two worlds w1, w2
which only differ in whether the agent performs ap or some other action
alternative a (assume that w1 ∈ap and w2 ∈a): w1 ≤g1w2
On the truth conditional level, Ffs behaves like a (partial) identity function. It
presupposes that there is a decision problem D and a uniquely identified action
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alternative ap in the sense specified in the previous sections. On the non-truth-
conditional level, the free factive subjunctive contributes the following: among
the worlds which are optimal in view of the agent of the decision problem D,
there is (at least) one optimal world in where the agent chooses the action alter-
native ap, which is the one uniquely identified by p. Communicating that there
are optimal worlds in which the agent performs ap (rather than that all optimal
worlds are ap-worlds) has exactly the ‘tentative suggestion’ effect the descriptive
literature ascribes to the free factive subjunctive.
Before turning to the question of compositionality in the next chapter, I will
briefly discuss in prose what this analysis predicts for some of the examples that
have appeared in previous chapters. To make the examples easier to read, I present
them in the following format.
(3.67) ~p= truth-conditional meaning of pnon-truth-conditional meaning of p
The truth-conditional meaning of a proposition p is written on the numerator,
while the non-truth-conditional component is written on the denominator.
(3.68) ~Es wäre Pizza im Kühlschrank.w,g=
~Ffs(Es ist Pizza im Kühlschrank.)w,g=
[∃D and ∃aeat−pizza] Es ist Pizza im Kühlschrank∃w′∈Optg3 (Optg2 (Optg1 (∩ f (w)))):aeat−pizza(w′)=1
The meaning of es wäre Pizza im Kühlschrank is the following: the speaker
presupposes that there is a salient decision problem, and that there is an action al-
ternative identified by the prejacent proposition there is pizza in the fridge which
is as good or better than its alternatives when ranked by the stereotypical order-
ing source g1 (I call this action alternative eat-pizza). At the truth-conditional
at-issue level, the speaker communicates that there is pizza in the fridge. At the
non-truth-conditional, non-at-issue level, the speaker communicates that there is
a world which is optimal with respect to the decision problem and in which the
agent performs the action eat-pizza.
Now consider some other examples of free factive subjunctives.
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(3.69) ~Hier ginge es zum Gipfel.w,g=
~Ffs(Hier geht es zum Gipfel)w,g=
[∃D and ∃achoose−path]
this is the way to the summit
∃w′∈Optg3 (Optg2 (Optg1 (∩ f (w)))):achoose−path(w
′)=1
The speaker communicates that this is the way to the summit. She presupposes
that there is a decision problem (for example, which way should the agent go at a
crossroads in order to reach the summit), and that the prejacent proposition iden-
tifies one action alternative (for example, choose this particular path). The non-
truth-conditional, non-at-issue meaning conveyed by the free factive subjunctive
is that there are worlds which are optimal with respect to the decision problem in
which the agent chooses this particular path.
We can also analyze example (29) from Duden (2006).
(3.70) ~Hier hätten wir den Blumenladen.w,g=
~Ffs(Hier haben wir den Blumenladen.)w,g=
[∃D and ∃aremember−location]
here we have the florist’s shop
∃w′∈Optg3 (Optg2 (Optg1 (∩ f (w)))):aremember−location(w
′)=1
The speaker communicates that this is the florist’s shop. She presupposes that
there is a decision-problem (for example, which key locations should the agent
remember in the new town he is in), and that the prejacent proposition identifies
one action alternative (for example, remember the location of the florist). The non-
truth-conditional, non-at-issue meaning conveyed by the free factive subjunctive
is that there are worlds which are optimal with respect to the decision problem in
which the agent chooses to remember the location of the florist.
Finally, let us consider one of the literary examples discussed in chapter 1, Der
Dunkelgraf by Ludwig Bechstein.
(3.71) ~Ich hätte noch viel zu sagen.w,g=
~Ffs(Ich habe noch viel zu sagen.)w,g=
[∃D and ∃aask−speaker]
I have much more to say
∃w′∈Optg3 (Optg2 (Optg1 (∩ f (w)))):aask−speaker(w
′)=1
The speaker communicates that he has more to say. (The context is such that the
station of the speaker does not allow him to say more to his interlocutor, whose
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position in society is more powerful.) Using the free factive subjunctive pre-
supposes that the interlocutor has a decision problem (‘what should I do next?’)
and the prejacent proposition identifies one action alternative (asking the speaker
to say more). The non-truth-conditional, non-at-issue meaning conveyed is that
there are worlds which are optimal with respect to the decision problem in which
the agent chooses to ask the speaker to say more. In the context of the novel, it is
clear that the interlocutor does not have this decision problem, and that he will not
ask the speaker to say more. But by using the free factive subjunctive, the speaker
makes a conversational move which suggests that it is possible for the interlocutor
to accommodate both the decision problem and choosing to ask the speaker to say
more.
Summary I have argued that the free factive subjunctive makes three distinct
contributions to the meaning of the utterance it occurs in: it carries two presup-
positions and a non-at-issue, non-truth-conditional contribution. It presupposes
the existence of a decision problem and of an action alternative which is uniquely
identified by the prejacent, and then makes an existential claim about the worlds
where this action alternative is chosen.
I have provided a rendering of decision problems in a modal framework which will
enable us to derive a fully compositional semantics of the free factive subjunctive




As the previous chapter has shown, the contribution of the free factive subjunc-
tive is more than ‘just’ truth-conditional. Important parts of the content it conveys
are non-at-issue material. In order to still provide a compositional semantics, we
need to adopt a framework which can handle dealing with non-at-issue material in
a compositional way. One such framework is multi-dimensional semantics, and
in the present chapter I work out an analysis of the free factive subjunctive in a
multi-dimensional semantics.
Recent years have seen an increased interest in multi-dimensional semantic
composition. My proposal is in the spirit of Potts (2005, 2007) and follows the
important insight in McCready (2010) that elements can at once contribute to
the truth conditions and to the non-at-issue content of the utterance. I use the
logic developed in Gutzmann (2012) which translates McCready’s insights into
a fully compositional system. Note that I will not spend a lot of time reviewing
McCready’s or Gutzmann’s work; for details on the system, proofs, etc., I refer
readers to the original work.
The system works in the following way. Gutzmann argues we need three dimen-
sions which each contain semantic meaning of a different kind. We maintain the
familiar truth-conditional dimension with basic types e and t and its application
rules (functional application, predicate modification, etc.). We also maintain a
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Potts-style ‘use-conditional’ meaning dimension. All material on this dimension
is assigned the basic type u. Material on the use-conditional dimension cannot
participate in semantic composition; any material on this dimension is simply col-
lected and added to make up the expressive content conveyed by an utterance.
The ‘middle’ dimension is where truth-conditional and use-conditional meaning
can compose.
An expression like damn, as in that damn Alex, which is looking for an argu-
ment of type e, would thus be modelled as having type <e,u>: it is a function from
individuals to purely expressive meaning. Gutzmann proposes that the basic type
u can participate in type formation in the same way as the other basic types.
When determining the denotation of an expression, we have to pay attention to
all three dimensions: the purely truth-conditional level with its familiar types, the
purely use-conditional level with any expressive content that does not participate
in composition, and the ‘mixed’ level.
Consider again the element damn. Intuitively it contributes non-truth-conditional
material (roughly: the speaker has a negative attitude towards something), but it
is also a modifier which needs to combine with an argument (in this case, an in-
dividual, namely (that) damn Alex). It does not seem to contribute any purely
truth-conditional material or purely use-conditional material. We conclude that
it is of type <e,u> because it takes an element of type <e> as its argument and
returns an element of type <u>. Gutzmann suggests the following denotation for
verdammt ‘damn’; his example (5.89).
(4.1) ~damn= λp. p q bad<e,u> • U
We read the notation in (1) as follows. The lexical content is specified for all
three dimensions; first the truth-conditional material, then the ‘mixed’ content,
then purely use-conditional material. In the case of damn, there is no purely truth-
conditional content. We indicate this with a placeholder identity function which
is semantically vacuous. Material on the ‘mixed’ dimension is introduced by the
q symbol; in this case bad<e,u> which Gutzmann proposes to use as shorthand
for ‘a function which maps an individual to the use-conditional contribution that
the speaker has a negative attitude towards that individual’. Finally, the purely
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use-conditional dimension (introduced by •) is empty again and receives the se-
mantically vacuous value of the placeholder U.
Gutzmann proposes the following composition rules, as illustrated below.
(4.2) Functional application
α: <σt, τt>•γ β: σt • δ
α(β): τt • γ  δ
(4.3) Expressive application
α: <σ, τ>u •γ β: σt • δ
β: σtqα(β): τt • γ  δ
(4.4) Mixed application
α1:<σt, τt>qα2: <σt, νu> •γ β: σt • δ
α1(β): τtqα2(β): νu • γ  δ
(4.5) Shunting application
α:<σt, τt>•γ β: σt • δ
T, α(β): τu • γ  δ
(4.6) Shunting elimination
α: σtqβ: u •γ
α: σt • γ  β: u
I will not explain the proposal in detail. What is important for my purposes here
are rules (4) and (6): mixed application and shunting elimination. Mixed applica-
tion defines how a multi-dimensional element can take a purely truth-conditional
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element as an argument. Consider again damn which, on its mixed dimension, is
looking for an argument of type <e>. For damn to be able to combine with an ele-
ment of type <e> (which is of course purely truth-conditional), we have to assume
that the content of the truth-conditional dimension is always available for compo-
sition at the ‘mixed’ level (so the truth-conditional content of the expression Alex
is available at the mixed level).
(4.7) a. ~damn Alex=
b. damn<e,u> [Alexe]=
c. λp. p q bad<e,u> • U[Alexeq Alexe• U]=
d. Alexeq bad(Alex)u• U=
e. Alexeq Alexe• bad(Alex)u
We apply damn to Alex. Since damn is semantically vacuous on the truth-
conditional level, the truth-conditional content of the complex predicate is only
the individual Alex. At the mixed level the function bad<e,u> finds its argument of
type <e>: it combines with Alex (line (7d)). Note that after combining it is now
of type <u>.
Line (7e) illustrates the rule of shunting elimination: because the element on the
mixed dimension saturated its argument position in the previous step of the com-
putation and is now of type <u>, it gets shunted to the use-conditional dimension.
It is now no longer available for further computations on the ‘mixed’ dimension.
We predict that the meaning of (that) damn Alex is only Alex at the truth-
conditional level, and (very roughly) ‘the speaker expresses a negative attitude
towards Alex’ on the use-conditional level. (The truth-conditional content re-
mains available at the ‘mixed’ level for future composition with use-conditional
elements which may be met later in the tree.)
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4.1 The free factive subjunctive: a compositional ana-
lysis
With this mechanism in place, we can now provide a compositional semantics for
the free factive subjunctive. Please take note of the following important fact: the
expressions and formulae in this chapter will get very long. Therefore I will not
spell out the presuppositions that are attached to the lexical elements except in
the present section. In the remainder of this chapter, the reader should add them
herself.
I propose the following meaning for the free factive subjunctive.
(4.8) Proposal for ~Ffs (final)
~Ffs= λp<i,<s,t>>. λi. [∃ Di, ∃ ap]
λi. p(i)
q [∃(w’,t’) ∈Optg3D (Optg2D (Optg1D (∩ fD(w)))): ap(w’,t’)=1∧ i≺t’]<<i,<s,t>,<i,u>>
• U
where i is a time interval, D is a decision problem, consisting of a modal
base f D=Doxα, a stereotypical ordering source g1D , a teleological ordering
source g2D={the agent reaches her goal}, and a bouletic ordering source
g3D , when necessary supplemented by an effective preference structure,
and a unique action alternative ap such that for any two worlds w1, w2
which only differ in whether the agent performs ap or some other action
alternative a (assume that w1 ∈ap and w2 ∈a): w1 ≤g1w2
In prose: the Ffs presupposes that there is a decision problem D at time i and
a uniquely identified action alternative ap in the sense specified in the previous
sections.1 On the truth conditional level, Ffs behaves like a (partial) identity func-
tion. On the ‘mixed’ level, the free factive subjunctive contributes the following:
among the worlds which are optimal in view of the agent of the decision problem
D, there is (at least) one optimal world in which the agent chooses the action al-
ternative ap (and performs it at a time t’ shortly after i), which is the one uniquely
identified by p. Communicating that there are optimal worlds in which the agent
1The presuppositions carry over to the other dimensions; cf. Liu 2012.
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performs ap (rather than that all optimal worlds are ap-worlds) has exactly the
‘tentative suggestion’ effect the descriptive literature ascribes to the free factive
subjunctive.2
The type of the mixed level denotation of the free factive subjunctive is<<i,<s,t>,<i,u>>
– a function from propositions which are still missing their time argument to func-
tions from times to use-conditional content.3 The use-conditional dimension con-
tains a placeholder because the Ffs does not contribute any purely use-conditional
content.
Modifying the syntactic structure proposed in Kratzer (1998) I propose to add
a MoodP node between AspP and TP.












The denotation of the free factive subjunctive given in (8) then yields the fol-
lowing meaning (ignoring all presuppositions for easier legibility).
2Remember that for the reasons outlined in section 3.3.2 it is not possible to give a more precise
method of deriving the action alternative. It does depend on the content of the prejacent, but cannot
be identified compositionally; it can only be identified via world knowledge.
3I assume that modals allow existential quantification over times as argued for in Condoravdi
2002, Kusumoto 2005, Arregui 2007, and others.
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(4.10)
Ffs ich habe Pizza
p (λi. have(pizza, sp) at i)<i,<s,t>>
q Ffs<<i,<s,t>,<i,u>> q (λi. have(pizza, sp) at i)<i,<s,t>>
• U • U
Ffs(ich habe Pizza)
(λi.have(pizza, sp) at i)<i,<s,t>>
q (11)<i,u>
• U
For reasons of space, the denotation of (11) is given below.
(4.11) qλi.∃(w’,t’) ∈ Optg3D (Optg2D (Optg1D (∩ fD(w)))): ahave(pizza,sp)(w’,t’)=1 ∧
i≺t’
The final step of the computation happens when the expression at MoodP meets
the time variable. I follow the referential analysis of tense developed in Partee
(1973) in its instantiation in Heim’s lecture notes on tense which assumes that
tense refers to time intervals in a similar way as pronouns do to individuals:
(4.12) Presk is only defined if g(k)=t where t is the utterance time.
When defined, ~Prest,g= g(k) (Heim’s example (7))
(4.13) Pastk is only defined if g(k)<t where t is the utterance time.
When defined, ~Pastt,g= g(k). (Heim’s example (1a))
I follow von Roncador (1988) in assuming that the Konjunktiv II is interpreted
as a present tense and not as a past tense. This makes sense intuitively since it
can co-occur with genau jetzt ‘right now’. Then we can compute the meaning of
(Ffs(I have pizza))(Pres) as follows.
(4.14)
Ffs(have pizza) pres
(λi. have(pizza, sp at i))<i,<s,t>> g(k)<i>
q (11)<i,u> q g(k)<i>
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(4.15) (have(pizza,sp) at g(k))<s,t> (after shunting)
(4.16) ∃(w’,t’) ∈Optg3D (Optg2D (Optg1D (∩ fD(w)))): ahave(pizza,sp)(w’,t’)=1∧ g(k)≺t’
(after shunting)
At the ‘mixed’ level, an expression of type <i,u> combines with an expression
of type <i> to form an expression of type <u>. This expression is then shunted to
the •-dimension (given in (16)). At the ‘mixed’ level, the truth-conditional con-
tent is made available for any further computation.
The non-truth-conditional meaning in (16) in prose is as follows. There is a
world in the set of best worlds (relative to three ordering sources and a modal
base which are all relative to the (presupposed) decision problem) at which the
unique action alternative made salient by the proposition ‘I have pizza’ is carried
out at a time in the near future (relative to the utterance time). Note that this
condition ‘in the near future’ is necessary, as evidenced by the following context.
(4.17) Context: A (a freshman in high school): When I graduate from col-









intended: ‘There is a travel agency.’
B’s utterance is odd even though there is a salient decision problem (A wants to
travel the world) and B is making a contribution towards choosing an action (go
to the travel agency that is right there). However, the action alternative ‘go to the
travel agency’ is not one that makes sense for A to choose soon after the utterance
(it is known that A will not travel for at least another 7 years). Note that B could
have used a free factive subjunctive to point out what A should do right now in
order to pursue the dream of travelling the world.








‘Here is your chemistry book.’
The action alternative that is made salient by B’s utterance (‘study chemistry so
you can graduate on time’) is one that A can carry out in the near future in pursuit
of the goal.
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4.2 Interaction with other operators
Now that we have an analysis of the free factive subjunctive, we can test what
meanings it predicts when it interacts with other operators. As we have seen in
chapter 1, the free factive subjunctive can co-occur with past tense, and it (often)
resists combining with negation. In this section, I will account for this composi-
tionally. I also briefly discuss the effect of the free factive subjunctive in questions
and its interaction with other expressions that have a multi-dimensional semantics.
This is where our hard work pays off: any proposal which does not allow the
systematic composition with other operators is bound to fail, while the current pro-
posal can straightforwardly capture the meaning contribution of the Ffs in those
cases.
4.2.1 Past tense
As already discussed in chapter 1, the free factive subjunctive can co-occur with
past reference. In fact, the construction is very productive with past reference
as shown below. Intuitively, the meaning of free factive subjunctive plus past
reference is entirely compositional. We simply get the intuition that there was a
decision problem in the past, a salient action alternative in the past, and that in
the past the agent had an opportunity involving that action alternative. Note that a
conservative notion of (Gricean) relevance cannot help us analyze the meaning of

























4I assume that the form of the subjunctive used here – Konjunktiv II Perfekt – exhibits the same
ambiguity the indicative Perfekt exhibits: it is ambiguous between a ‘past tense’ interpretation
and a perfective interpretation, cf. Kratzer 1998. I will informally refer to the form as the Ffs’s
‘past tense’ where applicable, e.g. in contexts where it makes contextual sense to combine it with
gestern ‘yesterday’.
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‘If you were hungry yesterday, there was pizza in the fridge.’ Consequent
of a conditional
The free factive subjunctive can productively occur with past reference not only
in unembedded contexts, as in (19), but also in embedded contexts as in the ques-
tion in (20) and the consequent of a conditional in (21). This productivity poses
a compositionality puzzle – how does the contribution of the free factive subjunc-
tive interact with the past tense?
Following Partee (1973), Kratzer (1998), Ogihara (2007), Hatav (2012), Beck
and Gergel (2014) and others, I assume that past reference is more than existential
quantification over past times, namely that there is a particular point in time which
is in the past that a speaker refers to. I assume that using the past tense presupposes
that there is such a point in time, and I repeat here the denotation of the past tense
that I assume (following Heim 2014).
(4.22) Pastk is only defined if g(k)<t where t is the utterance time.
When defined, ~Pastt,g= g(k). (Heim’s example (1a))
Note that because the past reference is contributed as a presupposition, noth-
ing in the computation changes. As already mentioned, presuppositions – as part
of the truth conditions – are available at the ‘mixed’ level. Remember again the
presupposition that there is a salient decision problem. This presupposition was
time-indexed by the temporal variable i. When the time selected by i lies in the
past relative to the utterance time, the decision problem itself must also have ex-
isted in the past at time i.5 Then we can simply compute the meaning of past tense
5The case is slightly different if the agent has a decision problem now, and the speaker is point-
ing out that a solution was available at a past time. The interlocutors would have to accommodate
a (counterfactual) decision problem in the past in that case. I will ignore this here.
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occurrences of the free factive subjunctive as before. I call this scopal configura-
tion the ‘past over Ffs’ configuration.












The free factive subjunctive first combines with the tenseless phrase ‘I have
pizza’ as is familiar by now.
(4.24)
Ffs ich habe Pizza
p (λi. have(pizza, sp) at i)<i,<s,t>>
q Ffs<<i,<s,t>,<i,u>> q (λi. have(pizza, sp) at i)<i,<s,t>>
• U • U
Ffs(ich habe Pizza)
(λi.have(pizza, sp) at i)<i,<s,t>>
q (25)<i,u>
• U
(4.25) qλi.∃(w’,t’) ∈ Optg3D (Optg2D (Optg1D (∩ fD(w)))): ahave(pizza,sp)(w’,t’)=1 ∧
i≺t’
The difference in interpretation from the present tense case arises as expected:
the speaker is not committed to having pizza now, but at the relevant past time
picked out by the past tense.
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(4.26)
Ffs(have pizza) past
(λi. have(pizza, sp) at i)<i,<s,t>> g(k)<i>
q (25)<i,u> q g(k)<i>




(4.27) (have(pizza,sp) at g(k))<s,t> (after shunting)
(4.28) ∃(w’,t’) ∈Optg3D (Optg2D (Optg1D (∩ fD(w)))): ahave(pizza,sp)(w’,t’)=1∧ g(k)≺t’
As before, the ‘mixed’ level expression is shunted to the • dimension, and it is
communicated that there is a world among the best worlds (relative to the three
ordering sources and the modal base which themselves are relative to the pre-
supposed decision problem) where the action uniquely identified by the prejacent
proposition is carried out at a time t’ shortly after g(k), the reference time in the
past selected by the variable assignment.
Note that so far we have only discussed cases where the Konjunktiv II Perfekt
form of the Ffs is interpreted as a past tense, i.e., where the past scopes over
the Ffs. However, because the German Perfekt is also compatible with a perfect
interpretation, we should find examples where it is interpreted as present tense +
perfect aspect. This is indeed the case.
Perfective interpretations of the Ffs As pointed out in Kratzer (1998), the Ger-
man Perfekt is ambiguous between a true past tense meaning and a perfect inter-
pretation (present tense plus perfect aspect). For the Ffs this translates to contexts
where the decision problem has a reference time of now (present), but a past event
time. We do find examples like this, as follows.
(4.29) Context: A is making a documentary about men who were in the military
in the 1970s. B knows someone who was in the military then (who is long
retired).
B: Peter wäre in den Siebzigern bei der Bundeswehr gewesen.
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‘Peter was in the army in the seventies.’
{ ‘There is an opportunity (now) to interview Peter.’
Speaker A has a decision problem at the time of B’s utterance (present). What
B conveys is that it is currently relevant for A to know that Peter was in the mili-
tary in the past. That is, the time selected by g(k) is the utterance time.
Following Kratzer (1998) I assume that the ‘perfect’ meaning of the German
Perfekt is as follows.
(4.30) λP. λi. λw. ∃ε (time(ε) <i and P(ε)(w)=1
Since AspP is below MoodP, we assume that the proposition Peter be in the
army in the Seventies first combines with Perfekt, yielding the following.
(4.31) λi. λw. ∃ε (time(ε) <i and Peter be in the army in the Seventies(ε)(w)=1.
In prose: There is an event prior to time i which is an event of Peter being in
the army. Now this proposition combines with Ffs in the by now familiar manner,
yielding that there is an opportunity (at i) connected to the fact Peter was in the
army in the Seventies was true at a time before i. Finally, we apply (present!)
tense for all values of i.
(4.32)
Ffs Peter ist bei der Bundeswehr gewesen.
p (λi. ∃ε. Time(ε)<i and army(Peter)(ε)(w)=1)<i,<s,t>>
q Ffs<<i,<s,t>,<i,u>> q (λi. ∃ε. Time(ε)<i and army(Peter)(ε)(w)=1)<i,<s,t>>
• U • U
Ffs(Peter ist bei der Bundeswehr gewesen)
((λi. ∃ε. Time(ε)<i and army(Peter)(ε)(w)=1)<i,<s,t>>
q (33)<i,u>
• U
For reasons of space, the denotation of (33) is given below.
(4.33) qλi. ∃(w’,t’) ∈ Optg3D (Optg2D (Optg1D (∩ fD(w)))): aarmy(Peter)(w’,t’)=1 ∧
i≺t’
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(4.34)
Ffs(Peter ist bei der Bundeswehr gewesen) pres
(λi. ∃ε. Time(ε)<i and army(Peter)(ε)(w)=1)<i,<s,t>> g(k)<i>
q (33)<i,u> q g(k)<i>
• U • U
(∃ε. Time(ε)<g(k) and army(Peter)(ε)(w)=1))<s,t>
q (35)
• (36)
(4.35) (∃ε. Time(ε)<g(k) and army(Peter)(ε)(w)=1))<s,t> (after shunting)
(4.36) ∃(w’,t’) ∈Optg3D (Optg2D (Optg1D (∩ fD(w)))): aarmy(Peter)(w’,t’)=1 ∧ g(k)≺t’
(after shunting)
This yields precisely the meaning that we want to derive: There was an event
of Peter being in the Bundeswehr prior to the utterance time, and this gives rise to
an opportunity for the agent shortly after the utterance time.
The following example is a frequently-occurring example of the same kind.
(4.37) Das hätte ich erledigt.
‘I finished this (in the past).’
{ ‘There is an opportunity to start something new (now).’
Again, the speaker conveys that something that happened in the past is relevant
for a decision problem she is having at the utterance time.
The analysis can straightforwardly account for the contribution of the free fac-
tive subjunctive as it combines with tense and aspect.
4.2.2 Negation
As discussed in chapter 1, free factive subjunctives often resist co-occurring with
negation in out-of-the-blue contexts.









intended: ‘I don’t have any pizza.’
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But note that it is not the negation which makes the speaker’s utterance odd. An
utterance containing no overt negation but a similar propositional content is just
as odd.









intended: ‘The fridge is empty.’
The reason why both (38) and (39) are bad is because presupposition 2 is vi-
olated: there is no unique action alternative which is promoted. Free factive
subjunctives are only compatible with negation if the negated proposition itself
presents an ‘opportunity’. (This automatically excludes the Neg > Ffs scope con-
figuration.)
When the context is such that a proposition containing a negation does promote
a unique action alternative, the free factive subjunctive is perfectly acceptable.
(4.40) Context: The hotel is almost booked out, but there are some smoking
rooms left. A is looking for a room.
Host: XDie Raucherzimmer wären (noch) nicht belegt.
The smoking rooms are not booked up (yet).
{ ‘There is an opportunity involving the not-booked-up smoking rooms.’












‘C is not here now.’
Note that the negation takes narrow scope, and the Ffs scopes over it. In this
case, we predict that the presuppositions are as follows: there is a decision prob-
lem D, and the prejacent proposition C is not here uniquely identifies an action
alternative (for example ‘we can talk now while C is away’). Then the multi-
dimensional composition takes place as before, with negation inside the prejacent
of the free factive subjunctive.
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(4.42)
Ffs C is not here
p (λi. not(be-here(C)) at i)<i,<s,t>>
q Ffs<<i,<s,t>,<i,u>> q (λi. not(be-here(C)) at i)<i,<s,t>>
• U • U




For reasons of space, the denotation of (43) is given below.
(4.43) qλi.∃ (w’, t’) ∈ Optg3D (Optg2D (Optg1D (∩ fD(w)))): anot(be-here(C))(w’, t’)=1
∧ i≺t’
As before the final step of the computation happens when the expression at
MoodP meets the time variable.
(4.44)
Ffs(C not here) pres
(λi. not(be-here(C)) at i)<i,<s,t>> g(k)<i>
q (43)<i,u> q g(k)<i>




(4.45) (not(be-here(C)) at g(k))<s,t> (after shunting)
(4.46) ∃ (w’, t’) ∈ Optg3D (Optg2D (Optg1D (∩ fD(w, t)))): a(not(C here))(w’, t’)=1 ∧
g(k)≺t’










intended: ‘There is no pizza.’






The presuppositions are the following: There is a salient decision problem
D, and the prejacent of the subjunctive (which does not contain the negation)
uniquely identifies an action alternative.
The free factive subjunctive combines with the prejacent at MoodP and we com-
pute that there is a world (optimal with respect to the ordering sources and the
modal base) in which the agent chooses that unique action alternative. This mate-
rial is then shunted to the ‘use-conditional’ dimension at TP. But only then does
the negation meet the prejacent. So on the truth-conditional level the speaker com-
municates that there is no pizza in w0, while on the use-conditional level commu-
nicating that there are worlds where choosing an action alternative based on the
fact that there is pizza in those worlds is optimal in those worlds. This results in
an odd utterance: First we calculate the meaning of Ffs(there is pizza)(pres) as
before. Only then do we apply the negation.
(4.49)
Ffs there is pizza
p (λi. pizza at i)<i,<s,t>>
q Ffs<<i,<s,t>,<i,u>> q (λi. pizza at i)<i,<s,t>>





For reasons of space, the denotation of (50) is given below.
(4.50) qλi.∃ (w’, t’) ∈ Optg3D (Optg2D (Optg1D (∩ fD(w)))): apizza(w’, t’)=1 ∧ i≺t’
Now the expression in MoodP meets the time variable.
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(4.51)
Ffs(pizza) pres
(λi. pizza at i)<i,<s,t>> g(k)<i>
q (50)<i,u> qg(k)<i>




(4.52) (pizza at g(k))<s,t> (after shunting)
(4.53) ∃ (w’, t’) ∈ Optg3D (Optg2D (Optg1D (∩ fD(w, t)))): apizza(w’, t’)=1 ∧ g(k)≺t’
In prose, at this point (before negation) the truth-conditional content is: there is
pizza in the fridge at the utterance time. At the use-conditional level (importantly:
already shunted so no longer available for computation) the speaker is conveying
that there is a world among the best worlds regarding the agent’s decision prob-
lem in which the agent performs the action uniquely identified by ‘there is pizza’
shortly after the utterance time.
What happens when negation meets this expression? The truth-conditional con-
tent is negated straightforwardly. However, because the use-conditional content is
no longer available for computation, it does not interact with the negation.
(4.54)
Ffs(pizza)(pres)<s,t> Neg<<s,t><s,t>>
(pizza at g(k))<s,t> Neg<<s,t><s,t>>
qM qM
• ∃ (w’, t’)...: apizza(w’, t’)=1 ∧ g(k)≺t’ • U
(no pizza at g(k))<s,t>
qM
• ∃ (w’, t’)...: apizza(w’, t’)=1 ∧ g(k)≺t’
I introduce the shorthand M here to indicate that nothing interesting is hap-
pening at the mixed level (q). Technically speaking the material from the truth-
conditional dimension is copied to the q level and the exact same calculations are
carried out there as well.
So while the truth-conditional content of the utterance is ‘there is no pizza at the
utterance time’, the use-conditional content that is communicated is about which
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actions the agent should take in those worlds where there is pizza in the fridge.
This results in the utterance being odd. Because negation cannot interact with
the contribution of the free factive subjunctive once it has met the tense variable
and has been shunted to the use-conditional dimension, negation cannot take wide
scope.
4.2.3 Questions
As I have shown throughout the present text, the free factive subjunctive can co-
occur with questions. Both polar questions and wh-questions are acceptable if the





















‘Does Peter have a beard?’
(4.57) Context: The speaker is wondering whether she should take the car or











‘Where is the car?’
(4.58) Context: The speaker is hosting a party and is wondering whether he








As predicted by standard theories of presuppositions, the presuppositions in
these questions project, and in each case the speaker is committed to there being
a salient decision problem.
Spelling out a particular semantics for the Ffs in questions is beyond the scope
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of the present work; I will therefore limit myself to briefly sketching what the
proposal should look like. Following Stenius (1967) I assume that questions con-
sist of a question operator ? and a sentence radical p which can take the form of
a proposition (in the case of a polar question) or of a property (in the case of a
wh-question).
(4.59) a. Polar question: λw.proposition-content(w) (proposition)
b. Constituent question: λw.λx.property-content(w)(x) (property)
c. Multiple consituent question:
λw.λx1. . . . λxn.relation-content(w)(x1) . . . (xn)
(intensional relation between two or more individuals)
Then we get the following semantics for questions containing the Ffs.
(4.60) ?(Ffs(p))
{p;¬p}
{ There is an opportunity related to p.
(4.61) . ?λx(Ffs(p(x)))
{x.|p(x)}
{ λx. There is an opportunity related to p(x).
For example, the question Is(Ffs) there pizza in the fridge? asks whether there is
pizza in the fridge. On the non-at-issue level, it signals that there is an opportunity
connected to the sentence radical (that is, there is an opportunity connected to
there is pizza in the fridge).
For a wh-question such as Who is.Ffs hungry?, the contribution of the Ffs at
the non-at-issue level is ‘There is an opportunity connected to x is hungry’ for
relevant x.
4.2.4 Free factive subjunctives and other multi-dimensional ex-
pressions
Given the denotion of the free factive subjunctive in (8), there is nothing that
should prevent the free factive subjunctive from co-occuring with other expres-
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sions which have a multi-dimensional semantics. Remember that ‘use-conditional’
material can simply be added at the • level.
(4.62) Context: A is the last guest at B’s party. A is hungry, but there is only











‘I have that shitty pizza.’
Let us assume the following (crude) denotation for scheiß ‘shitty’.
(4.63) ~scheiß= T q bad<<e,t>,u>• U
The contribution of scheiß ‘shitty’ is that the speaker has a negative attitude









After scheiß has combined with pizza, its ‘use-conditional’ contribution is shunted
to the • level. It no longer interacts with the rest of the computation. The meaning
of ich habe scheiß Pizza is computed only on the truth-conditional level (up to
MoodP), with the use-conditional meaning of scheiß Pizza stored away in the U
dimension. Then we apply Ffs in the familiar manner.
(4.65)
Ffs I have shitty pizza
p (have(sp, pizza))<i,<s,t>>
q [ λi. ∃ (w’, t’)...: ap(w’, t’)=1 ∧ i≺t’]<<i,<s,t>,<i,u>> q (have(sp, pizza))<i,<s,t>>
U • bad(pizza)u
(λi. have(sp, pizza) at i)<i,<s,t>>
q [ λi. ∃ (w’, t’)...: ap(w’, t’)=1 ∧ i≺t’]<<i,<s,t>,<i,u>>
• bad(pizza)u
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The Ffs only contributes material on the second dimension. It takes as input the
material found in the truth-conditional dimension, ignoring the use-conditional
content. That is, the fact that the speaker has a negative attitude towards the pizza
does not enter the computation because it is no longer available. The final step
again consists of combining with tense.
(4.66)
Ffs(I have shitty pizza) pres
(λi. have(pizza, sp) at i)<i,<s,t>> g(k)<i>
q (λi. ∃ (w’, t’)...: ap(w’, t’)=1 ∧ i≺t’)<i,u> q g(k)<i>




(4.67) (have(pizza,sp) at g(k))<s,t> (after shunting)
(4.68) (∃ (w’, t’) ∈ Optg3D (Optg2D (Optg1D (∩ fD(w)))): ahave(pizza,sp)(w’, t’)=1 ∧
g(k)≺t’)u  bad(pizza)u (after shunting)
This corresponds to our intution: the speaker is both contributing the non-
truth-conditional information that the pizza is shitty, but also that there are worlds
among the ‘best’ worlds in which A chooses the action alternative made salient
by the prejacent proposition. That is, even though the pizza is shitty, if A is really
hungry, he might consider eating it nonetheless.
4.3 Summary
In this chapter, I have provided a formal analysis of free factive subjunctives that
is fully compositional. I have employed a multi-dimensional semantics to capture
its meaning. (For reasons of legibility I have not included each expression’s pre-
suppositions in my computations.) I have shown how the semantics work for the
basic case, and I have sketched how we can apply the semantics of the free factive
subjunctive in cases where it interacts with other operators such as negation and
past tense.
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The free factive subjunctive can be analyzed formally as follows.
(4.69) ~Ffs= λp<i,<s,t>>. λi. [∃ Di, ∃ ap]
λi. p(i) q [∃(w’, t’) ∈ Optg3D (Optg2D (Optg1D (∩ fD(w)))): ap(w’, t’)=1∧
i≺t’]<<i,<s,t>,<i,u>>• U
where i is a time interval, D is a decision problem, consisting of a
modal base f D=Doxα, a stereotypical ordering source g1D , a teleologi-
cal ordering source g2D={the agent reaches her goal}, and a bouletic
ordering source g3D , when necessary supplemented by an effective
preference structure,
and a unique action alternative ap such that for any two worlds w1,
w2 which only differ in whether the agent performs ap or some other
action alternative a (assume that w1 ∈ap and w2 ∈a): w1 ≤g1w2

Chapter 5
Free factive subjunctives and
relevance conditionals
In this chapter I discuss the intuition that because free factive subjunctives and rel-
evance conditionals fulfill similar functions, we might be able to come up with an
alternative analysis of Ffss in terms of relevance conditionals. The most famous
example of a relevance conditional is given in (1) and appeared first in Austin
(1956); in fact this example has given rise to the alternative name biscuit con-
ditional. I will use the more descriptive term relevance conditional, following
Iatridou (1994) and others.
(5.1) There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them.
The chapter first gives a very brief introduction of what relevance conditionals
are and how they differ from other types of conditionals in section 5.1. Section 5.2
motivates the intuition that free factive subjunctives and relevance conditionals
are somehow related, and it gives a brief overview over the existing theories of
relevance conditionals on the market. Section 5.3 argues that it is actually not
possible to use relevance conditionals to explain what free factive subjunctives
are and what they mean. I show that existing analyses of relevance conditionals
simply do not capture the properties of free factive subjunctives.
Instead, I introduce novel data on relevance conditionals in section 5.4, and
I explore the interaction between relevance conditionals and tense. Section 5.5
proposes a unified analysis that can account for the past tense data. Finally sec-
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tions 5.6 and 5.7 raise two side issues: 5.6 discusses a problem for analyes of
present counterfactuals, and 5.7 presents some experimental data on word order
in German conditionals.
5.1 Relevance conditionals
Consider the following minimal pair.1
(5.2) If Alex went shopping, there is pizza in the fridge.
Hypothetical conditional
(5.3) If you are hungry, there is pizza in the fridge.
Relevance conditional
Our intuition is the following: a speaker who utters (2) is not committed to there
being pizza in the fridge in the actual world. If the addressee hears (2) and finds
no pizza, it is perfectly natural for the speaker to continue, ‘oh, Alex must not
have gone shopping then.’ Moreover, the hearer cannot complain that the speaker
said there was going to be pizza in the fridge. By contrast, if the speaker utters
(3) and the addressee does not find pizza in the fridge, it is weird for the speaker
to say ‘oh, you must not be hungry then’, and it is perfectly acceptable for the
addressee to complain when there is no pizza.
To put this more technically, the speaker of (2) conveys a complex belief: she
does not believe that there is definitely pizza in the fridge in the world of evalua-
tion. Instead she is committed (very roughly) to the belief that in all worlds where
Alex went shopping there is pizza in the fridge.
But the intuition for (3) is different: here the speaker does seem to be com-
mitted to there being pizza in the fridge in the world of evaluation. Whether the
addressee is hungry or not (i.e., whether the antecedent is true or not) does not
seem to play a role. This is the hallmark of a relevance conditional: the speaker
is taken to be committed to the truth of the consequent proposition in the actual
world, whether or not the antecedent proposition turns out to be true.
1Example 3 goes back to Ebert et al. 2008.
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Before addressing the connection between relevance conditionals and free fac-
tive subjunctives, let me very briefly introduce some terminology.
For a conditional of the form if p, q the proposition p is called the antecedent
whereas q is called the consequent. I assume a standard analysis following Lewis
(1975) and Kratzer (1981, 1986), taking conditionals to be modal sentences, with
the antecedent modifying the restrictor of the modal. I assume the semantics in
the notation of von Fintel and Heim (2011), given in (4).
(5.4) ~if p, qw,g= λf. λg. ∀w’∈ Optg(∩f(w)∪p): q(w’)=1.
In prose, all the (best, relative to ordering source g) worlds in the modal base f
in which p also holds are worlds in which q holds.
As we will see in the following section, it is a matter of some debate whether
the semantics in (4) applies only to hypothetical conditionals, or to relevance con-
ditionals as well.
5.2 Free factive subjunctives and relevance condi-
tionals
As was shown in chapter 1, free factive subjunctives can be used when there is a
salient decision problem. A speaker who wishes to suggest an action alternative
without appearing ‘pushy’ can use a free factive subjunctive (this is why the free
factive subjunctive has been described as having a tentative or polite meaning).
Of course there are numerous other ways of providing tentative advice.
(5.5) You could eat some pizza. PossibilityModal
(5.6) If you want to eat something, you could have some pizza.
Anankastic Conditional
(5.7) Why don’t you eat some pizza? neg/rhet. Question
(5.8) If you are hungry, there is some pizza in the fridge.
Relevance conditional
Of the options presented above, the one that is intuitively perhaps the most sim-
ilar to the free factive subjunctive is the relevance conditional in (8): the speaker
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has to be committed to the truth of there is pizza in the fridge and the ‘proposal’
that the addressee eat the pizza is somewhat indirect. Compare the other cases
where some version of you eat pizza is explicitly mentioned; this is not possible
in either the Ffs or the relevance conditional. In both cases the utterance is com-
patible with a scenario in which the speaker already knows that the addressee is
hungry (in this case the antecedent of the relevance conditional is interpreted fac-
tually). Crucially it is also compatible with a scenario in which the speaker is not
sure.
One reasonable approach to analyzing free factive subjunctives could therefore
be to argue that they are not in fact ‘free’ after all, but rather that they are al-
ways the consequent of a relevance conditional. For the cases where there is no
overt antecedent (the ‘unembedded’ cases discussed in the previous chapters of
the present text) we simply assume a hidden antecedent. It is intuitively easy to
reconstruct a possible antecedent: since free factive subjunctives always presup-
pose a salient decision problem, the antecedent can simply make this explicit, and
we can even formulate an explicit ‘recipe’ for retrieving a possible antecedent.
Consider again our paradigm example in (9).
(5.9) Es wäre Pizza im Kühlschrank.
truth-conditional import: ‘There is pizza in the fridge.’
presupposed: A salient individual is hungry and wondering what to do
about that.
Instead of having the presupposition that there is a salient individual who is
hungry, we can construct a relevance conditional which contains this information
in the antecedent as in (10). In this case, the factive subjunctive in the conse-
quent is no longer ‘free’; instead we have a relevance conditional with a factively



















‘If you are hungry, there is pizza in the fridge.’
A ‘hidden relevance conditional’ style analysis along these lines is especially
attractive in view of the fact that a similar proposal has been made for unem-
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bedded counterfactual subjunctives for English and German: Kasper (1992) and
Schueler (2008) propose that unembedded counterfactuals should be analyzed as
the consequent of a counterfactual conditional with a hidden antecedent.
(5.11) I would have passed that test.
(5.12) If I had taken it, I would have passed that test.
Kasper proposes that an unembedded counterfactual such as (11) is interpreted
semantically as the consequent of a counterfactual conditional such as (12). He
suggests that a plausible antecedent can be reconstructed from the context – typ-
ically it is a ‘necessary precondition’ for the truth of the consequent. For exam-
ple, the speaker can only pass the test by taking it. Note that Kasper allows the
antecedent to not be uniquely identified: depending on context, other plausible
antecedents for (11) could be if I had studied more or if I had arrived on time.
Kasper’s analysis is very elegant: it provides a modal, counterfactual meaning for
unembedded counterfactual subjunctives that corresponds to our intuitions, and it
moreover reduces the – crosslinguistically atypical – unembedded subjunctive to
the better-understood counterfactual conditional case, which is also attested more
widely cross-linguistically.
It is intuitively easy to come up with a parallel story for free factive subjunc-
tives as sketched above. We can propose the following alternative analysis of free
factive subjunctives.
(5.13) Proposal (to be rejected). A free factive subjunctive Ffs(p) with a con-
textually salient decision problem Dp should be analyzed as a relevance
conditional of the form:
If the agent is wondering about Dp, Ffs(p).
(with the meaning of Ffs to be determined.)
In order to see whether it is possible to implement the proposal in (13), I will
briefly review the existing analyses of relevance conditionals. Note that the argu-
ment I will eventually make to reject (13) will not hinge on choosing a particular
analysis; it is purely data-driven.
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5.2.1 Theories of relevance conditionals
There are two main types of analyses available for relevance conditionals: those
that propose the same syntax and semantics for relevance conditionals as we as-
sume for hypothetical conditionals (DeRose and Grandy 1999, Franke 2007, 2009,
Scheffler 2008), and those who do not (Davison 1983, Iatridou 1994, Siegel 2006,
Predelli 2009, Swanson 2013, Ebert et al. 2008, 2014). Authors who assume a
different syntax and semantics at least partially base this decision on the follow-
ing empirical observation for German. German relevance conditionals generally
prefer to occur with V2 word order in the consequent, whereas hypothetical condi-
tionals prefer V1 word order. By some authors this obsevation has been strength-
ened to a general rule ‘German relevance conditionals require V2 word order in
the consequent.’ In section 5.7 I show empirically that the data are actually not as
clearcut, and that basing a theory on the ungrammaticality of relevance condition-
als with V1 word order in the consequent is perhaps flawed.
In what follows, I call theories who base their analysis of relevance condition-
als on the general assumption that they have a different syntax and/or seman-
tics syntax-based theories. Theories which assume that the syntax and semantics
of relevance conditionals are the same as that of hypothetical conditionals and
that the difference in interpretation comes about through pragmatic means will be
called pragmatic theories.
Let me first very briefly summarize what is claimed by the syntax-based the-
ories. They differ in the details, but all share the common assumption that the
syntax of relevance conditionals is different from that of hypothetical condition-
als, which in turn causes them to receive a different semantic interpretation. For
Iatridou (1994), it is the relevance conditionals’ (perceived) inability to host then
in the consequent. Ebert et al. (2014) also assume that it is the presence of
then which forces a hypothetical conditional reading (for them, then serves as
a world pronoun which picks out the world described by the antecedent; they fol-
low Schlenker 2004 in assuming that the antecedents of conditionals are definite
descriptions of worlds).
Because the syntax-based theories base their analyses on a set of facts which
I have shown not to hold for German (speakers do not perceive relevance condi-
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tionals with V1 word order in the consequent to be ungrammatical), I conclude
that these analyses do not quite capture the meaning of relevance conditionals yet.
Let us therefore turn our attention to the pragmatic theories.
DeRose and Grandy (1999) propose a ‘conditional assertion’ account: the con-
sequent of a conditional is only asserted if its antecedent is true (in the case of
a hypothetical conditional) or if its antecedent is relevant (in the case of a rele-
vance conditional). This kind of analysis has been shown to be problematic on
the basis of two types of examples: first, there are examples where the conse-
quents still have an effect on the public commitments of the speaker even when
the antecedent is false. For example, Siegel (2006) argues that an utterance of If
you want to know, the gardener was the murderer still commits the speaker to the
belief that the gardener was the murderer (and therefore perhaps even asserts the
consequent, even if the antecedent was false). A second type of example are those
where the consequent is not an assertion, but a different speech act type, e.g. an
imperative (If I may be honest, better call Andreas as soon as possible), as argued
in Schwager (2006).
Scheffler (2008) suggests that relevance conditionals have a two-dimensional
semantics. Following Potts (2005), and in particular his proposal for speaker-
oriented adverbs, she proposes that relevance conditionals assert their consequent
and communicate the entire conditional as a conventional implicature (CI). The
semantics of the conditional at the CI level are those of a hypothetical conditional.
(5.14) If you are hungry, there is pizza in the fridge.
asserted: There is pizza in the fridge.
conventional implicature: If you are hungry, there is pizza in the fridge.
The account remains problematic even if we assume that it is possible to extend
Scheffler’s account straightforwardly to other speech act types to account for the
examples such as (15).
(5.15) a. If we now turn to page 5, where is the summary?
b. If we now turn to page 5, please provide a brief summary!
Since we would probably not want to propose that the consequents of (15) are
somehow asserted, we would have to somehow come up with an analysis that
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would allow us to retrieve the speech act type of the (embedded!) consequent.
But even if this was possible, the following problem remains. Scheffler’s main
argument for proposing an analysis of this kind is the embeddability properties of
relevance conditionals (which she argues are similar to those of speaker-oriented
adverbs). But Franke (2009) argues that relevance conditional readings are avail-
able independently of special embedding properties. This is a convincing argu-
ment, and we conclude fthat a different mechanism must be at stake.
Franke (2007, 2009) proposes that relevance conditionals have the same se-
mantics as hypothetical conditionals. The reason why the speaker is assumed to
be committed to the truth of the consequent in the actual world is the result of
pragmatic reasoning paired with conditional independence.
Franke proposes that two propositions p and q are conditionally independent
if changing your beliefs about one of them will not result in a change of your
belief of the other. Consider a hypothetical conditional such as (16), which is
conditionally dependent.
(5.16) If Alex went shopping, there is pizza in the fridge.
Once you change your beliefs about whether or not Alex went shopping, you are
likely to also change your beliefs about whether there is pizza in the fridge. This
means that Alex went shopping and there is pizza in the fridge are conditionally
dependent. But compare (17).
(5.17) If you are hungry, there is pizza in the fridge.
Learning that the addressee is hungry will not change your beliefs about whether
there is pizza in the fridge – this means that you are hungry and there is pizza in
the fridge are conditionally independent.
Conventionally, a conditional construction is used when two propositions are
conditionally dependent, resulting in hypothetical conditionals like (16). But
when two propositions are conditionally independent and are still conjoined in
a conditional construction, Franke proposes that the following chain of pragmatic
reasoning occurs on the part of the addressee:
1. The speaker pronounced a conditional.
Chapter 5. Free factive subjunctives and relevance conditionals 133
2. The antecedent and consequent are conditionally independent.
3. The speaker knows this, and knows that the addressee also knows this.
4. Therefore the speaker must have independent evidence for the truth of the
consequent.
In the final step the addressee infers that the speaker is committed to the truth
of the consequent in the actual world, but crucially this is an effect of pragmatic
reasoning, not part of the semantics.
It is important to note that while Franke’s analysis seems to fare better than its
syntax-based competitors, it also has some problems. For example, the meaning
expressed by a hypothetical conditional can also be conveyed in a number of dif-
ferent ways which do not have the form if p, q, for example parataxis (p. q.). It
seems to be almost impossible to give a relevance conditional interpretation to two
propositions in a paratactic structure (cf. von Fintel 2015)
(5.18) a. The sun comes out. You are happy.
≈ whenever the sun comes out, you are happy; if the sun comes out,
you are happy.
b. You are hungry. There is pizza in the fridge.
0 if you are hungry, there is pizza in the fridge.
We observe that the paratactic structure in (18a) can be used to convey a hypo-
thetical conditional meaning, while it is impossible to get a relevance conditional
interpretation for (18b). We must ask, first, whether (18a) can be thought of as
a conditional. If the answer is yes, and we want to maintain Franke’s hypothe-
sis that hypothetical and relevance conditionals have the same semantics, there
would be a problem: then we should be able to read (18b) as a conditional which
receives a relevance interpretation via pragmatic reasoning. While this goes be-
yond the scope of the present work, I want to sketch a way out. Remember that the
starting point for the pragmatic reasoning that Franke describes is that the speaker
pronounces a conditional with an antecedent and a consequent which are condi-
tionally independent. The reason why an addressee starts pragmatic reasoning is a
repair mechanism: the speaker utters a structure which is structurally dependent,
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but conditionally independent, and the addressee needs to make sense of this.
But the speaker of (18b) did not pronounce a conditional. She pronounced two
conditionally independent and structurally independent clauses. Therefore the
addressee does not need a repair mechanism; the two clauses can simply be in-
terpreted independently of each other and do not need to be made sense of by
additional pragmatic reasoning.
5.3 A relevance conditional analysis of free factive
subjunctives
For now, we will leave the matter of how to appropriately analyze relevance condi-
tionals behind: no matter which analysis we choose, there are empirical problems
with trying to analyze free factive subjunctives in terms of relevance conditionals.
Recall from the previous section that the intuitive way to go would be to emulate
Kasper’s proposal for unembedded counterfactual subjunctives.
Kasper conceded that reconstructing the hidden antecedent (of a counterfac-
tual conditional) results in some vagueness, and we also have to assume a certain
underspecification with respect to the antecedent of a reconstructed relevance con-
ditional. For example, we can imagine that the granularity of the decision problem
might depend on the context.
Thus, da wäre Pizza im Kühlschrank ‘there is.Ffs pizza in the fridge’ could be
expanded into the following acceptable relevance conditionals depending on what












































‘If he wants to eat at home, there is pizza in the fridge.’
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Compared to the conditional with the ‘standard’ antecedent if you are hungry,
(19) is mentioning a more coarse-grained decision problem (thinking about food
more generally), whereas (20) is more fine-grained: thinking about what to eat at
home is more specific than thinking about what to eat.
Assuming that there is a way to deal with this vague mechanism for recon-
structing an antecedent, both for Kasper’s counterfactual subjunctives and for free
factive ones – what then is the meaning of the free factive subjunctive in relevance
conditionals such as (19) and (20)?
We run into a problem here. Relevance conditionals do not typically contain
a subjunctive in the consequent. Kasper’s proposal for unembedded counterfac-
tual subjunctives is so attractive because it explains precisely why the subjunctive
occurs where it does: counterfactual conditionals (in German) always use a sub-
junctive in their consequents. It also predicts their meaning: all we have to do
is employ our favourite semantics of counterfactual conditionals (and add an ap-
propriate antecedent) to calculate the meaning of an unembedded counterfactual
subjunctive.
But the case is very different for free factive subjunctives which are embedded
in the consequent of a relevance conditional. Relevance conditionals typically do
not have a subjunctive in their consequents. The analyses of relevance condition-
als therefore do not allow us to simply adopt our favourite theory of relevance
conditionals to account for the meaning of free factive subjunctives.2
In particular, we observe the following problem: unlike counterfactual condi-
tionals, relevance conditionals in German do not always use a subjunctive in their
2Swanson 2013 discusses true counterfactual uses of relevance conditionals. Note that in those
cases both the antecedent and the consequent show the morphology that is associated with counter-
factual conditionals, and they also receive a counterfactual interpretation. Consider his examples
(1) and (2) reported below which according to Swanson receive a counterfactual interpretation
(the speaker is not committed to the presence of biscuits on the sideboard in the actual world) in a
context where she is fantasizing about an ideal Sunday afternoon in Paris.
(5.i) There would be biscuits on the sideboard, if one were so inclined.
(5.ii) There would have been biscuits on the sideboard, if one had been so inclined.
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consequents. In fact, there is a subtle difference in meaning between (more fa-







































‘If you are hungry, there is (Ffs) pizza in the fridge.’
Both (21) and (22) are relevance conditionals. They only differ in the choice of
mood in the consequent. However, this choice of mood results in a subtle differ-
ence in their meaning which is – crucially – the same as the difference in meaning
between an unembedded free factive subjunctive and its indicative counterpart!
This difference in meaning will cause me to reject the alternative proposal. The
difference between (21) and (22) forces us to provide a non-empty semantics for
the subjunctive in (22). We cannot use either the reportative or the irrealis mean-
ing. Thus we are in the same situation that we were in at the outset. Adding a
relevance conditional antecedent does not gain us anything.
For completeness’ sake, I will briefly spell out how we can deal with (22). We
could assume that the free factive subjunctive is semantically vacuous in a rel-
evance conditional. If there is no overt antecedent, it would simply serve as a
signal to retrieve a relevance conditional antecedent. This predicts that (21) and
(22) have the exact same meaning, which is empirically wrong.
Assuming that the subjunctive in (22) has a reportative meaning also contra-
dicts our intuitions, and it is also not the case that it conveys weakened epistemic
commitment to the fact that there is pizza in the fridge. Thus, we can also ex-
clude an irrealis interpretation. There are three opportunities which would make
a relevance conditional analysis attractive: if the subjunctive in the antecedent of
a relevance conditional is vacuous; if it is always reportative, or if it is always
an irrealis use. Empirically none of these is the case. Thus, thinking of free fac-
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tive subjunctives as the consequents of a hidden relevance conditionals does not
help us interpret the free factive subjunctive itself. We still have to assume a non-
vacuous meaning of the subjunctive, and crucially, we have to assume a meaning
which is different from either of the two established meanings, the reportative and
the irrealis.
Overall, it is clear that abandoning the analysis I have outlined in chapters 3 and
4 in favour of a ‘hidden relevance conditional antecedent’ one is not favourable
because, unlike in the seemingly parallel case of unembedded counterfactual sub-
junctives, we do not retain any of that analysis’ explanatory power. Instead we
simply inherit the difference in meaning that already exists between a plain in-
dicative and its free factive subjunctive counterpart and now also have to contend
with a conditional semantics on top of that. Therefore I propose to abandon this
alternative theory for the time being. In order to make it work we would still have
to assign a (non-empty and not previously established) meaning to the subjunctive
in the consequent. But this is exactly what my analysis developed in chapters 3
and 4 sets out to do.
5.4 Problem-solving and discourse-structuring rele-
vance conditionals
Even though looking to relevance conditionals in order to learn something about
free factive subjunctives might be less productive than one’s first intuition may
have suggested, it is still worth taking a closer look at relevance conditionals






































‘If you are hungry, there is pizza in the fridge.’















































‘If you are interested, there is a Kandinsky exhibit in the Neue Na-
tionalgalerie.’
There is a contrast in acceptability when we add past reference: the conditionals
that make a decision problem salient can have a past tense antecedent, whereas
those that make a discourse move salient cannot. (This is true both for free factive
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intended: ‘If I was being honest (yesterday), you looked tired.’
Importantly we can replicate this contrast in acceptability of past reference in
English: relevance conditionals which make a decision problem salient can have
an antecedent which expresses past reference, but those that make a discourse
move salient cannot.
(5.30) a. If you are hungry, there is pizza in the fridge.
b. X If you were hungry yesterday, there was pizza in the fridge.
(5.31) a. If I am being frank, you look tired.
b. ?? If I was being frank yesterday, you looked tired.
It is important to note here that this contrast in acceptability only exists for the
antecedents – it is perfectly acceptable to have a present tense antecedent with a
past tense consequent.
(5.32) X If I am being frank now, you looked tired yesterday.
(5.33) ?? If I was being frank yesterday, you look tired now.
In what follows I am not interested in the tense configuration in (32) for rea-
sons that will become obvious below. I propose the following terminology: I call
relevance conditionals like (30) problem-solving relevance conditionals (PSRCs)
because their antecedents make a (decision) problem salient. Relevance condition-
als like (31) will be called discourse-structuring relevance conditionals (DSRCs)
because they structure the discourse in a particular way (explored below).
Another way to distinguish between the two types of relevance conditionals is
that in case paraphrases of the antecedent are only available for the type compati-
ble with past reference (Larry Horn, Kai von Fintel, p.c.). Compare the following
sentences.
(5.34) In case you are hungry, there is pizza in the fridge.
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(5.35) ??In case I’m being frank, you look awful.
There are two additional intuitive differences between problem-solving RCs
and discourse-structuring RCs: problem-solving RCs allow the speaker to be un-
biased about the truth of p (they can be pronounced even if the speaker knows that
p is false), and the addressee can reject p. Pronouncing a discourse-structuring RC
when its antecedent is known to be false crashes the discourse, and it is extremely
difficult for the addressee to reject p.
Bias towards truth of p Problem-solving RCs do not convey that the speaker
has an opinion about the antecedent p. It is even possible to assert ifPS RC p, q when
the speaker knows that p is false.
(5.36) Context: B has just complained that he is very full.
A: XWell, but don’t forget. If you are hungry, there’s pizza in the fridge.
The same is not true for discourse-structuring RCs.
(5.37) Context: B has just complained that A is too blunt.
A: ?? Well, but don’t forget. If I’m being frank, you look tired.
A’s assertion of the discourse-structuring RC is very odd.
Rejecting p When a speaker utters a problem-solving RC whose antecedent
happens to be false, the addressee can simply state this, effectively rejecting the
antecedent.
(5.38) A: If you are hungry, there is pizza in the fridge.
B: XWell, I’m not hungry.
This has led DeRose and Grandy (1999) to propose the conditional assertion
analysis for RCs – if the antecedent is false, the consequent is ‘not relevant’ and
not asserted.
But this goes wrong for discourse-structuring RCs. As has been pointed out by
Siegel (2006), the speaker is taken to be committed to the truth of the consequent
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even if the antecedent turns out to be false.3 Moreover, it is extremely difficult for
the addressee to reject the antecedent in the first place.
(5.39) A: If I may be frank, you look tired.
B: ?? Well, you may not be frank!
(5.40) A: If I am being frank, you look tired.
B: ?? Well, you are not being frank!
These differences motivate a closer look at discourse-structuring RCs, and they
invite the question: Are discourse-structuring RCs even conditionals, or are they
just ‘borrowing’ the form to express something very different? I will propose that
they can in fact be analyzed as conditionals, and that the reason that they cannot
be used with a past tense is because they are self-verifying expressions.
The reason why I propose to treat discourse-structuring RCs as conditionals
and not as something else is simple. They share the form if p, q with other types
of conditionals, even cross-linguistically. Treating them as something else would
force us to come up with a principled reason why many languages choose to ex-
press them in conditional form, but without them being conditionals. We would
then have to come up with a compositional analysis which somehow derives the
fact that despite their conditional form, they are not interpreted as conditionals.
Note that a compositional analysis of their (conditional) meaning is possible with
a Franke-style analysis along the lines proposed below.
Before proposing my analysis, I will briefly review the large and growing body
of literature on relevance conditionals. Notice that discourse-structuring RCs are
a problem for current theories of relevance conditionals because all theories treat
relevance conditionals as a homogenous class – no theory predicts that only some
should be able to co-occur with past reference (or free factive subjunctives which
we set aside for the moment). Let us consider Franke (2009)’s theory in more de-
tail. I will show that it does not predict the difference in acceptability between the
past tense problem-solving RC (30b) and the unacceptable past tense discourse-
3Interestingly, the examples discussed by DeRose and Grandy are problem-solving RCs, while
the examples discussed by Siegel are discourse-structuring RCs, but both treat the two classes as
being of the same kind.
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structuring RC (31b).
Franke argues that relevance conditionals have the same semantics as hypo-
thetical conditionals. Hypothetical conditionals can occur with past reference, as
illustrated in (41a) – (41b).
(5.41) a. If Alex takes the train at three, he will be here at five.
b. If Alex took the train at three, he got here at five.
Hence Franke predicts relevance conditionals should also be able to occur with
past reference.
German hypothetical conditionals can also occur with ‘mixed moods’, i.e., with
















































‘If he left at three, he will be here by seven.’
Franke’s theory works fine for problem-solving RCs which can occur with past
reference: since he predicts that they have the same semantics as hypothetical
conditionals, their distribution is expected to be parallel to that of hypothetical
conditionals. Analyzing them is easy: we simply choose our favourite semantics
of hypothetical conditionals and apply Franke’s steps of pragmatic reasoning to
derive the additional ‘relevance’ interpretation.
4Note that current theories of conditionals do not predict the existence of ‘mixed mood’ or
‘mixed tense’ conditionals, especially those based on some notion of agreement or sequence of
tense. Even those analyses that are explicitly interested in tense or mood in conditionals seem to
focus on ‘uniform’ mood/tense configurations, e.g. von Stechow and Grønn 2011, Schulz 2008,
2014, Ippolito 2006, 2013. An unpublished BA thesis by Carina Kauf may address some of these
problems but I have not been able to read it.
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However, since he does not assume a difference between problem-solving and
discourse-structuring RCs, Franke does not predict the unacceptability of (29) and
(31b). His theory seems to break down for discourse-structuring RCs.5
In what follows I propose how to rescue Franke’s proposal: there are two inde-
pendent reasons why discourse-structuring RCs are odd with past reference.
5.5 An analysis of discourse conditionals
A relevance conditional if p, q is a discourse-structuring RC if its antecedent can
be uttered self-referentially (in the sense of Eckardt 2012), and the entire condi-
tional is self-verifying.6 Eckardt proposes that an utterance is self-referential if the
utterance ‘denotes a proposition about the existence of a certain kind of event and,
at the same time, might be such an event’ (p.40). An utterance is self-verifying if
‘it can never fail to hold in any situation where it is uttered’ (p. 45). Consider the
example below.
(5.44) I am using a verb.
The speaker’s utterance is self-referential: it claims there is an event of the
speaker using a verb, while at the same time containing the verb use. The presence
of use causes the utterance to be an event of the speaker using a verb. Moreover,
the utterance is self-verifying – there is no way in which the speaker could utter
(44) where it fails to be true. We can model the denotation of be using as follows. I
adopt Eckardt’s formalization which makes use of Davidsonian assumptions about
5Scheffler 2008 has a similar problem since she proposes that relevance conditionals assert
their consequents (this should be unproblematic), and the entire conditional is interpreted hypo-
thetically at CI level. This is where she inherits Franke’s problem: there is nothing in the seman-
tics of hypothetical semantics that explains why discourse-structuring RCs should be unacceptable
with past reference while problem-solving ones are fine. Therefore she also does not predict the
unacceptability of (29) and (31b).
6Because the topic of self-referentiality is not central to the present text as a whole, I do not
review the literature on this topic, but instead refer readers to the references in Eckardt 2012 and
Lauer 2013.
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events (cf. Davidson 1980), and Reichenbachian assumptions about tense (cf.
Reichenbach 1966).
(5.45) λy.λx.λe. [use(x, e, y, w0) and R⊆t(e) and S⊆R]
(5.46) a. I am using a verb.
b. λy.λx.λe. [use(x, e, y), w0]
c. ∃e.[use(sp, e, verb, w0) and R⊆t(e) and S⊆R]
Eckardt suggests that if we are in a context where ε13 is a sincere utterance of
(44), it holds that
(5.47) ∃e.[use(sp, e, verb, w0) and R⊆t(e) and S⊆R] = 1 because
use(sp, ε13, verb, w0) and R⊆t(ε13) and S⊆R]) =1
Crucially, the utterance that there is an event such that the speaker uses a verb
is true because the utterance itself is such an event. Now let us consider the truth
conditions for (48).
(5.48) I am being frank.
I propose that to be frank involves a communication event in which the speaker
sends an honest message, but it is the communication event itself which counts as
frank.7
(5.49) a. frank
b. λy.λx.λm.λe. During e, x sends message m to y, and Honest(e, m).
In prose, for an utterance event to be frank, the speaker needs to send an honest
message to an addressee. (Note that being frank is not self-referential in quite the
same way as using a verb is: the speaker needs to send an additional message m.
This explains why it is odd to use (48) in a context where nothing else is said all
day.)
With these semantics for frank in place, I am being frank has the semantics given
in (50b).
7This formalization of the meaning of frank is rather crude and merits further investigation, but
this is outside the scope of the present work.
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(5.50) a. I am being frank.
b. ∃m.∃e.x sends m to y, and Honest(e, m), and R⊆t(e), and S⊆R.
The speaker is asserting that there is an ongoing communication event e during
which she honestly sends the message m to an addressee y. I follow Reichen-
bachian assumptions about aspect, assuming that the event time t(e) includes the
reference time R, and that R includes the speech time S.
Thus in a sincere utterance situation ε15 during which the speaker sends honest
message m3, (50a) is judged as true because the speaker is sending an honest mes-
sage to the addressee.
(5.51) I am being frank.
∃m.∃e. x sends m to y and Honest(e,m), and R⊆t(e) and S⊆R = 1 because
sp sends m3 to ad and Honest(ε15, m3), and R⊆t(ε15) and S⊆R =1.
Let us now consider the meaning of the relevance conditional (52).
(5.52) If I am being frank, you look tired.
For a sincere utterance ε34 of the relevance conditional (52) we assume a stan-
dard semantics of the conditional. Because the antecedent and consequent are
conditionally independent, the speaker is also understood to be committed to the
truth of the consequent. Therefore the consequent can serve as the kind of mes-
sage required for felicitous use of frank: you look tired = m5. Now we get the
following semantics for (52).
(5.53) a. If I am being frank, you look tired.
b. ∀w’∈Optg(∩f(w0)∪~I-am-being-frankw’): you-look-tired(w’)=1 be-
cause
c. ∀w’∈Optg(∩f(w0)∪(sp sends m5 to ad and Honest(ε34, m5), and R⊆t(ε34)
and S⊆R): add-looks-tired(w’)=1.
Because of conditional independence, the speaker is understood to be sending
the ‘honest’ message m5 in w0. Therefore a sincere utterance of (52) counts as
an instance in which the speaker is being frank. This means that the antecedent
is true in w0, and the speaker’s utterance of (52) is self-verifying: she is asserting
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that in all the worlds most similar to w0 where she is sending an honest message
the addressee looks tired, and at the same time making sure that the world of eval-
uation w0 is one such world.
Let us consider another example.
(5.54) If we now turn to point 5 on the agenda, here is a chart.
Again, the antecedent proposition we now turn to point 5 on the agenda is
self-referential: it is a proposition denoting the existence of a turning-to-point-5-
event while at the same time being such an event. We assume the following truth
conditions for turn to.
(5.55) turn to
λy.λx.λe. [Turn(x, e, y), and t(e)⊆R and R=S]
There is a turning event e which involves an agent x and a patient y. The
time of e is included in the reference time R which coincides with the
speech time S.
A sincere utterance ε12 of We now turn to point 5 is again self-referential.
(5.56) We now turn to point 5.
∃e. [Turn-to(sp+ad, e, point5), and t(e)⊆R and R=S] =1 because
[ Turnto(sp+ad, ε12, point5), and t(ε12)⊆R and R=S] =1
Finally, a sincere utterance ε17 of (54) is self-verifying.
(5.57) a. If we now turn to point 5 on the agenda, here is a chart.
b. ∀w’∈Optg(∩f(w0)∪~we-are-turning-to-point-5w’): I have prepared
a chart(w’)=1 because
c. ∀w’∈Optg(∩f(w0) ∪(Turnto(sp+add, ε17, point5), and t(ε17)⊆R and
S=R): sp-prepared-chart(w’)=1.
Because the actual world is one in which the interlocutors are turning to point 5,
and the actual world is one in which the speaker has prepared a chart, the worlds
closest to w0 are also such worlds – the conditional is made true by virtue of being
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uttered. This means it is self-verifying.
What goes wrong if the antecedent contains a past tense as in (58)?
(5.58) ?? If I was being frank yesterday, you looked tired.
Because of conditional independence, the addressee will again pragmatically
infer that the speaker is committed to the truth of the message m7=‘you looked
tired’. But note that this message is being sent in the current utterance situation,
not at the relevant time in the past. But the antecedent proposition makes a claim
about a frank communication event of the speaker in the past.8
(5.59) a. ??If I was being frank yesterday, you looked tired.
b. ∀w’∈Optg(∩f(w0)∪~I-was-being-frank-yesterday):
you-looked-tired(w’)=1.
c. ∀w’∈Optg(∩f(w0)∪(sp sends m to ad and Honest(e, m), and R⊆t(e)
and R<S)): Ad-looked-tired(w’)=1.
The current utterance situation ε28 and message m7 fail to make (58) true in w0:
for a reference time R1 with R1 ⊆ t(ε28), R1 ≮S. It is not guaranteed that there is a
different communication event ε2 and honest message m9 in w0 with R⊆t(ε28) and
R<S. Because this is not guaranteed, (58) is not self-verifying.
Of course we can give a compositional account of what the meaning of (58)
should be – but this meaning is so far removed from anything that world knowl-
edge tells us can be true in the actual world, it is extremely unlikely we would
ever utter it, and therefore it appears to be odd.
Note that not much is known about conditionals that ‘go wrong’. Hypothet-
ical conditionals are only acceptable if it is possible to construct some kind of
(causal) relationship between antecedent and consequent. Franke suggests that
whenever such a relationship is unavailable, the conditional receives a relevance
conditional interpretation, but this is clearly exaggerated. Even in relevance con-
ditionals, there is some kind of discourse relation between the antecedent and the
8I do not address potential interactions between self-referential/self-verifying expressions and
negation.
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consequent (I propose to call them problem-solving and discourse-structuring, but
we can give them other names). But we do observe conditionals where antecedent
and consequent do not appear to be in a relationship, causal or otherwise. Those
conditionals are very odd.
(5.60) ?? If I cook split pea soup tomorrow, Peter missed his train yesterday.
While our semantics predicts a meaning for (60), it is very hard to imagine a
context in which a speaker can reasonably utter it. ‘In all the best worlds in which
the speaker cooks pea soup tomorrow, Peter missed his train yesterday.’ Note that
even though world knowledge tells us that antecedent and consequent are most
likely conditionally independent, the (very odd) default interpretation we assign
to (60) is that of a hypothetical conditional (contra Franke): speakers try to ac-
commodate a context in which my cooking pea soup tomorrow will have caused
Peter missing his train. I propose that the oddness of (58) is of the same kind.
Note that when used non-referentially, I was being frank is a perfectly fine
antecedent for a (hypothetical) conditional.
(5.61) a. If I was being (too) frank yesterday, I apologize.
b. ∀w’∈Optg(∩f(w0)∪~I-was-being-frank-yesterdayw’): You-looked-
tired(w’)=1.
c. ∀w’∈Optg(∩f(w0)∪(sp sends m to ad in w’ and Honest(e, m), and
R⊆t(e) and R<S)): Sp-apologize(w’)=1.
(61a) receives a straightforward hypothetical conditional interpretation: in all
the best worlds in which there was a communication event in the past during which
the speaker sent an honest message, she apologizes.
Before moving on, let me briefly return to the tense configuration we left behind
in (32), repeated here as (62).
(5.62) If I am being frank (right now), you looked tired yesterday.
It now easily follows from my account why (62) is acceptable: the antecedent
contains a present tense, thus making a claim that is self-referential if it can be
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verified by the current utterance situation. Because the consequent is condition-
ally independent, it counts as an (honest) message. Thus the conditional is self-
verifying.
5.6 Present counterfactuals
In the previous section I have shown that there is a contrast in acceptability be-
tween discourse-structuring RCs and problem-solving RCs with respect to whether
they allow past reference in their antecedents: only problem-solving RCs do,
while discourse-structuring RCs do not. This is because discourse-structuring
RCs are self-verifying – whenever the present context does not allow them to self-
verify (such as when they refer to a past context), they are odd.
So far I have ignored that English often uses past tense to express counterfac-
tuality. This phenomenon has been termed ‘fake past’ in Iatridou (2000) and has
received a large amount of attention in the literature, for English as well as cross-
linguistically. There are presently two types of analyses on the market: those that
suggest the label ‘past’ actually covers a range of phenomena which mark remote-
ness (e.g. Iatridou 2000, Wiltschko and Ritter t.a.; Wiltschko t.a.) and those that
propose to derive the ‘fake’ past from a purely temporal past (e.g. Ippolito 2002,
2013, Arregui 2009).
If the analysis of discourse-structuring relevance conditionals that I have out-
lined in the previous section is correct, it allows us to pit these theories against
each other: we can show that both problem-solving and discourse-structuring rele-
vance conditionals can occur with ‘fake’ past. The following examples are present
counterfactuals.9
9Note that German does not employ a fake past, but uses the Konjunktiv in its irrealis meaning
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(5.63) If you were hungry (right now), there is pizza in the fridge.
(5.64) If I was being frank (right now), you look tired.
We observe the following. Problem-solving RCs such as (63) can occur with
a ‘fake’ past in the antecedent. Perhaps this is unsurprising, given that I have
shown in the previous section that they can also occur with a ‘real’ past tense that
conveys anteriority. We would still need to address the intuition that the past tense
morphology in (63) does not seem to express anteriority (clearly shown by the
fact that it is compatible with right now), and also explain the mismatch of fake
past in the antecedent and present tense in the consequent.
‘Mismatched’ tenses are not explained by current theories of counterfactual
conditionals.
We also observe that the discourse-structuring RC in (64) is acceptable. It
shows the same mismatched tenses as (63). Remember from the previous sec-
tion that discourse-structuring RCs cannot co-occur with past reference. Clearly
the past tense morphology in the antecedent is not interpreted as anteriority (again
shown by the presence of right now).
The data in (63) and (64) are troubling for theories of counterfactual condition-
als: theories which do not analyze fake past in terms of remoteness, but purely
temporally, will have to say something about discourse-structuring RCs which
resist temporally interpreted past tense in their antecedents, but which are accept-
able with fake past such as (64). But more generally, it is not clear how theories of
conditionals which assume that there is only one node where tense or mood can
be interpreted can deal with ‘mismatched’ conditionals like (63) and (64) where
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5.7 Conditional word order in German
As discussed in section 5.2, the literature on relevance conditionals can be divided
into two groups: some authors believe that there is no syntactic or semantic differ-
ence between relevance conditionals and hypothetical conditionals (e.g. Scheffler
2008, Franke 2009). A large number of authors, however, believe that there is
such a difference (e.g. Iatridou 1994, Siegel 2006, Ebert et al. 2014). One of these
authors’ main arguments comes from German and goes back to an observation in
Davison (1983): German allows both V1 and V2 word order in the consequent of
a conditional, and in fact it seems as if V1 word order coincides with a hypotheti-
cal conditional interpretation, whereas V2 word order coincides with a relevance
conditional interpretation. The status of the relationship between word order and
interpretation is the crucial difference between the pragmatic and the syntactic-
semantic accounts.
The syntax-based accounts propose that the word order of the consequent causes
the interpretation (while differing in the implementation). On this view a condi-
tional with V2 word order obligatorily receives a relevance interpretation – if the
context and content are such that only a hypothetical interpretation makes sense,
a V2 conditional is predicted to be odd. Likewise, a conditional with V1 word
order obligatorily receives a hypothetical interpretation, and if the context and
content are such that only a relevance interpretation makes sense, the conditional
is predicted to be odd.
This type of account also predicts that when an interlocutor encounters a con-
ditional which is in principle compatible with either a hypothetical or a relevance
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(reported: unambiguously relevance) ‘If you need me, I’ll be in my of-
fice.’
Note that the claim made by syntax-based analyses is very strong: whenever
the context strongly suggests one interpretation but the word order is the ‘wrong
one’, (i.e., when the word order signals a hypothetical conditional, but the context
calls for a relevance interpretation, or vice versa), the utterance is predicted to be
ungrammatical (not just pragmatically odd). This is empirically wrong. There
is already experimental evidence from Köpcke and Panther (1989) which shows
that speakers accept hypothetical conditionals with V2 word order, and Franke
(2009) argues that additionally, relevance conditionals can occur with V1 word
order. Consider the following minimal pair, and note that no context is needed to






































‘If you tell him about it, I’ll beat you!’
We observe that both (67) and (68) are acceptable (albeit perhaps slightly de-
graded). Moreover, they both work as threats – in particular, (68) is not interpreted
as a relevance conditional despite its V2 word order. The speaker is not commit-
ting herself to beating the addressee no matter what. She is understood to only be
committed to beating him in worlds where the antecedent is true. This is a hypo-
thetical interpretation, which syntax-based accounts argue should be unavailable.
Now consider the following examples in which only a relevance interpretation
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Both sentences receive a relevance conditional interpretation. To Franke (and
myself) they are both perfectly acceptable, but the syntax-based analyses which
discuss German claim that (70) is odd. In the experiment reported on in this sec-
tion, I set out to collect acceptability judgments on precisely how acceptable (67)
and (68) are on the one hand, and (69) and (70) on the other. I show that (70) at
least is perfectly acceptable.
It is worth mentioning that while I do not share the intuition that (68) and (70)
are ungrammatical, they are somewhat marked. Franke suggests this is due to a
‘default’ word order for each type (V1 for hypothetical conditionals and V2 for
relevance conditionals). If the context can disambiguate, the dispreferred word
order is possible. In contexts that do not disambiguate, the interpretation cor-
responding to the dispreferred word order is harder to get but not impossible.
Franke’s pragmatic account, unlike the syntactic accounts, predicts that the dis-
preferred word order is at least not ungrammatical.
Experiment design
In order to show that Franke’s (and my own) intuitions correspond to those of
naive native speakers, I conducted an acceptability judgment experiment which
asked participants to rate the acceptability of hypothetical conditionals (threats),
problem-solving RCs, and discourse-structuring RCs on a 7-point scale.10
The experiment was designed as follows: There were two experimental factors
(consequent word order with two levels: V1 and V2; and conditional type with
three levels: HC, PS and DS). Both factors were tested within-subjects; condi-
tional type was tested between-items unlike word order. Crossing these factors
resulted in six conditions, given in (71).
(5.71) a. HC V1 (hypothetical conditional with V1 word order in the conse-
quent)
10I gratefully acknowledge help with the experiment design and statistics from Thomas Weskott,
and with running the experiment from his research assistants Melanie Hoffmann and Stephan
Simon.
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b. HC V2 (hypothetical conditional with V2 word order in the conse-
quent)
c. PS V1 (problem-solving RC with V1 word order in the consequent)
d. PS V2 (problem-solving RC with V2 word order in the consequent)
e. DS V1 (discourse-structuring RC with V1 word order in the conse-
quent)
f. DS V2 (discourse-structuring RC with V2 word order in the conse-
quent)
I also added two types of fillers: sentences containing weil ‘because’, a comple-
mentizer for which both verb-final and V2 complementizers are attested, and sen-
tences containing da ‘because’ which only allows V-final complements.11 Both
types of fillers were presented with the complementizer co-occuring with verb-
final and V2 complements in order to achieve a kind of benchmarking (while da
with verb final word order should be fully acceptable, it should be unacceptable
with V2 word order). I tested the following hypotheses:
1. Hypothetical conditionals (HC) will be more acceptable with V1 word order
than with V2.
2. Problem relevance conditionals (PS) will be more acceptable with V2 word
order than with V1.
3. Discourse-structuring relevance conditionals (DS) will be more acceptable
with V2 word order than with V1.
4. The less preferred word order in all cases will still be significantly better
than benchmark fillers which are ungrammatical (da-V2).
5. The acceptability in the V1 condition is as follows: HCV1 > PSV1 > DSV1
6. The acceptability in the V2 condition is as follows: PSV2 = DSV 2 > HCV2
Two experimental lists were created by combining the conditional sentences
(12 per conditional type) with the benchmarking items (weil and da; 6 each per
11For an overview of the literature on weil-V2, cf. Antomo and Steinbach 2012, Reis 2013.
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word order condition) and some additional fillers according to a latin square de-
sign. These two lists were pseudo-randomized (items from different conditional
types should not follow each other immediately), and two further lists were cre-
ated by inverting the original order to control for possible ordering effects. 24 na-
tive speakers of German (undergraduates from Göttingen University, aged 18-23)
filled out the questionnaire; thus each cell of the design contained 6 observations
per subject, and 12 per item. The participants were asked to assess the acceptabil-
ity of each sentence on a scale ranging from 1 (completely unacceptable) to 7 (fully
acceptable).
The following is a sample item. ‘V1’ indicates that the word order in the con-
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Experiment results
The experiment results are as follows. The descriptive statistics show that par-
ticipants preferred V1 word order for hypothetical conditionals, and V2 word or-
der for problem-solving and discourse-structuring conditionals (table 5.1 lists the
mean followed by standard deviation in brackets).
V1 V2
HC 6.51 (1.21) 3.14 (1.62)
PS 5.4 (1.62) 5.93 (1.13)
DS 4.75 (1.99) 5.64 (1.35)
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics
Inferential statistics (ANOVA) show the following results:
Hypothesis 1 The acceptability of hypothetical conditionals with V1 word order
in the consequent is significantly higher than that of hypothetical conditionals with
V2 word order, both by subject (F1(1,23)=218.8, p<.001, η2G=.79) and by item
(F2(1,11)=195.2, p<.001, η2G=.89). Hypothesis 1 was confirmed.
Hypothesis 2 The acceptability of problem-solving RCs is marginally signif-
icantly higher for V2 word order than for V1 word order (F1(1,23)=6.1, p=.2,
η2G=.08; F2(1,11)=4.05, p=.7, η
2
G=.13). Hypothesis 2 was (weakly) confirmed,
but note that the effect is not significant by items.
Hypothesis 3 The acceptability of discourse-structuring RCs with V2 word or-
der is significantly higher than that of conditionals with V1 word order (F1(1,23)=
11.7, p=.02, η2G=.17; F2(1,11)=4.7, p=.053, η
2
G=.17). Hypothesis 3 was (weakly)
confirmed, with only a marginally significant effect by items.
Hypothesis 4 I present the results for comparing the lowest-rated experimental
condition (HC V2) with the ungrammatical da-V2 fillers. Again there is a signif-
icant difference (F1(1,23)=42.00, p<.001, η2G=.19). Hypothesis 4 was confirmed:
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the ungrammatical fillers have a significantly lower acceptability than the lowest-
rated conditionals. (Therefore the ungrammatical fillers are also less acceptable
than all other experimental conditions.)
Hypothesis 5 and 6 The effect sizes reported are generalized eta-squared values
(cf. Bakeman 2005). Since the designs employed here are one-factorial within-
subjects and within-items designs, generalized-eta-squared gives a conservative
approximation of partial eta-squared. This in turn is interpretable as percentage
of variance explained for one-factorial designs. Comparing the eta-squared values
for the V1 conditions, we observe HC (.79)>DS (.17)>PS (.08). For the V2 con-
ditions, we observe HC (.89)>DS (.17)>PS (.13). The hypotheses were partially
confirmed: the largest effect was observed in the HC condition, with PS and DS
being close together.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 graphically represent the results.
Figure 5.1: Experimental results
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Figure 5.2: Filler results
Discussion
I propose the following conclusions from the data. Franke proposes that there
is a preferred word order for hypothetical conditionals (V1) and for relevance
conditionals (2). This was confirmed in the data: speakers rated V1 HCs and V2
RCs higher than their counterparts with the dispreferred word order. However,
Franke also proposes that the dispreferred word order is not ungrammatical (there
is no syntactic or semantic ‘violation’). This is definitely true for (PS and DS)
relevance conditionals whose acceptability is high in both V1 and V2 conditions.
And even the dispreferred word order of hypothetical conditionals (HC V1) is
significantly higher rated than the ungrammatical da-V2 sentences.
I take this as evidence in favour of Franke’s analysis, and against analyses which
argue for a syntactic difference between hypothetical conditionals and relevance
conditionals. If V1 relevance conditionals were truly syntactically ungrammatical,
their acceptability should have been much lower. In fact, there should have been
no difference between the ungrammatical da-V2 fillers, the V2 HCs and both
kinds of V1 RCs. But this is not how speakers judge these sentences. While a
syntax-based account of relevance conditionals cannot explain why V1 relevance
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conditionals show almost no degradation, and even V2 hypothetical conditionals
are more acceptable than ‘real’ word order violations, a pragmatic account can
straightforwardly explain the data: there is a preferred word order (and thus, a
bias towards V2 RC and V1 HC), but if necessary, the dispreferred structure can
also be interpreted.
Syntax-based analyses would have to explain why V1 relevance conditionals do
not show the extreme degradation that other syntactically ill-formed complements
of German show (such as da-V2 complements).

Conclusion
In this dissertation I have set out to describe a phenomenon I have called the
free factive subjunctive, and to provide an analysis of its meaning and use that
is compositional. Thus the analysis I have proposed allows to make predictions
about what the free factive subjunctive means in simple contexts as well as for
how it interacts with other operators.
I have shown that the meaning of the free factive is quite complex; it has two
presuppositions and makes a non-at-issue contribution to the meaning of the ut-
terance it occurs in. Using a free factive subjunctive presupposes that there is a
salient decision problem, and that the prejacent proposition uniquely identifies an
action alternative (this action alternative is the one whose ‘chance for success’ is
improved the most by learning the prejacent). The non-at-issue contribution of the
free factive subjunctive is to make an existential claim about the worlds in which
the agent chooses the uniquely identified action alternative – some of these worlds
are among the optimal worlds in which the agent reaches her goal. Because the
claim is only existential, there is a tentative effect, and I have provided data show-
ing that each of these ingredients is necessary for an acceptable use of the free
factive subjunctive.
My analysis contained two important pieces: a proposal for how to model deci-
sion problems within a modal framework to ensure compositionality, and a multi-
dimensional denotation for the free factive subjunctive operator itself. I showed
that the predictions made by my proposal match our intuitions regarding the mean-
ing of simple free factive subjunctives on the one hand, and the Ffs’s interaction
with operators such as tense and negation on the other.
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In the final chapter, I briefly digressed to discuss a possibly attractive alterna-
tive analysis of the free factive subjunctive: namely being the consequent of a
relevance conditional with a hidden antecedent. I argued against such an analysis:
without making any independent assumptions about its meaning such an analysis
is not powerful enough to capture the meaning of the free factive subjunctive.
I then discussed the interaction of the Ffs’s meaning with the meaning of rele-
vance conditionals, and I introduced the notion of problem-solving and discourse-
structuring relevance conditionals. I showed that only the former can co-occur
with past reference, and I provided an analysis in terms of self-referential expres-
sions to explain this fact.
Of course the present work has raised more questions than it could answer.
Because it is the first work that provides a formal treatment of the free factive
subjunctive, there is much that is left to discover. Below I list a selection of
puzzles and briefly discuss their potential impact.
Free factive subjunctives and disjunction Free factive subjunctives can teach
us something about other constructions. For example, epistemic indefinites like ir-
gendein ‘any’ have been taken to have a similar meaning as disjunction (cf. Alonso-
Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito 2011 and references therein). But while the Ffs is
acceptable with the epistemic indefinite irgendein ‘any’, it is only acceptable with
a disjunction if the speaker is committed to the truth of both disjuncts.12
(5.75) Context: Alex, Bert and Clark are living together. Whenever Bert goes
shopping, he buys cheddar, and whenever Clark goes shopping, he buys
gouda. Alex knows that either Bert or Clark went shopping this morning,



























intended: Alex: ‘There is cheddar or Gouda in the fridge, but I don’t
know which.’


























Alex: ‘There is some cheese in the fridge, but I don’t know which
exactly.’
The epistemic indefinite irgendein is acceptable with a free factive subjunctive
as long as the speaker is committed to the fact that there is cheese in the fridge
(without forcing the speaker to be committed to more precise knowledge about
what type of cheese it is). This is surprising for analyses which assume that epis-
temic indefinites like irgendein behave like disjunctions, that e.g. irgendein Käse
‘any cheese’ has the same meaning as Gouda cheese or Emmenthal cheese or
Cheddar cheese or Münster cheese or Edam cheese or cottage cheese or . . . , and
it deserves further attention.
A unified analysis for the Konjunktiv II I have been conspicuously silent about
a potential unified analysis of the different uses of the Konjunktiv II in German:
the irrealis, reportative, and free factive uses. I cannot help but observing that the
analysis I have provided for the Ffs is hard to reconcile with any analysis of a
subjunctive expressing an irrealis or a reportative, but so are the data. A speaker
using an Ffs is fully committed to the truth of the prejacent, while a speaker using
an irrealis subjunctive (and to some extent perhaps also a reportative one) is doing
so to express something like weakened epistemic commitment to the prejacent.
Hardwiring the notion of weakened epistemic commitment into the semantics of
the Konjunktiv will make it incompatible with the Ffs use. But I showed that
alternative analyses such as the competition-based elsewhere-case are problematic
as well. That is not to say that it is impossible to provide a unified analysis, but it
will be challenging to account for the particular distribution of the Ffs in a more
general account.
The typological landscape of subjunctivity While my investigation has not
been a typological one, it was clear almost immediately that the free factive use
of the subjunctive seems to be incredibly rare if not unique, at least among Indo-
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European and Slavic languages. Perhaps this is another sign that a unified account
is not possible, but more typological work is needed in order to better understand
in which direction the search for a unified analysis of the Konjunktiv should go.
Mood in DGS (German sign language) Part of a typological investigation
should be to look at German sign language (DGS). Since – as I showed – the free
factive subjunctive occurs in written texts, speakers of DGS encounter this use
frequently. It would be interesting to learn whether DGS uses the same morphol-
ogy expressing irrealis, reportative, and Ffs uses of the subjunctive as in spoken
German – or if it employs different morphology as in other languages.
The Konjunktiv diachronically Another line of attack for learning whether the
three uses of the Konjunktiv share a common semantic core is to look at its history
(to the extent that this is possible). When is the free factive interpretation attested?
Do the data allow hypotheses about the kind of trajectory that the Konjunktiv has
taken?
The interaction between mood and modals I have carefully avoided discussing
examples containing modals, leaving this for future work. The question of whether
the meaning of ‘weakened’ modals can be derived from their ‘strong’ counter-
parts has been discussed in the literature (cf. e.g. von Fintel and Iatridou 2008,
Rubinstein 2012, 2013). German modals have distinct ‘past tense’ and ‘weak-
ened/subjunctive’ forms and are therefore interesting to study. For example, müssen
‘must’ has the past tense form musste and a weakened form müsste; dürfen ‘be al-
lowed to has durfte and dürfte, and können ‘can’ has konnte and könnte. The
question arises whether it is possible to provide a compositional semantics for the
weakened forms using the strong modal meanings plus the reportative, irrealis,
and free factive uses of the subjunctive. Consider the following examples.
(5.76) Calvin: Hobbes kann schon zählen.
‘Hobbes can count.’
Susie: Calvin sagt, Hobbes könnte schon zählen. reportative
‘Calvin says Hobbes can count.’
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(5.77) Ach, wäre Calvin doch nur letztes Jahr eingeschult worden! Dann könnte
er jetzt zählen! irrealis
‘If only Calvin had started school last year! Then he would be able to
count now!’
(5.78) Susie: Wir brauchen noch jemanden zum Zählen!
‘We need someone to count!’
Calvin: Hobbes könnte zählen. Ffs
‘Hobbes could count.’
These examples are highly suggestive of a possible compositional semantics
for müsste. However, it also raises cross-linguistic questions – languages like
English or French which also have weakened modals do not have a free factive
subjunctive. Why?
The role of tense and mood in conditionals; the syntax of conditionals I
pointed out that the interpretation of mood in conditionals is more free than pre-
viously assumed. In particular, I argued that it is possible to have configurations
where tense and mood need to be interpreted independently in the antecedent
and the consequent. Under the present analyses (based on agreement/sequence of
tense) it is not clear how these meanings would be derived.
Modelling plans and decision making More generally, the question of how we
use language to talk about desires, plans, and the decision making process has
become of interest in recent years. In the present work I have not had the time and
space needed to compare my proposal to others which are potentially addressing
some of the same concerns. By shedding some light on the free factive subjunc-
tive construction, I hope to have provided a piece to this bigger puzzle.
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